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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the interpretation of European Union law, 
both primary and secondary, is having a deconstructive effect on national family law 
and is reconstructing it via the European Union legal order. The broad impetus of this 
research stems from the assumption that the nation state has undergone significant 
change and is, in addition, now influenced by the fast-pace development of a 
supranational/transnational body of law. As a result of these twin-dynamics, what are 
termed here as peripheral family law cases are being reconceptualised by the 
European legal order. This is quite incredible considering the isolated position family 
law was forced to assume as a result of it being coupled with tradition, morals, and 
local custom in the past.  
The research conducted herein follows a genealogical approach to 
developments concerning the regulation of family relationships based on a framework 
adopted from Duncan Kennedy’s Three Globalizations thesis. It begins with an 
analysis of the globalization of Classical Legal Thought, during which family law did 
not even exist as a distinct legal field, to an evaluation of the Social where we note the 
failure of social engineering attempts in terms of breaking down the family/market 
dichotomy that had been so firmly entrenched previously. Finally, the study arrives at 
the crux of the thesis in investigating the neo-formalist langue and its influence in 
resolving the peripheral family law issues that have come before the Court of Justice of 
the European Union demonstrating how the family has been incorporated into the 
citizenship discourse which has led to its reconceptualization and lifted it outside of 
the traditional, patriarchal framework.  
What we question, however, is the change in discourse at the EU level from 
being based in market logic to a more socially inclined grammar. In this vein, the 
fundamental rights perspective is examined, particularly considering the influence of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union. Following on from this, we proceed, to investigate the effects 
of the EU Citizenship provisions and how this move, to what can arguably be 
conceived as a European identity-building project, could potentially reconceptualise 
family law in Europe.   
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Introduction 
The research conducted and set out in this thesis rests upon the following hypothesis: 
The interpretation of European Union law, both primary and secondary, is having a deconstructive 
effect on national family law and is reconstructing it via the European Union legal order. Its broad 
impetus stems from the position that the nation state has undergone significant change 
and a simultaneous shift is noted in terms of the face-pace development of a 
supranational/transnational body of law. As a result, what are termed here as 
peripheral family law cases are being reconceptualised by the European legal order. 
This is quite incredible considering that just over one hundred years ago, not even 
colonial courts were prepared to engineer local family law. 
To exemplify: in 1908, a case was heard in Singapore by the Court of Appeal 
by an English judge sitting in a colonial court – The Six Widows Case.1 A merchant 
named Choo died intestate and an issue arose concerning the distribution of his estate. 
No less than six women presented themselves before the Court claiming to be Mr. 
Choo’s widow and consequently a share in his property. The Court of Appeal was 
faced with a conundrum in that it was, on the one hand, precedent bound and 
therefore there was no avenue to legally accept polygamous marriages, and, on the 
other, there was a qualification in the settlement that English law should be applied 
only ‘as far as the religions, manners and customs’ of the inhabitants permit. The Court 
therefore was forced to balance the English conception of the family and its 
regulation, and a foreign conception that rested on the particularities of the family 
institution in Singapore. The Court placed heavy weight on the latter consideration 
and the estate was divided between five of the six wives.2 
                                                
1 In the Matter of Choo Eng Choon, Deceased (1908) 12 SSLR 120; extracted in Leong Wai Kum, Family Law 
in Singapore: Cases and Commentary on the Women's Charter and Family Law (1990), 106, 275 and summarized 
in Harding, A., “Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South East Asia”, The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 35- 53. 
2 The sixth widow was found to be a fraud. 
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I use this case by way of introduction so as to delineate the premise of this 
thesis. It clearly demonstrates the exceptionalism that characterised family law for 
such a long time and permits us to consider the current position of the family in 
relation to legal regulation. The principal question to be considered is how it has 
come to pass that the family is being considered at the supranational level whereas 
one hundred years ago courts took a non-interventionist approach to such 
relationships and left its regulation to local custom, religion and essentially self-
regulation in terms of the private dynamics within the family structure.  
In fact, through the genealogical approach used here to uncover the persistent 
peculiarities of the family, we note that the family has gone from private, self-
regulation to regulation via the state and state bodies. In some instances, we are even 
now witnessing a re-privatisation of the family sphere. 3  The unsettled picture 
concerning the regulation of the family will become apparent from Part I of this thesis 
that aims to juxtapose the family with the characteristics of Classical Legal Thought, 
The Social and finally Neo-formalism – a useful template adopted from Duncan 
Kennedy.4 The principal goal is to analyse the family against the background of 
diverse cycles of historical, economic and political changes in consideration of 
fluctuations between various legal perceptions necessarily impacting the family sphere 
and its relation to market ideologies. This analysis permits us to establish a framework 
within which the current situation concerning the adjudication of peripheral family 
law cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union can be examined. 
I) The Impetus 
The impetus underlying this thesis stems from the apparent overall consensus in 
political sciences and legal research that the nation state is undergoing a 
                                                
3 Reference here is made to recent trends concerning the mediation of family law disputes. This is not 
dealt with specifically in this thesis but it is an interesting point in terms of dispute resolution in the 
private sphere which should be borne in mind.  
4 D. Kennedy, “Three Globalizations of Legal Thought 1850-2000”, in D. Trubek, The New Law and 
Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal, (Oxford 2006).   
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transformation.5 Even though the concepts and methodological lenses differ, we note 
the trend recognizing the evolving nature of the European transnational legal order 
which provides a forum within which both citizens and private actors can avail of 
increased opportunities to participate in the changing economic and political 
environment. Within this framework, the principal focus of this research is the role of 
anti-discrimination, fundamental rights and EU Citizenship in deconstructing and 
reconstructing family law.  
To this end, the thesis embarks on an examination of the relationship between 
the family and the market in three theoretical steps, scrutinising the relationship 
between the two in terms of the legal langue6 that characterized Classical Legal 
Thought, The Social, and finally Neo-formalism. By way of brief introduction, we 
note that the first globalization of Classical Legal Thought7 was centred on legal 
formalism: the idea that law provided facilitative rules, which meant formal equality in 
terms of the parties and on the basis of procedural fairness. In other words, the rules 
of the game apply to all meaning that the outcomes, even those resulting in 
distributive inequality, are therefore also fair. It was essentially characterised by ‘law 
without politics’. The second globalization, The Social,8 on the other hand, was typified 
by a ‘law versus politics’ approach and an increase of using law to meet social ends. 
Private law in this period was overlain with an increased awareness of social 
obligations and the idea of social protection. When we come to the third globalization, 
                                                
5 We can think here about the effects of globalization on the nation state, the effects of international 
agreements and the establishment of international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, 
but more specifically for our purposes we focus attention on the influence of the European legal order 
on the individual nation states as constitutive members. See Slaughter, A.M., “Global Government 
Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy”, Harvard Law School, Public 
Law Working Paper No. 18.;  Slaughter, A.M., A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2009); 
Fischer-Lescano A., & Teubner G., “Regime-Collision: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law”, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 999 (2004); Sassen S., Territory, Authority, Rights: From 
Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton University Press, 2006). 
6 In Kennedy’s contribution, legal consciousness (a term he does not define very well), determines how 
various ‘interests’ are integrated into the legal dominant language. He argues that in order to assert a 
legal claim, this claim must be framed in the governing legal language. For example, the contemporary 
language is neo-formalism i.e. constitutional rights, resulting in, what we refer to here, as the 
development of a constitutional rights rhetoric as the language within which the parole must fit.  
7 For a more detailed discussion of Classical Legal Thought see Chapter I. 
8 The characteristics of this globalization are detailed in Chapter II. 
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Neo-formalism,9 we witness a change in legal grammar in an attempt to integrate 
‘politics through law’ via rights discourse which can be exemplified via the employment 
of proportionality, balancing, the emergence of identity rights and the use of law to 
meet a variety of ends including distributive and social functions. 
It is precisely here in terms of the langue of Neo-formalism that we can locate 
the principal hypothesis of this research. Rights, in the third globalization, cut across 
the tensions that persisted after the globalization of Classical Legal Thought and The 
Social because they have the potential to give rise to solutions considered more 
satisfactory as opposed to the purely private or the purely social solutions that were 
adopted during the earlier globalizations. For instance, take for example the potential 
of relying on one’s market rights before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
such as to undermine or reduce the scope of social regulation – recall the Sunday 
Trading debate thrashed out by jurisprudential advances made at the EU level.10 
These same rights however can simultaneously give voice to those who would 
previously not be considered during Classical Legal Thought - for instance, during the 
first globalization there was a right to personal autonomy but no recognition of 
unequal bargaining power. It is posed here that we are witnessing the progression of 
an identity-based notion of rights and a recodification of The Social into the legal 
system via arguments based on constitutional and fundamental rights. Consequently, 
political disputes are being portrayed as legal disputes in courts. 
If we parallel these developments in legal langue with the family law sphere 
and its horizontal and vertical dynamics, we are enabled to construct a framework 
within which interesting questions in relation to the effects of the three globalizations 
on the family can be examined. In fact, the genealogical approach to this research is 
motivated, as we will see in Part II, by the added value of deciphering the effects that 
different time-frames, various power struggles in terms of market-state relations and 
variable customs, traditions and approaches have had on the family. The aim is to 
decipher, such as to inform and explicate, why the principal hypothesis of this 
                                                
9 See Chapter III below. 
10 Micklitz, Hans-W. The Politics of Judicial Co-Operation in the EU: Sunday Trading, Equal Treatment and Good 
Faith (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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research could be construed as controversial given resistance on the part of national 
courts to assume the role of social engineers in terms of family regulation. In other 
words, the hypothesis i.e. that the family is being deconstructed and reconstructed by 
the European legal order - is controversial given the traditional reticence of national 
courts to submit the family to legal regulation. The geneological appraoch applied 
here assists in understanding this resistence and therefore is essential in terms of 
depicting the current understanding of the family. 
It is argued that the impenetrability of the family is largely owed to its 
exceptional position within the private law structure. This has resulted in its isolation 
and it being quarantined within local law and morals based on the perception that 
legal concepts closely connected to the conflictual, individual ethos of the market 
would corrupt and destroy the family sphere. In fact, according the some of the 
functions of the family it could reasonably be argued that the family is indeed better 
situated alongside morals, local law and tradition. Consider the argument that values 
defining the personality of an individual are nurtured within the family sphere11 and 
the evidence produced by anthropologists and sociologists12 demonstrating that the 
family is more suitable than any other social structure to balance the contrasting 
values inherent in various local communities.13 Additionally, it is settled that ethic, 
religious, and cultural values are essentially home to the private sphere of the family in 
reflection of the social system at any given historical moment.14 Considering this, the 
                                                
11 This argument is played out by D. Amram in “Homosexuality and Child Custody Through the 
Lenses of Law: Between Tradition and Fundamental Rights”, Vol 15, No. 1 Electronic Journal Of 
Comparative Law, (December 2011). 
12 Paola Ronfani, Il diritto e le nuove famiglie: una lettura sociologica di un rapporto complesso, Min. e giust., 
Rome, 2, 13-26 (2008); Maurice Godelier, Métamorphoses de la parenté, éd. Fayard (2005); Agnès Martial, 
L’anthropologie de la parenté face aux transitions familiales contemporaines: des interrogations en suspens, La 
Découverte - Travail, genre et sociétés, 158-163 (2005); Gérard Lucas, Quelques préalables à l’étude des 
parentalités homosexuelles, Revue française de psychanalyse, Vol- 67, 229-240, (2003). 
13 The topic has been first apprehended by social science. On these issues, see Douglas Laycock, 
Anthony R. Picarello Jr, and Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Emerging 
Conflicts (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). Interdisciplinary legal scholars have further 
approached the argument through the lenses of other fields: see Nicholas Kasirer, “The Dance Is One” 
in Sylvio Normand, ed., Mélanges offerts au professeur François Frenette: Études portant sur le droit patrimonial 
(Ste. Foy, Qc.: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006). 
14 Antokolskaia, Masha. “Family law and national culture. Arguing against the cultural contraints 
arguments”, in Woelki, K. Boele. Debates in Family Law around the Globe at the Dawn of the 21st century, 
Intersentia, 37-51 (2009); Celerier, Marie C. “La famille homoparentale: continuité ou rupture?”, 
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family’s isolation from the rest of the private law system, it could be argued, may be 
the most desirable situation. 
In anticipating the counter-argument that will be presented in this thesis, let us 
briefly delineate the genealogical path of the family such as to formulate the starting 
point for arguing for a more neo-formalist approach to the family. During the classical 
period, the governance of the family structure and family relationships was conducted 
in a strictly private bubble with little or no intervention from external forces aside 
from paying lip service to the social relevance of the family as an institution that in 
some way economically supported the market. The result, it was noted, was a ‘hands 
off’ approach to both the horizontal and vertical dynamics of family relations. The 
emergence of the welfare state however made some attempts to burst this bubble. To 
this end, we note the clear delineation of the public/private divide in family law 
stemming from a shift in focus from the will of actors to interdependence and the 
ensuing rise of The Social. In terms of family regulation, this is particularly evident 
from the enactment of national constitutions that were influenced by this shift in legal 
consciousness essentially creating a new legal langue resulting in the family being 
placed in an important position claiming that it deserved the utmost protection based 
on the argument that it was the fundament of good in society. That being said, aside 
from some isolated attempts to socialise the family, it remained exceptionalized in the 
sense that its progression lagged considerably when juxtaposed with the leaps and 
bounds that, for instance, the master-servant relationship made in reaction to the rise 
of The Social. It is not until the birth of the internal market, essentially catapulting the 
family into the post-national sphere, that we can note shifts in relation to the family 
and its relationship with fundamental rights, initially with anti-discrimination law 
based on the economic ethos of the market and more recently with reference to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. To 
note briefly, for instance, at the EU level anti-discrimination in its early days aimed to 
reintroduce women into the market place by providing for equal pay for men and 
                                                                                                                                      
Champ psychosomatique, n. 38, 167-170 (2005); Françoise Héritier, “Quel sens donner aux notions de 
couple et de mariage? A la lumiere de l'antropologie’, Information sociales, n. 122, 6-15 (2005). 
  
23 
women.15 Today, however, we note the extensive character of anti-discrimination law 
at the European level and its expansive reach in many directions. In relation to the 
family this has had considerable effects not only on the regulation of family 
relationships but also on contract law and labour law as can be deduced from, for 
example, Case C-104/09 Roca-Alvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA16 which dealt with 
breastfeeding leave and gender roles within the family. 
Suffice it to note that isolating the family - a real player in the market with a 
need for protection considering the increase of what we term peripheral family law 
issues and their effect on what is termed as the core – is no longer an option. The 
undercurrent of this thesis demonstrates that neither Classical Legal Thought nor The 
Social were forceful enough to consider the changing nature of the family essentially 
permitting the resistance of hierarchical structures that remained unresponsive to calls 
for equality of treatment within the family in terms of individual members and indeed 
equality of treatment in horizontal terms. 
A. The National Impetus 
In addition to the desire to flesh out the potential of the neo-formalist langue in terms 
of the family, this research also takes inspiration from the changing nature of the 
family and the catch-up position it often finds itself in at the national level. The family 
has gone though radical changes in the last one hundred years. Traditionally 
home to religion, culture, local norms and customs, there was a clear 
demarcation line between the regulation of the market on the one hand and that 
of the family on the other with family regulation lagging behind. What resulted 
was what we may term a horizontally characterised unit in that governance was 
strictly private. That being said, vertical, hierarchical tendencies within that 
                                                
15 Importantly however, this must be noted as an economic based advance, at least to some extent, on 
the preoccupations of the French that their equal pay laws would place them at a competitive 
disadvantage. 
16 The Court ruled that the right to breastfeeding leave in favour of women to the exclusion of 
employed fathers is contrary to the principle of equal treatment between male and female workers 
according to Art. 2(1), (3) and (4) and Art. 5 of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 
1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards 
access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions. 
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structure were very much at play given the role of the patriarch within family 
units. This will be dealt with in more detail in chapter one but suffice it to say 
that the self-governing, traditional family, has altered dramatically in terms of 
structure, composition and ideology essentially invoking a shift between ‘the 
family’ and ‘the rest’. 
These developments have proven difficult for national courts to resolve since, 
as we will see, the conception of the family as being based on marriage and rooted in 
local law persisted though The Social. Therefore, national courts had their hands tied 
when it came to the recognition of new family compositions, conceptions and 
ideologies. In 2006, for example, the High Court of Ireland, in the case of Mc D. v L. 
& Anor,17 found that a lesbian couple and their child, conceived via sperm donation, 
constituted a “de facto family”, opening up the possibility of expanding upon the Irish 
definition of the family, one that might concentrate on the substance of the family 
rather than its constitutional form. Shortly after this revolutionary pronouncement, 
the High Court judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court of Ireland18 which 
categorically rejected the notion that there exists an institution of a de facto family in 
Ireland, maintaining the exclusionary approach to furthering the family beyond the 
classical notion enshrined in the Irish Constitution. In fact, difficult issues such as the 
one just described are bringing to the fore more prominently the institutional choices19 
that are being made when such controversial issues present themselves as 
demonstrated by another recent case heard before the Corte Costituzionale20 in Italy. 
The case concerned the refusal of the local administration in Venice to recognise a 
same sex marriage and was referred to the Constitutional Court on the three points of 
law to be considered i.e. whether the recognition of a same sex marriage would be in 
conflict with the civil code, whether Article 3 of the Italian Constitution prohibits 
discrimination based on sexual orientation in cases of same sex marriage and also, the 
court sought guidance from the Constitutional Court regarding the gender neutral 
                                                
17 Mc D. v L. & Anor (2008) IEHC 96  
18 Mc D. v L. & Anor (2009) IESC 81 
19 Komesar, N., Law’s Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights (Cambridge University 
Press, 2001.) 
20 Corte Costituzionale, ord. 15 April 2010, n. 138 
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marriage stipulation in Article 29 of the Constitution. The case was declared 
inadmissible, citing the inappropriateness of deciding this issue in the courts and 
rather inferring that the matter is one for the discretion of Parliament. This already 
gives us some indicative response to the questions of how and why controversial issues, 
not only or necessarily this one concerning same sex families, arrive before the CJEU, 
i.e. national legal courts are not equipped with legal tools to resolve intricate issues 
that arise outside the limitations of national traditional family law.  
This being said, other shifts that have occurred within family structures and 
ideologies over time have indeed been recognised by national courts. For example, the 
procreation ideology has come into question, one that, for a considerable time within 
the realm of the traditional family, was upheld by the courts. The notion, and indeed 
for a long time the reality, that families should be composed of a married couple, the 
principle scope of which should be procreation, was reflected in Ireland right up until 
1974 when legislation was finally introduced overturning the ban on contraceptives 
after the case of McGee v. The Attorney General rendered the ban unconstitutional. 21 This 
case finally led to the recognition in Ireland that even within marital bonds, 
procreation is a choice and not a requirement of the marital relationship, emphasising 
the importance of autonomy and self-determination within relationships. The 
traditional ethos failed to accept that in society there are many couples who freely 
choose not to procreate and many couples who cannot procreate. Moreover, many 
people nowadays procreate outside the bonds of marriage22 illustrating that marriage 
is not a necessary condition for procreation and vice versa.23 This is largely due to the 
complex society we now find ourselves living in and the influence that self-
                                                
21 McGee v. The Attorney General (1974) I.R. 28.  
22 According to the 2006 census in Ireland there were 152,500 lone parent families in Ireland. See 
http://www.cso.ie/.  In fact, a recent poll conducted by the BBC in the UK demonstrates that 
marriage levels in Britain are at an all-time low. For every three weddings there are now two divorces - 
the highest rate in Europe. Moreover, cohabitation has risen 64% in a decade, with almost half of 
children now born outside of wedlock, inherently signifying a decrease of births within the bonds of 
marriage. The complete results of the poll are available online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_11_07familypoll.pdf   
23 Abrams, K. & Brooks, P. “Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental 
Procreation”, Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, Vol. 21, No. 1, (2009). 
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determination has in the private sphere. 24  Even adoption law now refutes the 
presumption that procreation goes hand in hand with marriage. In Ireland,25 for 
example, it is possible for a single person to adopt if the Adoption Board considers it 
desirable, considering the welfare of the child as its paramount condition. Indeed, 
more extensive rights regarding adoption are evidenced in the UK where adoption 
rights for homosexuals are in fact specifically legislated for.26 In Italy, adoption 
remains to a large extent reserved for married couples. However, there are exceptions 
based on the best interests of the child.27  In addition, scientific advances,28  for 
example, artificial insemination,29 have reduced procreation barriers faced by lesbian 
couples and single people.30 
B. The European Impetus 
An additional factor that has considerably influenced the family is the cross-
pollination of diverse cultures, traditions, religions and so on. From the local level to 
the global, migration has been a constant occurrence. It is defined as the movement of 
                                                
24 See Brüggemeier, G., Ciacchi  A. Colombi, & Comandé, G. (eds.) Fundamental Rights and Private Law in 
Europe Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Brüggemeier, G., Ciacchi, A. Colombi, 
& Comandé, G.  (eds.) Fundamental Rights and Private Law in Europe Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
25 In Ireland, adoption is governed by the Adoption Acts, 1952, 1964, 1974, 1976, 1988, 1991 and 
1998.  
26 See sections 49 and 144 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. For a European picture see M.B. 
Baraldi, “Different Families, Same Rights? Freedom and Justice in the EU: Implications of the Hague 
Programme for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Families and their Children”, ILGA Europe, 
(2007. 
27 Art 44 l. Law No. 184/1983 
28 In general here see J. Shapiro, “Changing Ways, New Technologies and the Devaluation of the 
Genetic Connection to Children” in Maclean, M. (ed), Family Law and Family Values, (Hart Publishing, 
2005). 
29 Waldman, E.A. “What Do We Tell the Children?”, Capital University Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2.; 
TJSL Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1020095 (2006), offering a discussion on the rights of children 
in relation to Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) that are now offering an array of ways to 
parenthood for infertile heterosexuals, gay and lesbian couples, and singletons of varying sexual 
preferences. 
30 This depends of course on whether or not national legislation provides for artificial insemination for 
same sex couples or single people. There is no Irish legislation dealing with assisted reproduction as yet. 
The Irish Medical Council’s ethical guidelines do not specify that unmarried partners or same sex 
partners are excluded from availing of fertility treatments. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act, as amended in 2008, in the UK extends clear legal rights to lesbian couples permitting fertility 
treatment and indeed granting parental rights and responsibilities. The actual moral implications of this 
will not be discussed here. For an overview see E.A. Waldman, ibid. Suffice to say that scientific 
advancements have lead to a situation in which marriage is not necessarily a precondition of 
procreation.   
  
27 
people from one place to another and has become an increasing phenomenon31 in 
Europe ever since the creation of the European Economic Community and 
subsequently the European Union which has over time rendered invisible the 
geographical boundaries of Member States resulting in the free flow of goods, services 
and, most importantly for our purposes, persons within the Union’s borders.  
However, quite obviously, when we speak of migration we cannot simply consider the 
migration of the physical self. Rather, both the mutable and immutable characteristics 
of migrants naturally migrate with the subject and this has indeed led to further 
changes in the nature of the family. Indeed, this has recently been noted by Advocate 
General Sharpston in highlighting that “when citizens move, they do so as human beings, not 
as robots. They fall in love, marry and have families”.32  Intercultural and interreligious bonds 
have been formed as a result of the fusing of these mutable and immutable 
characteristics of European migrants and immigrants. It is precisely this migration 
that brings the family under the scope of protection of the European legal order, as we 
will see from a more informative description of the hypothesis. 
II) The Hypothesis 
As mentioned, the broad impetus of this research stems from the position that the 
nation state has undergone significant change and a shift can be noted toward 
supranational/transnational law-making. In correlation to this, if we juxtapose the 
changes that have occurred in the family sphere, we note that the family, particularly 
its ‘new’ forms, has become disconnected from the nation state and has in turn been 
catapulted into the transnational sphere as a result of free movement within Europe. 
From this shift, the following hypothesis has been delineated:  
                                                
31 Indeed Eurostat estimates that approximately 3.5 million people settled in a new country of residence 
within the EU-27 in 2006. See Herm, A. (2008), “Recent Migration Trends: Citizens of EU-27 
Member States become ever more mobile while EU remains attractive to non-EU citizens”, Eurostat, 
Statistics in Focus, available online at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-
SF-08-098/EN/KS-SF-08-098-EN.PDF  
32 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 30 September 2010 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz 
Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEM) para. 128. 
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The interpretation of European Union law, both primary and secondary, is having a 
deconstructive effect on national family law and is reconstructing it via the European 
Union legal order. 
The Primary law of the European Union, particularly the Treaty provisions on free 
movement,33 anti-discrimination,34 fundamental rights,35 and citizenship 36 are very 
powerful in themselves. This - coupled with the pivotal role of the CJEU in 
developing and indeed widening the scope of these elements of primary law37 and 
giving shape to them based on the reality facing migrating families - is a potent 
influence in shaping Europe. The hypothesis of this thesis concerns the development 
of the neo-formalist langue in terms of anti-discrimination and fundamental rights. 
Additionally, this research aims to investigate European Citizenship as a force going 
                                                
33 Free movement of workers is enshrined in Article 39 of the EC Treaty. As a result of the 
Maastricht Treaty the rights of economically-active persons to free movement within the EU 
have been complemented by limited rights for non-economically-active citizens to move freely 
within the EU, under Article 20 (1) of the TFEU. Furthermore, Directive 2004/38/EC on the 
right to move and reside freely within the EU, coined ‘the Citizens Directive’, has further 
bolstered the free movement rights of EU citizens. 
34 The Treaty of Amsterdam reinforced existing provisions in the EC Treaty on preventing pay-
related discrimination between men and women which were contained in Article 141. In fact, it 
went beyond this by delineating a new role for the EU in promoting equality between men and 
women in general (Articles 2 and 3). Article 12 of the Treaty bans all discrimination on the basis 
of nationality. And, in a ground-breaking new article, Article 13, the Treaty empowers the EU 
to combat all discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, and 
sexual orientation. On the basis of this Article, the Council adopted a directive designed to 
combat discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin (Directive 2000/43/EC) and a directive 
banning discrimination in employment on the grounds mentioned in Article 13 with the 
exception of sex (Directive 2000/78/EC).  
35 Consider the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and additionally the influence 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States.  
36 Article 17 of the TEU (now Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union) states: (1) Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be 
additional to and not replace national citizenship.(2) Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights 
and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. 
37 Among some of the most interesting cases concerning non discrimination, please see Case C-
144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm; Case C-555/07 Seda Kucukdeveci v Swedex; Case C-54/07 
Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismbestrijding v Firma Feryn NV; Case C-164/07 James 
Wood v Fonds de garantie des victimes des actes de terrorisme et d’autres infractions; Case C-148/02 Carlos 
Garcia Avello v État belge; Case C-353/06 Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul v Leonhard Matthias 
Grunkin-Paul and Standesamt Stadt Niebüll; Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der 
deutschen Bühnen. See also A. Eriksson, “European Court of Justice: Broadening the Scope of 
European Non Discrimination Law”, 7, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2009. 
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beyond neo-formalism in attempts to provide for access justice38 in the construction of 
a new societal ideal. 
The visual of my hypothesis below demonstrates its simplicity: 
 
 
Families migrating within Europe’s borders are not, in many circumstances, granted 
full recognition by the host Member State’s legal system. This is evident from an 
examination of the CJEU’s case law, which reveals that an increasing number of cases 
concerning family law issues are being referred to it by national courts. I refer to these 
                                                
38 Micklitz H-W., The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2011). 
  
30 
cases as peripheral cases, in other words those perhaps not dealing with the core of 
family law as we traditionally know it, for example, inheritance, divorce, separation, 
child custody.39 Rather, these peripheral issues are issues that are coming to the fore 
as a result of free movement, for example questions concerning rights of residence, 
welfare benefits, name registration and employment rights, issues that are a direct 
result of the right to free movement granted by the Treaty.40 As we can see from the 
figure, the prohibition of discrimination, fundamental rights, and citizenship can be 
described as the external forces used to resolve the peripheral issues eventually 
reflected back into the national legal systems. 
The core of family law here refers to that regulated by the domestic law of 
Member States. When one considers the family, at least as was the case until more 
recent times, one typically imagines the traditional family based on marriage, the 
classic definition of which is provided in the case of Hyde v. Hyde41 by Lord Penzance 
as “the voluntary union of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others”. This traditional 
family is significantly protected by domestic legal systems, with particular reference 
often made to it in national constitutions. For example, in Ireland, despite the fact that 
‘the family’ is referred to in Articles 4142 and 4243 of Bunreacht na hEireann (the Irish 
Constitution),44 nowhere in these articles is the term defined.45 Through judicial 
                                                
39 This phenomenon must be considered also in light of the fact that family law is a Member 
State competence, therefore the traditional issues are generally dealt with in domestic courts, for 
example, at least until recently, divorce, separation and child custody. See also, however, The 
Brussels Regulation.  
40 Which do then fall within the competence of the EU. 
41 (1866) L.R. 1 P & D 130 at p. 133. 
42Article 41.1 reads as follows: The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental 
unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, 
antecedent and superior to all positive law. Article 41.2 The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the 
Family in its constitution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to 
the welfare of the Nation and the State. More importantly for our purposes Article 41.3.1 stipulates 
that: The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on which the Family 
is founded, and to protect it against attack. 
43Article 42.1 reads as follows: The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the 
child is the Family and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, 
according to their means, for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their 
children.  
44 The Constitution of Ireland, 1937. 
45 For a detailed discussion see, (2006) The All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution: Tenth 
Progress Report: The Family, available online at: http://www.constitution.ie/reports/10th-Report-
Family.pdf; Kiernan, K. “The Diversity Initiative – Welcoming the Diversity of Family Life in 
Ireland”, available at: www.equality.ie/indexasp?IocID=90&docID=197;  Ryan, F.W. (2004) 
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interpretation of both Articles, however, it is clear that it is the family based on 
marriage to which the Constitution refers to as the most important social unit within 
the State.46 The leading case, The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala47 clarified in no 
uncertain terms this position.48 A similar result was found in the later case of G v Án 
Bord Uchtala49 in which O’Higgins CJ stated that Article 41 “refers exclusively to the family 
founded and based on the institution of marriage”. Similar references to the family can be 
found in the Italian Constitution. Article 2950 concerning Marriage and Article 3151 
entitled the Family contain the relevant constitutional provisions regarding the 
definition of the family recognising it as a ‘natural association founded on marriage’. We can 
therefore note that national, constitutional definitions of the family in these countries 
are firmly focused on the formal ties that are created between persons by the marital 
union. This will be dealt with in Chapter II. 
This definition of the family, however, which has its roots in traditional 
ideologies and a family structure and composition which is no longer the exclusive 
one, has failed to move with the times and to a large extent has neglected to expand 
the scope of its definition in recognition of the diversity of family life in today’s 
                                                                                                                                      
“Marriage at the Boundaries of Gender: The Transsexual Dilemma Resolved?”, Irish Journal of Family 
Law; Mee, J. & Ronayne, K. (2000) report on the “Partnership Rights of Same Sex Couples”, The 
Equality Authority; Ryan, F. (2000) “Sexuality, Ideology and the Legal Construction of Family: 
Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association”, Irish Journal of Family Law 
46 The State’s pledge in Article 41.3.1. to guard “with special care the institution of marriage on which 
the family is founded” has been criticised by a leading family law scholar in Ireland, Shatter, declaring 
that the family based on marriage in Ireland “has been placed on a Constitutional pedestal” since the 
enactment of the Constitution in 1937. See Shatter, A. (1997) Shatter's Family Law, 4th ed., Butterworths, 
Dublin. 
47 The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala, (1966) IR 567.  
48 This case concerned Nicolaou who was the biological father of a non-marital child who challenged 
the constitutionality of the Adoption Act 1952 on the basis that it allowed for the adoption of his child 
without his consent. The Supreme Court rejected his case basing its decision on the fact that he had no 
constitutional rights to his child since the ‘family’ was not a family based on marriage. 
49 G v An Bord Uchtala , (1980) IR 32. 
50 Article 29 [Marriage] (1) The family is recognised by the republic as a natural association founded on 
marriage. (2) Marriage entails moral and legal equality of the spouses within legally defined limits to 
protect the unity of the family. Article 31 [Family] (1) The republic furthers family formation and the 
fulfilment of related tasks by means of economic and other provisions with special regard to large 
families. (2) The republic protects maternity, infancy, and youth; it supports and encourages institutions 
needed for this purpose. English translation of Italian Constitution available online at:  
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/it00000_.html   
51 Article 31  [Family] (1) The republic furthers family formation and the fulfilment of related tasks by 
means of economic and other provisions with special regard to large families. 
(2) The republic protects maternity, infancy, and youth; it supports and encourages institutions needed 
for this purpose. 
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societies. Radical changes have occurred concerning the nature of the family that are 
reflected in Part I which delineates the genealogical analysis.  
It is precisely this shift that motivates this research. These peripheral family 
law issues are orbiting on the periphery and are outside the reach of the core of family 
law regulation due to its confinement to the periphery of private law for ideological 
reasons. Generally, although not always as we will see, the cases have one common 
denominator i.e. the peripheral issues arise as a result of the influence of EU law. The 
free movement provisions and subsequently enacted secondary legislation necessarily 
mean that families are now migrating within Europe’s borders and therefore new 
types of cases are being considered before the Court. In fact, one might say that the 
free movement provisions have paved the way for a new generation of legal issues that 
have moved beyond the control of national states and into the supranational sphere. 
However, the CJEU, not being equipped with a body of family law to resolve these 
issues, has had to dip in to its internal market tool-box in order to resolve the 
peripheral issues. It is precisely this development that captures the essence of this 
thesis since from an examination of the case law we can delineate that anti-
discrimination, and more recently fundamental rights have provided the basis for the 
legal resolution of the cases. This recognition can be directly linked to Kennedy’s 
theoretical template and the recognition by the Court that difference requires 
management and that legal tools need to be developed at the European level so as to 
adequately accomplish this. The Court’s tendency to apply the neo-formalistic langue 
to peripheral family law issues, as we will subsequently uncover, is in fact paving the 
way for a new branch of family law aimed at the protection of its substance rather 
than its form. In short, we have witnessed the disconnection of the family from the 
nation state via the internal market and an attempt to reconnect it via the social 
aspirations – be they well founded or not – of the European legal order. The extent to 
which EU primary law i.e. free movement provisions, anti-discrimination, and 
fundamental rights affect family law is an area very much underdeveloped in legal 
research.52 Therefore, this thesis aims, in the second part, to fill this gap by delineating 
                                                
52 For an interesting discussion on the influence of fundamental rights in private law see G. 
Brüggemeier, A. Colombi Ciacchi & G Comandé (eds.) Fundamental Rights and Private Law in 
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the evolution of EU primary and secondary law concerned with a view to 
deconstructing/reconstructing family law in Europe. 
In going beyond the Third Globalization, this thesis takes a further step based 
on the analysis of the case law of the CJEU. The pronouncement of the Court, that 
“Union Citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States” is 
very telling in terms of an advancement of a new, transnational, or perhaps post-neo-
formalist approach, which is materializing at the supranational level. It expresses 
clearly the goal that the introduction of European citizenship into the primary law of 
the Union intends to meet. Our goal is to question the extent to which citizen rights 
go beyond the formal rights the Court has developed on the basis of its progression 
from a market-based approach to anti-discrimination to its interpretation of 
fundamental rights in providing for a new societal ideal. What we will see emanating 
is that the ‘rights rhetoric’ in terms of the shifting goals of the EU assumes an 
additional dimension not only when we consider individuals as the recipients of 
citizenship rights but also in consideration of the family as a unit in providing for a 
new societal ideal. 
III) Methodology 
The harmonisation of family law has been deemed a “hopeless quest”.53 One of the 
theories that has been advanced is Watson’s theory of Legal Transplants;54 however, 
this well-known theory has been critiqued on many occasions, and not only in the 
field of family law. The main criticism remains Kahn-Freund’s analysis encapsulated 
in the following extract: 
                                                                                                                                      
Europe Vol. I Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; G. Brüggemeier, A. Colombi 
Ciacchi & G Comandé (eds.) Fundamental Rights and Private Law in Europe Vol. 2 Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010; C. Mak, “Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law. A 
comparison of the impact of fundamental rights on contractual relationships in Germany, Italy 
the Netherlands and England”, Kluwer Law International, 2008; Jan M. Smits. “Private Law and 
Fundamental Rights: A Sceptical View”, in T. Barkhuysen, & S. Lindenbergh (eds.) 
Constitutionalisation of Private Law. (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2006). 9-22. Available at: 
 http://works.bepress.com/jan_smits/5;  
53  Kahn-Freund, O. “Common and Civil Law – Imaginary and Real Obstacles to 
Assimiliation”, in Cappelletti (ed), New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe, 1978.  
54 Watson, Alan. Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (University of Georgia Press, 1974). 
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...we cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are transplantable. The criteria 
answering the questions whether or how far they are, have changed since Montesquieu’s 
day, but any attempt to use the pattern of law outside the environment of its origin 
continues to entail the risk of rejection55 
Kahn-Freund continues by arguing that law is socially, and perhaps more 
importantly, politically embedded. Therefore, like a kidney ‘foreign law’ may be 
rejected by its host if it cannot be adapted to its surrounding environment. It might be 
perspicacious, therefore, to recall the ‘six wives’ case56 outlined above. The law in this 
case in effect adapted to the particulars of the society to which it was being applied.  
The English law that was in force at the time had been ‘transplanted’ but was capable 
of adapting to the needs of society and of considering the morals, traditions and 
inherent differences in the structure of the family at issue in the case as opposed to 
what the law was accustomed to i.e. the English family where polygamy was not 
recognised. In effect, the transplanted law adapted to the local law.57 
The transplant theory has been significantly debated and greatly criticised by 
other scholars. Kahn-Freund’s sentiments have already been noted. More radical 
critiques have also been advanced by Pierre Legrand that Legal Transplants are 
impossible; somewhat arrestingly, that the word Brot in German does not mean the 
same as the word pain in French.58 Another prominent scholar in this area, Gunther 
Teubner, in reference to the difficulties of legal transplants, has coined the term 'legal 
irritant' which he uses to explain the impact of legal transplants on the law of the 
receiving legal system. According to Teubner, the transfer of a legal concept from one 
system to another will have unpredictable effects: 
 
                                                
55 Kahn-Freund, O. “On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law”, Modern Law Review, Vol. 37, 
No 1, 1974 
56 See Harding A., “Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South East Asia”, The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 35- 53 
57 Ibid 
58 Legrand, P. “The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’”, 4 Maastricht Journal of European & 
Comparative Law 111, 1997. 
  
35 
When a foreign rule is imposed on a domestic culture…it is not transplanted into 
another organism, rather it works as a fundamental irritation which triggers a whole 
series of new and unexpected events… 'Legal irritations' cannot be domesticated; they are 
not transformed from something alien into something familiar, not adapted to a new 
cultural context, rather they will unleash an evolutionary dynamic in which the external 
rule's meaning will be reconstructed and the internal context will undergo fundamental 
change.59 
Another strand of opposition to legal transplants, relates to the argument that it is a 
form of colonial imposition and, as such, contrary to the principles of democratic 
governance.60 It is argued that transplants interfere substantially with the sovereignty 
of the receiving country and clashes with domestic legal concepts are inevitable. 
With the opposition laid out, in investigating anti-discrimination and 
fundamental rights and the role they play in delegating the neo-formalist grammar, 
and European citizenship as going beyond this in the direction, as argued here of a 
post-neo-formalism and identity building project, we must bear in mind that the 
relationship between the CJEU and the Member States is a reciprocal one. The 
development of both legal systems is actually dependent on one other and the 
preliminary reference procedure provides for the ‘swash and the backwash’ of legal 
issues. On this basis, I would propose a variation in terminology.  
To this end, this research is more concerned with the catalytic effects of 
European Union law on the Member States as opposed to viewing it as an imposition 
of law or as a legal transplant. This would also perhaps lessen the apprehensions of 
scholars in relation to the severity of the imposition of foreign laws on domestic legal 
systems; an assumption frequently made when one considers legal transplants. In fact, 
the notion of the catalytic effects of Union law here is based on that advanced by Lord 
Denning in 1974: 
                                                
59 Teubner, Gunther. “Legal irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends 
Up in New Divergences” (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 12. 
60 However for a discussion on colonial transplants’ absorption of local law see A. Harding, 
“Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South East Asia” The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 35-53. 
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when we come to matters with a European element, the Treaty is like an incoming tide. 
It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back.61  
I will maintain his metaphor in arguing that when an incoming tide flows into the 
estuaries it naturally carries with it sediments of rock, sand and other materials which 
inevitably get left behind as residue with the backwash of the tide. In support of this 
hypothesis, I argue that the case law emanating from the CJEU is acting as a legal 
catalyst, with the preliminary reference procedure acting as the vehicle through which 
the reconstruction of family law can occur. Moreover, the Court is in fact a court 
among courts62 in the sense that the issues that are dealt with by the Court are those 
being referred to it by the national courts. Therefore, they are issues that national 
courts request to be interpreted. As argued by M. Maduro: 
the development of EU law is at least partially a function of, or dependent upon, 
national courts and national litigants.63  
It is an interdependent relationship. When one actually considers the preliminary 
reference procedure,64 one notes that the judgments of the Court are not only binding 
on the referring Member State but also on all the other Member States.65 In other 
words, the decision of the Court in any particular case has effects reaching far beyond 
the individual case. Could this not in fact aptly be termed as a legal catalyst? One 
could visualise a consequential rippling effect – the effect perhaps being more 
concentrated for the referring Member State but nonetheless reaching the beyond its 
borders to the corners of the Union, affecting, to some extent or another, sooner or 
later, the national laws of all Member States.  
                                                
61 H.P. Bulmer Ltd v J. Bollinger SA [1974] Ch 401 at 418. 
62 See Maduro, M.P.,  “Interpreting European Law – Judicial Adjudication in a Context of 
Constitutional Pluralism”, Working Paper IE Law School, WPLS08/02, 2008. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Micklitz, H-M. The Politics of Judicial Co-operation in the EU – Sunday Trading, Equal Treatment and 
Good Faith (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
65Bertelsmann, K. “Who’s afraid of the European Court of Justice? A Guide to the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure for National Courts”, European Anti-Discrimination Law Review, Issue No. 2, 
Oct 2005. 
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On the basis of the foregoing, the thesis is divided into two parts. Part I is 
concerned with family law exceptionalism and the process of embedding the well-
entrenched family versus market dichotomy. It moves from an analysis of the classical 
family to the social family and finally sets the theoretical scene for a consideration of 
the neo-formalist langue. We note a deconstruction of the classical family as a result of 
the infiltration of market-based reasoning at the EU level. Part II proceeds to deal 
with the process of reconstructing the family via EU law in consideration of anti-
discrimination and fundamental rights. However, what emanates is the potential of 
EU citizenship not only in broadening the scope of rights available to EU citizens but 
also in terms of moving towards a new societal ideal according to which rights rhetoric 
gains an additional dimension. 
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Part One – The Family: The Unruly Teenager of 
Private Law 
The Premise 
Legal institutions and ideas have a dynamic relationship with economic activity and 
society.66 This necessarily alters the discourse of law and the way legitimate arguments 
are made in that various social contestations form the parole of the legal 
consciousness67 at any given time. The purpose of this Part is to position the family 
within legal theory in relation to economic and social variations in an attempt to 
debunk ‘Family Law Exceptionalism’68 setting the scene for an examination of The 
Social and the Neo-formalist period. This is imperative to the thesis considering that 
the underlying premise is that the internal market has provided a forum within which 
peripheral family law issues are being decided according to the internal market logic.  
This claim might indeed appear rather controversial vis-à-vis the prevailing 
view which positions the family as distinct from, and dealing with issues that, the 
market could not resolve. For instance, it provided a space for mutual dependency, 
                                                
66  Kennedy, Duncan. “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000“, in Trubek, 
David. & Santos, Alvaro (eds.) The New Law and Economic Development. A Critical Appraisal, (Cambridge, 
2006). 
67 Ibid. Kennedy uses the term legal consciousness in expressing how various ‘interests’ are integrated 
into the legal dominant language, for example, the contemporary language he talks of is neo-formalism 
i.e. constitutional rights. He connects shifts in legal discourse to changing attitudes about state/society 
relations that are subsequently reflected in new legal discourses dependent on a new dominant 
language. 
68  Halley, Janet. “What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 23, 
no. 1 (May 8, 2013), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss1/1; Halley, Janet. What Is 
Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 23, no. 2 (May 8, 2013), 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss2/1; Nicola, Fenanda G. “Family Law 
Exceptionalism in Comparaitve Law” 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 777 (2010) p. 787. 
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provided a safe haven from individualism and kept the fire of moral and spiritual life 
burning.69 In other words, the family did what the market was not equipped to do. 
When we speak of family law exceptionalism then, we are essentially making 
reference to the “special nature” that characterizes the family; the unique and 
autonomous domain that it occupies based on the intimate, private and emotional 
relationships it governs; its quest to preserve traditional, national and customary ways 
of life against the upheavals of postmodernity and globalization and its derivation 
from values other than market rationality. In more specific terms, Halley and Rittich’s 
use of the ‘exceptionalism’ language encompasses: 
“the extremely broad range of ideas and practices – legal, cultural, social, economic, 
ideological, aesthetic – that set marriage, reproduction, the family, childhood, sexuality, the 
home (the list could go on) aside from domains of life deemed to be more general, more political, 
more international, more economic (and again the list could go on indefinitely)”.70 
When embarking on any research, one must question where precisely to start? 
In considering a reconceptualization of family law, I found myself pondering the 
development of family law relations in terms of their private/horizontal dynamics and 
public/vertical dynamics in the past. For this reason, I felt it imperative to investigate 
The Classical Family and The Social Family with a view to providing a better 
understanding of the neo-formalist family.71 The purpose of this delineation is not an 
attempt to pinpoint the origins of family law but rather to uncover distinct historical 
ideas and theoretical underpinnings that influenced the development of modern 
family law. The intention is to combat the idea that the family is a constant but rather 
that it is historically contingent and rests on power relations. We are not concerned 
here with pinpointing A, i.e. the origins, but rather with gaining an understanding of 
                                                
69 Foucault, M. “Security, Territory, Population”, Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978, 203-
05 (2004) cited by J. Halley and K. Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and 
Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism p. 758. 
70 Halley, Janet. & Rittich, Kerry. “Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and 
Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 58, no. 4 
(October 1, 2010): 753–75. 
71 In line with F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals (Horace B. Samuel trans., Boni & Liverwright 1913) 
(1887) and M. Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, in The Foucault Reader 83 (Paul Rabinow ed., 
1984). 
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how A, B, and C have influenced the construction of a modern family law that is 
considered peripheral in relation to the rest of private law.  
Therefore, in Part I, Chapter I will analyse the effects of Classical Legal 
Thought and its impact on the notion of the family necessarily entailing a discussion 
of the manifold struggles legal theorists faced when attempting to decipher the 
regulation of the family. This analysis has been fruitfully informed by Janet Halley’s 
work on Family Law Exceptionalism, particularly her research culminating in “What 
is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I”,72 and Duncan Kennedy’s ‘Three Globalizations 
of Law and Legal Thought’73 in terms of the historical template followed here. The 
aim in Chapter I is to illustrate the path the distinction between the family and market 
followed. As we will see, the influence of German Legal Thought and the 
globalization of Classical Legal Thought led to a process of deduction – a process 
whereby everything that could not be equated to a contract was pushed to the 
periphery of private law. Essentially, this deductive reasoning marginalized the 
regulation of the family. 
Chapter II will continue to analyse the reaction of the Classical Family to the 
globalization of The Social that pervaded legal discourse in the aftermath of the 
decline of Classical Legal Thought. We will examine the socialization process that 
occurred in terms of the master/servant relationship noting that the same advances 
that revamped this field had little effect on the family since in actual fact, the classical 
notion of the family was the one that was constitutionalized leaving the family 
quarantined with tradition and morals in terms of legal regulation.  
Chapter III introduces the third globalization. It sets out the neo-formalist 
langue and its dissemination through the CJEU in interpreting issues with a view to 
achieving equal treatment and respect for fundamental rights. It preempts a discussion 
on EU Citizenship as a further step in the legal discourse – one that goes beyond 
                                                
72 Halley, “What Is Family Law?,” May 8, 2013. 
73 Kennedy, Duncan. “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000”, in Trubek 
David. & Santos, Alvaro (eds.) The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
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Kennedy’s neo-formalism arguably in the direction of providing for a new societal 
ideal. 
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Chapter I:  The Classical Family 
Women are marriageable in hot climates at eight, nine, and ten years of age; thus, childhood and 
marriage almost always go together there. They are old at twenty: thus reason in women is never found 
with beauty there… 
Therefore, when reason does not oppose it, it is very simple there for a man to leave his wife to take 
another and for polygamy to be introduced. 
In temperate countries, where women’s charms are better preserved, where they become marriageable 
later, and where they have children at a more advanced age, their husbands’ old age more or less 
follows their own; and, as they have more reason and knowledge there when they marry, if only because 
they have lived longer, a kind of equality between the two sexes has naturally been introduced, and 
consequently the law permitting only a single wife. 
In cold countries, the almost necessary use of strong drink establishes intemperance among the men; so 
women, who have a natural reserve in this respect because they must always defend themselves, again 
have the advantage of reason over the men74 
I) Introduction 
As is clear from the introductory quote from Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, two 
principal elements characterized the classical family: marriage being the first and its 
variable character influenced by tradition, culture, gender structures, and secondly, 
the customs underpinning the society where the act of marriage took place. 
Montesquieu’s analogy in terms of the volatility of global weather patterns rings loud 
                                                
74 Montesquieu, “The Spirit of the Laws” 264-77 (Cohler, Anne M., et al. trans., eds., Cambridge Univ 
Press 2009) (1748) cited by Nicola, Fernanda G. “Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparaitve Law” 58 
Am. J. Comp. L. 777 (2010) p. 787. 
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and clear to C21st comparativists who struggle with the study of family law given its 
deep-rooted, national-specific, moral peculiarities.75 
These constitutive elements of the classical family go a long way towards 
explaining the state of disarray of modern family law. Confusion concerning the 
relationships that are encompassed, how they are regulated, and which situations and 
structures can be classified as coming within the purview of family law permeates the 
modern debate on family law. In many instances, states and courts76 insist that the 
legal family is to be considered as that relating to the traditional family structure, that 
is, one based on the institution of marriage, the classic definition of which is provided 
in the case of Hyde v. Hyde77 by Lord Penzance as “the voluntary union of one man and one 
woman, to the exclusion of all others.” Why has this definition of the family, especially 
considering the myriad of relationship forms that are discernable in society, withstood 
variation for so long? Why, in times of increased consideration of transnational law 
making, has so much attention been paid to the harmonisation of private law in 
Europe to the exclusion of family law?78 How have we come to consider the family as 
                                                
75 In fact, it has been argued that attempts to harmonize or Europeanize family law are doomed to 
failure based on the fact that “...we cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are transplantable. The criteria 
answering the questions whether or how far they are, have changed since Montesquieu’s day, but any attempt to use the 
pattern of law outside the environment of its origin continues to entail the risk of rejection” see Kahn-Freund, O. 
“On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law”, Modern Law Review, Vol 37, No 1, 1974. That 
being said, we cannot but make reference here to the significant work of the Commission on 
European Family Law including Boele-Woelki, K., Ferrand, F., Gonzàlez Beilfuss, C., 
Jantera.Jareborg M., Lowe, N., Martiny, D., Pintens W., “Principles of European Family Law 
Regarding Divorce and Maintenance Between Former Spouses”, European Family Law Series, No. 
7, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2004; Boele-Woelki, K., Ferrand, F., Gonzàlez Beilfuss, C., 
Jantera.Jareborg, M., Lowe, N., Martiny, D., Pintens, W., “Principles of European Family Law 
Regarding Parental Responsibilities”, European Family Law Series, No. 16, Intersentia, Antwerp, 
2007. See also Antokolskaia M., “Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe – A Historical 
Perspective”, European Family Law Series, No 13, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2006; Martiny D., “Is 
Unification of Family Law Feasible or Even Desirable”, in Haartkamp, A., et al (eds), Towards a 
European Civil Code, 2004. Muller-Freienfels, W., “The Unification of Family Law”, 16 American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 1968. 
76 Reference can be made to Ireland and Italy from which much of the supporting evidence herein is 
drawn.  
77 Hyde v. Hyde (1866) L.R. 1 P & D 130 at p. 133. 
78 Lando, O., Can Europe Build Unity of Civil Law Whilst Respecting Diversity?. Europa e Diritto Privato, 
2006. In fact it has even been noted by Watson himself that peculiarities regarding any field of study 
are not homogeneous even within countries let alone across the twenty seven Member States. 
He states that “It is banal to notice that the same legal rule operates differently in two countries: it operates to 
different effect even within one”, see Watson, A., “Legal Transplants and European Private Law”, 
Belgrade, 2006. 
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distinct from the market in upholding the traditional characteristics of this societal 
structure? 
In order to examine these questions, this chapter proposes to delineate early 
family law developments beginning with Blackstone’s early pronouncements and 
subsequently traces successive developments influenced by classical theorists in order 
to inform our understanding of the well-entrenched family/market dichotomy. We 
will map the construction and development of the legal relationship between family 
members with a view to informing our understanding of early family law so as to 
construct the foundations for a debate which juxtaposes ideological, theoretical and 
practical questions concerning modern family law. 
What we will note is, as reflected in Hyde v. Hyde, that marriage as an 
institution, considering both its private and public intricacies, provided for fruitful 
discussion on the construction of legal relationships and the rights and duties that 
resulted from this act.  
We proceed to examine the concept of marriage delineating how the actual 
formation of the family came to be that based on this single act. In addition, we will 
note the difficulties early theorists faced in their attempts to understand the difference 
between domestic labour and domestic love.  Subsequently we assess the influence of 
Classical Legal Thought on the family and its place in the legal framework 
particularly considering the influential work of Friedrich Carl von Savigny.79 This 
analysis will permit us to appreciate the foundations of the family/market dichotomy 
and the origins of family law exceptionalism that have characterized much if not all 
family law advancements – or stagnation as the case may be – until recent times. With 
the theoretical, genealogical analysis set out, we will proceed to draw from early 
family case law so as to bring to the fore the repercussions of distinguishing between, 
and indeed excluding, family relationships from private law. We conclude by 
                                                
79 Friedrich, Karl von Savigny. & Holloway, William. System of the Modern Roman Law, System Des 
Heutigen Römischen Rechts.1. Band.English. (Madras: J. Higginbotham, 1867); Kennedy, Duncan M. 
“Savigny's Family/Patrimony Distinction and its Place in the Global Genealogy of Classical Legal 
Thought,” 58 American Journal of Comparative Law 811 (2011). 
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summarizing the particularities of the family during the Classical period setting the 
scene for an analysis of the influence of “The Social” and its failed attack on the 
dichotomy entrenched by Classical Legal Thought. 
II) Marriage 
The classical debate on the family focused on marriage and attempts to gauge the 
legal and social effects of this institution. Legal thinkers at the time were preoccupied 
with figuring out that what was considered deviant from contract law. Marriage 
provided no exception and classical theorists set about deciphering the nature of 
relationships that were conducted within the household sphere.  
A. The Household 
The early nineteenth century knew no notion of family law that corresponded to the 
social order prevalent at that time. Familial relationships and their regulation i.e. 
sexual relations, reproduction, and cohabitation belonged within the household 
sphere. The principal question in this field prevalent at the time was is marriage contract 
or status? In fact, a certain preoccupation with this question evolved and to some extent 
smothered the potential emergence of other theoretical considerations. In order to 
gain a fruitful understanding of the development of marriage as the crux of the debate 
we must go back to Blackstone and his efforts to disentangle the relationships 
contained within the household sphere. 
In 1765, Blackstone, in Book 1 of Commentaries80 classified the laws of marriage 
under the heading of “Rights of Persons”. He made reference to the rights and duties 
ensuing from such relationships in terms of “private oeconomical relations”. Blackstone, 
reflecting Aristotle’s use of the term, refers to the household by the term oeconomical 
which might be confusing to the modern reader.81 At that time, the term oeconomical 
                                                
80 Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England, (1765). 
81 It does not mean to refer to the spontaneous order of the modern ‘economy’ which is more 
accurately referred to as a catallaxy. In this regard, see Hayek “Competition as a Discovery Procedure” 
The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 9-23. 
  
47 
– the etymological root for the term economy - meant “of or relating to household 
management, or to the ordering of private affairs: domestic”.82 It related therefore to all activities 
that were performed within the household and all relationships that were created by 
and lived out within the household structure such as the relationship between husband 
and wife, that between parents and children, guardians and wards and masters and 
servants. The household represented something on par with semi-public spaces83 
creating “a space for both human and material production, for the making, consumption, and 
distribution of wealth and material goods”.84 Therefore, for Blackstone, laws governing these 
oeconomical relationships determined all interaction, duties, and obligations that 
arose within the social order of the household. The ramification of this construction 
was that the relationship between man and wife was considered contractual in nature 
as made clear from Book 1 Chapter 15 ‘Of Husband and Wife’ where he states: 
Our law considers marriage in no other light than as a civil contract….And, taking it in 
this civil light, the law treats it as it does all other contracts; allowing it to be good and 
valid in all cases, where the parties at the time of making it were, in the first place, 
willing to contract; secondly, able to contract; and, lastly, actually did contract, in the 
proper forms and solemnities required by law 85 
Halley rightly points to the meaning and effects of this contractual notion of marriage 
in elegantly noting that if Blackstone were to hear utterances of mid-nineteenth 
century jurists referring to “marriage as a civil contract” he would surely insist that they 
were “putting the accent and the wrong syllable”86 in that his definition of marriage as a 
civil contract was more likely meant to emphasize its civil nature that had evolved in 
the revolt against ecclesiastical law. The point that Blackstone was trying to 
accentuate was the shift from religious law to civil control of marriage. He coupled it 
                                                
82 Farrar John. & Atiyah, P.S. “The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract,” British Journal of Law and 
Society 8, no. 2 (1981): 277; Ibid. p. 8. 
83 Halley and Rittich, “Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law.“p. 756. 
84 Halley, “What Is Family Law?,” May 8, 2013. p. 8. 
85 Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England, (1765) p. 421 
86 Halley, “What Is Family Law?” Part I, p. 10. 
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with contract simply because the form of the agreement reflected those elements 
belonging to the contractual construction i.e. will, capacity, consideration.87 
Regardless of potential interpretative misunderstandings, the lucidity of this 
pronouncement “our law considers marriage in no other light than as a civil contract” made no 
room for the communal, altruist, institutional and social aspects of such relationships. 
Some intriguing examples of early family law and the results of its containment within 
the household structure can be offered here: 
Marital Privacy 
The strictly private nature of the marital relationship and the patriarchy that 
characterized relationships within this sphere is interestingly portrayed by the doctrine 
of marital privacy. Marital privacy was a direct result of the convoluted approach to 
family law resulting in it being left to its own devices meaning that patriarchy was 
allowed to take the place of state intervention in private relations. This is clearly 
exemplified by the authoritative case of McGuire v McGuire88 that additionally permits 
us to preempt the effect the globalization of Classical Legal Thought had on the 
family which carried through to the second globalization – The Social. This will be 
dealt with in more detail below in Chapter II. For now, it suffices to illustrate the 
Court ruling in this case to the effect that Lydia McGuire was unable to secure a court 
order mandating her husband to provide her with additional subsistence support as 
long as the marriage relation between them was legally intact. This case, considered as 
nothing short of a horror story for feminists and divorce law reformers,89 nicely 
illustrates the effects that the construction of marriage as a contract had on the rights 
and duties of parties to the contract – will was replaced by patriarchy which in turn 
was justified and protected by marital privacy. Once a marriage had been contracted, 
courts had no business considering the suitability of ‘necessaries’90 as these decisions 
                                                
87 We can make reference here to a man’s promise to marry in exchange for the bride’s father’s 
marriage settlement on his daughter or dowry.  
88 McGuire v McGuire ,157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953). 
89 Hartog, H. Man and Wife in America: A History (Harvard University Press, 2009). 
90 The common law generally held necessary to include food, clothing, medicine, legal services, and 
housing.  
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were the essence of the private domain. The Supreme Court concluded by pointing 
out that the living standards of a family were “a matter of concern to the household, and not 
for the Courts to determine”. In placing this in the overall legal structure, it would seem 
that the household – the semi-public space – provided a space in relation to the 
informal terms of the marital agreement created upon the formal bond of marriage. 
Marriage had moved from ecclesiastical to Blackstone’s civil contract but this shift did 
little to penetrate the strictly private nature of the rights and duties that ensued upon 
the formalization of bonds. 
Breach of Promise 
Breach of promise provides another field from which we can deduce the private 
nature of couplings. This is reflected in Court pronouncements in early nineteenth 
century breach of promise cases whereby actions for damages were open to those 
where one of the parties to an engagement wrongfully failed to implement the promise 
to marry the other.91 Damages were not only extended to cover the pecuniary losses 
suffered but also included losses incurred based on solatium or injury to feelings: “for 
the unutterable anguish the pursuer must have suffered by the violation of such a contract as this”.92 In 
fact, it was common to consider a person’s standing and reputation in the community 
and the negative consequences a broken engagement could have on the same. This 
was often referred to as “loss of market” in the sense that one’s chances of securing 
another marriage proposal would be diminished if he or she had once been rejected or 
cast aside for another. In the words of Lord Meadowbank in the case of Hogg v. Gow:  
Her heart is used; it is worn; she is less attractive to others.93 
This approach dominated and the wrong remained actionable for longer than one 
might think. It was not until 1969 that the action came under the scrutiny of the 
English Law Commission which published a Report entitled Breach of Promise of 
                                                
91 Scottish Law Commission, Scot. Law Com. No. 76, Family Law: Report on Outdated Rules in the 
Law of Husband and Wife, Laid before Parliament  by the Lord Advocate  under section 3(2) of the Law 
Commissions Act 1965, Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 11th May, 1983, 
Edinburgh. 
92 Hogg v. Gow May 27, 1812, F.C. 
93 Ibid. 
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Marriage. 94  In it the Commission made reference to the importance of stable 
marriages to society highlighting the undesirability of pushing parties to an 
engagement into formalizing their ties. It concluded: “it can hardly be thought desirable to 
retain the contractual effects of an agreement to marry”. In Ireland, it was not until 1981 that 
the Family Law Act,95 after considerations from the Law Reform Commission in its 
report entitled The Law Relating To Breach Of Promise Of Marriage 1980,96 
abolished the legal action for breach of promise to marry. 
The action for breach of promise not only illustrates the private nature of 
marriage to which Blackstone refers but it additionally here serves – via the 
recognition of non-pecuniary damages for the loss of solatium and injury to feelings – 
to preempt a change in the discourse, a recognition of the fact that there was 
something more to this institution, as was eventually pointed out by Bishop in 
consideration of Scots law to which we will come.  
Liability for Adultery 
Liability for adultery can also be mentioned here with a view to illustrating the effects 
of the household structure on family relations. This nuance conferred a legal right on 
a husband whose wife had committed adultery to recover damages from the third 
party i.e. the person with whom the adultery was committed: the paramour.97 
Interestingly, these statutory rights provided legal avenues to husbands exclusively 
since to do otherwise would essentially mean that a husband who had committed 
adultery would, in effect, have profited from his own wrong as a result of wives having 
to relinquish their legal personality upon marriage. Therefore, any damages would in 
                                                
94 Law Commission Report No. 26 Breach of Promise of Marriage 
95 The Family Law Act 1981: An act to abolish actions for criminal conversation, enticement and 
harbouring of a spouse and breach of promise of marriage, to make provision in relation to the 
property of, and gifts to and between, persons who have been engaged to be married and in relation to 
the validity of the consent of a minor spouse for the purposes of the Family Home Protection Act, 1976, 
and to provide for related matters.  
96 The Law Reform Commission, LRC 1 – 1980, First Report on Family Law concerning criminal 
conversation, enticement and harbouring of a spouse or child, loss of consortium, personal injury to a 
child, seduction of a child, matrimonial property and breach of promise of marriage. 
97 In Scotland, for instance, this was governed by Section 7 of the Conjugal Rights (Scotland) 
Amendment Act 1861. 
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any case have automatically been passed on to the husband.98 The peculiar nature of 
the family coupled with an inability to decipher it leading to a strict patriarchal regime 
meant that its governance was confined to the logic espoused by Blackstone.   
Action for Enticement 
The enforceability of the marriage was another element of the formation of personal 
bonds that persisted for some time in the form, for example in Scots law, of the action 
for enticement of a spouse 99  not based on actual adultery but rather on the 
inducement of a spouse by a third party to abandon one’s spouse. The nature of this 
scenario is reflected in actions for damages that arose as a result of such enticements. 
In the case of Duncan v Cumming100 for instance, a husband claimed damages against 
his wife’s father “on account of his instigating, and enticing and encouraging his daughter to desert 
and abandon the pursuer her husband and harbouring her in his house after she had deserted him”.101 
In a much later case from as recent as 1951, the court held, in reliance on English 
authority, that a wife was indeed entitled to damages from a woman who had enticed 
her husband to leave the family home and give up on the marriage.102 
These examples serve to highlight the patriarchal approach to the formation 
and dissolution of marital bonds that were housed within Blackstone’s household 
structure. Bearing in mind the purpose of this investigation of the classical family 
espoused in the Introduction i.e. to decipher influencing elements on modern family 
law – we begin to understand the classical, patriarchal construction that persisted long 
after the dissolution of Classical Legal Thought.  
                                                
98 Scottish Law Reform Commission No 42 Family Law Report on Liability for Adultery and 
Enticement of a Spouse pp. 2 & 3. 
99 See Scot. Law Com. No. 42: Report on Liability for Adultery and Enticement of a Spouse (1976). 
100 Duncan v Cumming 1714 5 Broun’s Supplement 104, see p. 15 ibid 
101 Ibid 
102 Mc Geever v McFarlane (1951) 67 Sh Ct Rep 48 see p. 15 and 16 ibid 
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B.  Contracts: the “web and woof of actual life”103 
During this classical period, the imperialism of contact was a construct that held 
significant theoretical and practical weight. In this regard, it permitted a construction 
of the law of contract “as including, directly or indirectly, almost all the law administered in our 
courts”.104 In essence, everything was considered in a contractual light and therefore 
reduced to elements of a transaction and, as we have noted, marriage provided no 
exception to this rule: offer and acceptance constituting the first of the constitutive 
elements and the act of marriage constituting the valuable consideration.105 The 
importance of this construct is even reflected by the weight attached to secret 
marriages as illustrated by the case of Cochrane v. Campbell.106 Here, a man had secretly 
contracted and married a woman – a contract that was heavily relied upon after the 
man’s death in the sense that his second marriage was deemed bigamous and void 
and his “widow” was in fact left penniless and her children illegitimate.  
In fact, all activities conducted within the household – the semi-public space – 
were subject to rules, based on contract, pertaining to household actors as having 
“legally determined, hierarchically arranged relations”.107 Market modernization and the onset 
of global capitalism however altered the notion of the household essentially leading to 
a reconstruction of the legal relationships once bundled in Blackstone’s law of the 
household. The private, intimate space of the home was no longer the most adequate 
legal space for, for instance, the master/servant relationship, as we will see.  
Masters and their servants were included in Blackstone’s “private oeconomical 
relationships” therefore by default they were encompassed in the law that regulated 
                                                
103 Halley, “What Is Family Law?,” May 8, 2013. p. 16 citing T. Parsons, The Law of Contracts, vii, 
(Buffalo, Willian S. Hein, 1853). 
104 T. Parsons in The Law of Contracts who grandly suggested that “The Law of Contracts, in its widest 
extent, may be regarded as including nearly all the law which regulates the relations of human life. 
Indeed, it may be looked upon as the basis of human society. All social life presumes it, and rests upon it; 
for out of contracts, express or implied, declared or understood, grow all rights, all duties, all 
obligations, and all law. Almost the whole procedure of human life implies, or, rather, is, the conflictual 
fulfilment of contracts”. (see Ibid. p. 15). 
105 Ibid. p. 15. 
106 (1753) 1 Paton’s Cases 519 (HL Scot); and see also Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811) 2M Hag. Con.54, 
(1814) 2 Hag. Con. 137n. 
107 Halley and Rittich, “Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law.“ p. 756. 
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the household. For Blackstone, there was no difference between the relationship 
between husband and wife on the one hand and master and servant on the other. 
Both relationships existed and survived within the confines of the household – the seat 
of what we might call mini-economies where private ordering and domestic affairs 
were carried out with a view to material production. It provided a space within which 
hierarchical structures dominated and rights and duties halted at the household door.  
However, with the passing of time, and as noted with the changes in relation to 
the perception of marriage, the Rights of Persons in relation to the master servant 
relationship began to react to external forces and the influence of Classical Legal 
Thought. Essentially, the law of master and servant was migrating to contract law in 
line not only with the imperialism of contact law that dominated at the time - “the 
web and woof” notion - but also as a result of marriage shifting into another social 
sphere. Conveniently, the rise of paid labour bolstered by increased commercialism, 
trade and increased tendencies towards capitalism created a space or a new legal 
destination for the law of master and servant. To exemplify, under Blackstone’s Law 
of Persons, if a master, in avoidance of dying intestate, were to bequeath his property 
to two servants then the legal foundations would be in place to transfer the property in 
the same way as if he had bequeathed the property to a surviving wife, based on the 
comparable nature of their relationship. However, as the shifts in conception 
demanded, this same scenario was in fact treated very differently in 1843 in the case 
of Chappell v Trent108 according to which: 
The relations between Mr. Chappell [the decedent] and him [Ned Trent, one of the 
claimants] were those of employer and employé, or, more strictly speaking, that of 
principal and agent, or master and servant; nothing more, nothing less. Eliza Trent [the 
other claimant], on the death if her mother, succeeded to the duties and obligations of her 
housekeeper. She did, unaided, the milking, cooking, washing, and other drudgery 
                                                
108 Chappell v. Trent, 19 S.E. 314, 338 (1893). 
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incident to housekeeping. Such were the social and domestic relations existing between 
Mr. Chappell, on the one hand, and Ned and Eliza Trent, on the other109    
The creeping influence of contract law on master servant relations chipped away at 
the notion of the household as a hierarchical private sphere regulated by the patriarch 
leading to a reconceptionalization of the rights and duties owed to the parties of 
various relationships. As the master servant relationship was pushed out of the 
household structure, the special nature of the husband wife relationship was 
recognized. This contributed to the recognition of it as more altruistic while the 
master servant relationship followed a different path.  
In light of this, coupled with the marriage as status development,110 a clear 
conceptual shift began to emerge - private to public governance entailed an 
ideological shift from individualist to communal considerations. While the rise of paid 
labour pulled the master servant relationship into the field of contract law governed 
by the will of the parties and an individualist ethos, marriage as status pulled the 
governance of husband and wife away from the household. 
Gradually, this shift took hold and marriage as forming part of the original 
contractual legal construction began to be questioned – perhaps not expressly but 
there certainly emerged a new line of thinking that laid the foundations for marriage 
as status. Evidence of this can be uncovered by Parsons’s discomfort in bundling wives 
with all other categories that were exceptionalized from the notion of capacity to 
contract such as “infants, bankrupts, insolvents, idiots, aliens, slaves, outlaws and persons 
attainted and excommunicated”.111 In fact, we can pinpoint his revelations concerning the 
treatment of wives as the first major advances of feminist thinking.112 Eventually 
Parsons openly stipulated that “that marriage is not only a contract, but much more than a 
contract” even though he failed to delineate what exactly he meant by “much more” 
and the consequences this would have on the legal construction of marriage as 
contract. That being said, the seeds were sown for a change in discourse – the 
                                                
109 See Halley, “What Is Family Law?,” May 8, 2013 p. 12. 
110 See Part C “Marriage as Status” below. 
111 Halley, “What Is Family Law?,” May 8, 2013. p. 17. 
112 Ibid.  
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recognition of the ideological divergence between domestic labour and domestic 
love113 as previously noted. 
Spring came and the seeds that had been planted germinated. The blossom 
came in the form of Joseph Story’s input to Parsons’s proclamation that marriage is 
much more than contract. Essentially he defined this “something more” in terms of 
treating marriage “as a civil institution, the most interesting and important in its nature of any 
society. Upon it the sound morals, the domestic affections, and the delicate relations and duties of 
parents and children, essentially depend”.114  What we see here is a shift from Blackstone’s 
marriage as Law of Persons, those relations bundled into the law of the household, to 
marriage being treated as an institution of society founded on contract. It should be 
recalled here that this reasoning was developing alongside the notion of contact as 
“the web and woof of actual life”. Therefore, what emerged was the notion of contact 
as the rule with marriage being its exception. In attempting to put flesh on the 
skeletal, contractual, individualist, liberal bones of marriage, Story constructed 
contract as the modal law and marriage as its exception. 
C. Marriage as Status 
A definitive break away from marriage as contract can be exemplified via an 
illustration of the Scottish case of Duntze v Levett115 – a case centered on conflict of law 
rules arising as a result of Mr. Levett leaving his wife Mrs. Duntze (a marriage 
contracted in England) and relocating to Scotland where he proceeded to commit 
adultery. On discovery of this, Mrs. Levett proceeded to sue for divorce in Scotland 
since adultery was a well-settled avenue for divorce in Scotland and one which at that 
time was not available in England. In reasoning the case, it was clear that if the 
marriage were to be considered as a contract and only a contract, then the conflict of 
                                                
113 Ibid. p. 12 commenting on the emergence of the mark of the modern legal family.  
114 Story, J. Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, in Regard to Contracts, 
Rights, and Remedies, and Especially in Regard to Marriages, Divorces, Wills, Successions and 
Judgments 200 at 168. It is important to note at this point that some years previously the very same 
Story in the case of Dartmouth College v Woodward refused to accept that marriage was a civil institution 
and rather painstakingly stuck to the ‘marriage as contract’ construction. See also Ibid. p. 12. 
115 Duntze v. Levett, Ferg. 385, 397. 
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law rules related to commercial disputes would apply and Mr. Levett would in fact 
succeed in securing jurisdiction in England based on lex loci contractus. With the avenue 
of divorce based on adultery closed in that jurisdiction, Mrs. Levett would not have 
obtained legal recourse. In avoidance of this, and ultimately “the barbarities of 
English marriage law”, Lord Robertson avoided the marriage as contract construction 
by contriving a broad distinction between marriage and contract essentially 
constructing it as a social institution connected to the well-being of the state. His 
interpretation is worth noting: 
…marriage is a contract sui generis, and differing, in some respects, from all other 
contracts, so that the rules of law which are applicable in expounding and enforcing other 
contracts may not apply to this. The contract of marriage is the most important of all 
human transactions. It is the very basis of the whole fabric of civilized society. The 
status of marriage is juris gentium, and the foundation of it, like that of all other 
contracts, rests on the consent of the parties. But it differs from other contracts in this, 
that the rights, obligations, or duties arising from it are not left entirely to be regulated by 
the agreement of the parties, but are, to a certain extent, matters of municipal regulation, 
over which the parties have no control, by any declaration of their will. It confers the 
status of legitimacy on children born in wedlock, with all the consequential rights, duties, 
and privileges, thence arising; it gives rise to the relations of consanguinity and affinity; 
in short, it pervades the whole system of civil society. Unlike other contracts it cannot, in 
general, amongst civilized nations, be dissolved by mutual consent; and it subsists in full 
force, even although one of the parties should be forever rendered incapable, as in the case 
of incurable insanity, or the like, from performing his part of the mutual contract. No 
wonder that the rights, duties, and obligations, arising from so important a contract, 
should not be left to the discretion or caprice of the contracting parties, but should be 
regulated, in many important particulars, by the laws of every civilized country.116  
A profound shift was emerging, the consequences of which bear on the whole nature 
of this thesis. Marriage was being extracted from the private contractual sphere and 
placed at the periphery; contract was being differentiated as the site of pleasure and 
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intentions - the expression of will - whereas marriage was being nominated as a civil 
institution; marriage was being depicted as fundamental to the social order so much so 
that it could not possibly be left to the discretion, caprice or the will of the parties; 
marriage, in becoming “something more than a mere contract”, became insulated 
from the emerging global market logic and essentially became attached to the national 
legal setting. Another set of seeds was sown that would eventually blossom into the 
family/market dichotomy creating a gulf set to determine the exceptional nature of 
family law for a long time to come.  
A terminological issue necessarily ensued with the recognition of marriage as 
something social but still founded on the individualist principles of contract. Indeed 
the waters remained murky to say the least in terms of defining or classifying this 
peculiar relationship: 
To term it [marriage], therefore, a contract, is as great a practical inconvenience as to 
call a certain well-known engine for propelling railroad cars “horse”, adding, “but it 
differs from other horses in several important particulars,” and then to explain the 
particulars. It would be more convenient to use at once the word locomotive117 
In fact, marriage and the increasingly curious questions that surrounded this 
wayward, peculiar institution were perceived as an embarrassment due to the 
ambiguous nature and the very fact that classical legal thinkers found themselves in 
difficulty in conjuring a definitive opinion on what this “something more” entailed. 
Finally, Joel Prentiss Bishop set out to fathom the unfathomable and in doing so 
developed marriage as status: 
The word marriage is used to signify the act of entering into the married condition, or the 
condition itself. In the latter and more frequent legal sense, it is a civil status, existing in 
one man and one woman, legally united for life for those civil and social purposes which 
are founded in the distinction of sex. Its source is the law of nature, whence it has flowed 
into the municipal laws of every civilized country, and into the general law of 
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nations…Marriage may be said to proceed from a civil contract between one man and 
one woman of the needful physical and civil capacity. While the contract remains 
executor, that is, an agreement to marry, it differs in no essential particulars from other 
civil contracts, and an action for damages for breach may be maintained on a violation 
of it. But when the contract becomes executed in what the law recognizes as a valid 
marriage, its nature as a contract is merged in the higher nature of the status. And, 
though the new relation may retain some similitudes to remind us of its origin, the 
contract does in truth no longer exist, but the parties are governed by the law of husband 
and wife118 
Marriage was therefore pitted in opposition to contract. The wheels were set in 
motion as marriage as status was settled upon and considered the accepted notion that 
was to ride the wave of Classical Legal Thought.  
III) The Family’s National Roots 
Legal turmoil prevailed before the turn of the twentieth century and calls were 
growing for a more general approach in dealing with the myriad of issues that were 
coming before the courts. The haphazard approach was feared and a search began for 
coherence. German legal thought was to be the savior based on the perception that 
“German scholarship became the most prestigious source of law…Everywhere, in the common law, in 
the civil law, and even in most western legal systems ‘the German systematic and dogmatic method and 
the concepts defined within it were spreading triumphantly’”.119 The desire for “general principles, 
elegance of analysis and exposition, and a philosophical style of analysis” and reasoning based on 
“deduction and analogy, working down from general principles” were to culminate into the 
global transplantation of Classical Legal Thought which brought with it the 
family/market dichotomy. 
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A. The Foundations of Classical Legal Thought 
Classical Legal Thought was characterized by a clear distinction between the public 
and the private; individualism; and, interpretive formalism. As we have noted, it was 
centered on the imperialism of contract law and “The Will Theory” which espoused 
that the private law rules of the “advanced” Western nation states provided a rational 
set of derivations from the notion that governments should protect the rights of legal 
persons.120 The Will Theory was premised on the notion that restraint on a person’s 
will ought only be effectuated where it was necessary for others to do the same. The 
harm principle constituted a limit in terms of direct harm caused by X injuring Y. 
The characteristics of this globalization explicate the intricacies of this theory and set 
the basis for a discussion on the position of the family in relation to it.  
Characteristics  
As mentioned, during this timeframe – from approximately 1850 until 1914121 - the 
principle objective was economic development. Paramount to this was the private 
relationships that were being developed between market actors in view of individual 
self-realization. This first globalization was centred on the idea that law should be 
rules of conduct and the distributive consequences brought about by this ‘just rules of 
conduct’ approach would be fair and efficient. The market was the best distributive 
mechanism. Law was designed to further these goals by setting down rules that 
furthered transactions, as opposed to being used as a tool to effect perceived ‘socially 
just’ outcomes. It was essentially characterised by law without politics with a view to 
realizing economic development. 
Essentially, this first globalization espoused a legal consciousness that viewed 
law as a system of spheres of autonomy. From this, the development of a private law 
of contract – and to a lesser extent tort – emanated based on the will of actors and 
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private autonomy.122 One might say that the underlying foundation of The Will 
Theory was built upon the following reasoning:  I have private law rights and I owe 
no obligations save the harm principle.  Therefore, it adopted a belief in the virtue of 
permitting individuals to pursue their interests through market transactions with 
minimal external interference. It centered on the liberty of the parties to the contract 
to freely create an agreement according to their own terms and conditions. 
This ethos was even stipulated at the Constitutional level as illustrated by The 
Contracts Clause of the US Constitution which stipulates in its Article 1 section 10 
clause 1: 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and 
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto 
Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility123 
An important distinguishing feature then revolved around the facilitative character of 
contract via the will theory as opposed to the natural, cultural and moral 
underpinnings of the family. This gave rise to a differentiation of the source of rules 
accorded to each specific field in the sense that will paved the way for infinite 
variations of contract law rules given the changing nature of the will of parties 
whereas family law rules derived from the Volksgeist - the spirit of each particular 
people/nation. This will be dealt with in more detail below. Suffice it to point out 
here by way of introducing the specifics of Classical Legal Thought and the 
family/market dichotomy that “the matter of obligations is of an arbitrary nature for at one time 
this, at another time that, act may become the contents of an obligations; the matter of the family 
relations is determined by the organic nature of men, therefore bears in itself the character of 
necessity”.124  The effects are clearly illustrated by the Savignian pattern:125 
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Family Law Contract Law 
Family Law as the Domain of Status  Contract Law as the Domain of Will 
Family Law as Universal in the Sense that 
it is Fundamental Everywhere 
Contract Law as Particular in the Sense 
that Every Contract is Unique 
Family Law as Particular in the Sense 
that Each Nation’s Family Law Expresses 
the Spirit of the People 
Contract Law as Universal in the Sense 
that it is the Same Everywhere 
 
Enforceability 
According to The Will Theory, commitments made between parties to a contract 
were enforceable before courts because the parties freely chose to be bound by the 
contractual agreement. In fact, traditional contract law espouses, “the law of contract 
gives expression to and protects the will of the parties, for the will is something inherently worthy of 
respect”.126 This principle was upheld by case law and provided the basis of economic 
transactions during the second half of the nineteenth century: 
if there is one thing more than another which public policy requires, it is that men of full 
age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty in contracting, and that 
their contracts, when entered freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and shall be 
enforced by the Courts of  Justice127 
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Therefore it is clear that private law or the law of obligations was considered as the 
legal core and it was characterized by a formalistic approach to legal reasoning. 
Positive enforceability before the courts was key. A current derogation from strict 
principles of contract law and autonomy, i.e. The Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive,128 serves here to illustrate the formalistic classical approach. The Directive 
introduces a notion of good faith when it comes to the conclusion and execution of 
consumer contracts in Europe. The goal is to prevent significant imbalances when it 
comes to the rights and obligations of consumers on the one hand and sellers and 
suppliers on the other hand. It outlines a list of examples of specific terms that may be 
regarded as unfair and are therefore considered non-binding for consumers. This 
approach therefore recognizes a situation whereby parties to contractual relationships 
do not always come to the “bargaining table” as equals and in a sense one party’s 
inability to exercise “correct autonomy” gives rise to the need for certain protective 
measures. This example not only permits us to highlight the tensions that exist 
between party autonomy and social justice – a particularity of the third globalization 
to which we will come – and the balancing act that must be performed in relation to 
freedom of contract on the one hand and concerns related to justice and fairness on 
the other129 but it also, in the scope of this chapter, permits us to reflect on the 
importance of the market-based, individualist, formalistic character of the will theory 
juxtaposed with a perceived, more recent notion of market fairness. 
Ideological Foundations 
The objectives and the scope of rules during this globalization were bolstered by the 
individualist ethos that characterized the Will Theory. The governance of 
relationships was not based on the nation-state but rather on the institution of lex 
mercatoria. With no nation state there was in fact no responsibility of the state to 
regulate or to protect its citizens which effectively enhanced the individualistic 
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character of rules during this period.130 The social aspects were in a certain sense 
ignored or simply not considered leading to the dominance of a laissez faire ideology131 
when it came to contract setting the scene for emerging modern capitalism and its 
market.132 
Contract law became a method of understanding. Everything – expressed and 
implied will – came under its scope of application. This, coupled with the rise of 
capital, constituted the driving forces that generalized contract law. It occupied the 
core position in legal systems.133  So if contract law/will was the core everything else 
was pushed to the periphery and a process of subtraction from the core began.134 
Here we can pinpoint the emergence of the family/market dichotomy since marriage 
as status was subtracted from the core and marginalized. 
B. Family Law in the Corpus Juris  
As is already clear from the above, Friedrich Carl von Savigny has been nominated as 
“the hero figure of the first globalization”.135 His writings reached far and wide136 and 
legal scholars at the time, in their desire for a systemization of law, looked to him for 
inspiration. In fact, the influence of his work left many scholars feeling indebted: 
It is nothing extravagant when I say that any praise which could be bestowed on the 
writings of Savigny and Thibout, by any man the most competent to judge, would not be 
exaggerated. They are characterized by a soundness of knowledge, clearness of 
expression, perspicuity of [argument] and subtlety and depth of thought, that seldom have 
been equaled by any writer on any subject, and cannot be surpassed137  
Savigny’s ‘system’ looked something like this: 
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138 139 
As we can see, family law for him was essentially one of the constitutive elements of 
private law but was completely segregated from what he termed potentialities law. Let 
us be clear that at this time, during the first globalization, family law as a distinct legal 
discipline did not exist. The term itself did not come into circulation until the second 
globalization, as we will see. However, the point is that the governance of the family 
although exceptionalized from the core of private law due to its status-based 
underpinnings was included in the private side of Savigny’s overall system. From this 
simple illustration, we can clearly see that the regulation of the family was in direct 
opposition with potentialities law and from this distinction all regulation was deduced.  
Why though was Savigny so steadfast in his insistence on a distinction? 
Kennedy purports that the crux lies in the different aspects of human nature that are 
addressed by the two legal fields: 
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Man is an “incomplete being”, because men need women to be complete and vice versa, 
and because men and women need children, and children need parental care, in order to 
overcome mortality and love forward in time…Family law governs the relations of 
husband and wife and parent and child (plus guardian and ward). By contrast, 
potentialities law governs the relations between independent individuals exercising their 
wills vis-à-vis one another: property deals with an individual will controlling an object 
(to the exclusion of other wills), obligations with one will controlling another140 
This provides us already with some inkling into what Savigny perceived when he 
talked of family law. It consisted of the rules that governed marriage, divorce, 
parenthood and the protection of fathers’ rights in relation to his wife and children. 
This results from his notion that man is simultaneously both complete and 
incomplete. In the former sense, we can make reference to men as individual wholes 
striving for self-sufficient existence. The latter however draws our attention to man’s 
inherent desire and even need for partnership in the race for survival. What we see 
emanating here is an expression of individualism and will on the one hand – which 
can be expressed through potentialities law – and the desire to be part of an 
organically connected group underpinning human nature on the other which could be 
expressed via familial relationships. Savigny sums up the distinction between the 
individualist nature of man and the simultaneous incompleteness of his existence as 
follows: 
We regarded [the jural relations appertaining to the family] first as completions of the 
individuality in itself incomplete. Hence their proper nature consists in the place which 
the individual obtains in these relations, in his being not merely man in general but 
specially husband, father, son, therefore in a life-form firmly determined, independent of 
the individual will, grounded in a large natural coherence. The family relations therefore 
belong especially to the jus publicum i.e. to the absolute law…Hence also each family 
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relation of a man is called especially a status of that man, that is to say, his place or his 
existence in relation to other men determined141 
As a corollary to this, Savigny distinguished between that considered necessary and 
that deemed arbitrary or merely positive. The result of this distinction in terms of the 
family and its categorization quite simply gave rise to doubt in relation to the position 
of the real legal contents of familial relationships. He purported that the underlying 
source for this reservation stemmed from the intrinsic moral and cultural roots of the 
family. He makes reference to the morality of the family as an aspect of the Volksgeist 
necessarily beckoning considerations and essentially allowing room for deliberation 
related to local customs, traditions and peculiarities that touch upon family law.142 
Standing in opposition is his potentialities law which is characterized not by customs, 
traditions or morals but rather by its facilitative nature in expressing one’s will: “The 
matter of obligations is of an arbitrary nature for at one time this, at another time that, act may become 
the contents of an obligation; the matter of the family relations is determined by the organic nature of 
men, therefore bears in itself the character of necessity”.143 
Characteristically speaking then, for Savigny family law was status based, 
universal in the sense that it exists everywhere but simultaneously it is particular since 
it expresses the spirit of each nation. It therefore differs from one nation to another. 
                                                
141 Ibid p. 818. 
142 Let us recall here attempts in Europe to harmonise private law and the many projects that have 
been initiated in this direction juxtaposed with resistance to similar attempts in the family law domain. 
See Kahn-Freund, O. “Common and Civil Law – Imaginary and Real Obstacles to Assimiliation”, in 
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Contract, on the other hand, was characterized by will. It was particular in the sense 
that every contract is unique but simultaneously universal in the sense that the guiding 
rules are the same everywhere.144 The effects of these different characteristics will only 
really be understood on examination of the globalization of these notions via the 
vehicle of colonization highlighting the other constitutive characteristic of family 
regulation adumbrated via Montesquieu in the Introduction: the local nature of family 
regulation. 
C. Colonization 
Until now, we have seen that everything that could not fit within the “web and woof” 
contractual structure burdened the majority of legal thinkers during this time. 
Marriage as contract eventually evolved into marriage as status and Savigny firmly 
placed it in opposition to contract law. The globalization of Classical Legal Thought 
was to take place on the back of contract governing the individualism of liberalism 
whereas status was to provide shelter for particularized, increasingly deviant persons 
who could not be trusted with will-saturated freedom.145 The effects of this become 
strikingly clear when one examines the principal vehicle of this globalization: 
colonialism. 
The rise of the global market, the commercialization of trade, the imperialism of 
contract law, and the fact that it was guided by individualistic principles related to the 
exercise of one’s will meant that it was relatively easily received by the colonized 
countries. The family - or better, issues related to contract’s opposite now clearly 
encompassing status, traditions, customs, the will of the state as opposed to private 
actors and generally everything considered in opposition to the private will – was 
considered the “unruly teenager” that naturally resisted the imposition of global 
forces. In fact, it was so boisterous that global forces seemed comfortable with its 
excpetionalization. The practical outcome of this was a non-interventionist role based 
on the argument that the family as a unit would be “corrupted or destroyed by judicial 
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intervention” and that “legal tools closely associated with the conflictual individualist ethos of market 
law” were inappropriate.146 I have yet failed to find a more intriguing example 
illustrating the family/market dichotomy that was emerging than the ‘Six Widows 
Case’147 already delineated in the Introduction. To recall, the case concerned a 
wealthy merchant named Choo who died intestate leading to legal proceedings 
concerning the distribution of his estate. Bizarrely, at least for the English Court of 
Appeal judges, no less than six women presented themselves claiming to be the wives 
of Mr. Choo and consequently a share in his estate. The crux of the case therefore 
balanced on which law was to be applied – global i.e. the imposition of colonial law, 
or local? The judges were provided with some guidance on this issue in the form of 
King George IV’s Charter that stipulated that issues should be decided according to 
‘justice and right’. This had already been confirmed by another English judge in1856 
to mean: 
[not] that vague thing called natural equity, or the law of nature…but the justice and 
right of which the sovereign [is] the source or dispenser…a direction in an English 
Charter to decide according to justice and right…is plainly a direction to decide 
according to the law of England148 
With this direction in place, it would, on first sight at least, seem that this colonial 
court would decide in one way and one way only given that the law of England did 
not provide for polygamous marriages and therefore the doctrine of precedent would 
support a negative finding for all but one of the wives. However paradoxical it may 
seem, the Straits Settlement additionally required not only that English statute law 
should be interpreted according to the condition and wants of the inhabitants but also 
that English law be applied only ‘as far as the religions, manners, and customs of the 
                                                
146 It is interesting to note already at this stage in the analysis of Kennedy’s theory that today, at 
the supranational European level, the CJEU is doing precisely this in resolving the ‘new’ types 
of family law issues that are increasingly coming before it. Anti-discrimination is a very 
instrumental tool that has been extensively developed by the case law of the CJEU but that 
emanates from primary community law establishing the internal market. 
147 In the Matter of Choo Eng Choon, Deceased (1908) 12 SSLR 120; extracted in Leong Wai Kum, Family 
Law in Singapore: Cases and Commentary on the Women's Charter and Family Law (1990), 106, 275 and 
summarized in Harding, A., “Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South East Asia” 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 35- 53. 
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inhabitants admit’ effectively meaning that the English law in place at the time had to 
be read in light of Chinese marriage customs and traditions. The court reasoned 
around this conundrum considering “reams of evidence…and gritting its teeth”149 
held that five of the six litigants – the sixth was found to be a fraud - could be legally 
considered Mr. Choo’s wives and consequently obtained an equal share in his estate.  
If this had of been a commercial law case would the judges have faced the 
same difficulties? Would the judges have given much credence to local law when it 
came to interpreting a contract? I think not. A likely interpretation would have been 
one based on a strict application of the will theory and freedom of contract principles. 
Why then did this case present such difficulties? The answer can only lie in what has 
been outlined thus far in deciphering the family/market dichotomy. The family was 
different: it was social; it was an institution; it was moral; it was religious; it was 
traditional; it was local; it was “something more”. Not even colonial courts were 
prepared to apply what were considered to be ill-fitting, interventionist market-based 
tools to resolve such disputes in disregard of local law. The family was deviant - the 
unruly child of private law – and so was therefore left to develop in parallel all the 
while conscious of the dividing line that segregated it from the market. 
D. A Synopsis  
Before further delineating how this period of legal thinking actually affected the 
family, its structure, the relationships it encompassed, its governance and so on, it 
might be useful at this point to summarize the actual position of it in comparison to 
other legal fields and also in terms of the significant ideological shifts it had 
experienced. 
The figure below illustrates the shifts that took place that informed the 
regulation of the family. Essentially, the regulation of marriage was extracted from the 
core of private law to which it had been authoritatively attached according to 
Blackstone; upon extraction, it shifted to a status-based notion that held on to its 
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private law underpinnings but simultaneously assumed a social function; the fact that 
it resisted the globalization of the will theory and private law as the legal core 
necessarily meant that it became localized and was therefore deviant in consideration 
of the broader picture. It was pushed to the periphery of private law. 
 
 
Essentially, this development lead to a paradoxical situation: the regulation of family 
law was not considered a core function of private law, although an umbilical cord 
remained which tied it to private law via the marriage contract. How did this affect 
the internal and indeed external dynamics of family regulation then in terms of its 
initial isolation and subsequent regulation? Part IV aims to give an overarching 
answer to this question by examining in real terms the family/market dichotomy and 
the role of the state. 
 IV) The Classical Family 
The premise of this thesis stems from the fact that in recent times we have witnessed 
an unparalleled upheaval in what we now term ‘family law’. The areas of marriage 
and divorce have altered dramatically as have the intricate nature of parent child 
relationships, family support obligations, property and inheritance. In addition, other 
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fields of law not traditionally considered as constitutive elements have infiltrated the 
family sphere peppering the substantive family law regimes in place at the local level 
with, for instance, welfare regimes, labour law, social security and taxation, here 
referred to as peripheral family law issues. These shifts concerning substantive family 
law and the deconstruction/reconstruction processes concerned can only become 
clear subsequent to an analysis of the path the governance of familial relations has 
taken bearing in mind that the borders that once defined family relationships – both 
in their internal and external capacity - have dramatically shifted. This part aims to 
outline the effects the ‘original borders’ had on the governance of the family. 
What we will surely note from the following analysis is that we, in 
consideration of today’s family, have witnessed a progressive retreat from the official 
regulation of family formation, dissolution and daily family life with more attention 
being focused on the economic functions of diverse family structures and how they are 
regulated at the hands of modern administrative states. The state-family relationship 
has altered dramatically. This is profoundly investigated in Part II of this thesis. For 
now, let us draw from the genealogical analysis conducted here with a view to 
constructing the framework within which the modern family and new regulatory 
patterns can be discerned. 
A. Public/Private Divide 
We have already noted that the impetus for the shift from marriage as contract to 
marriage as status was the social role attached to the institution of marriage. This lead 
to a protectionist stance against foreign input when it came to regulating the family. 
Take for instance the opposition that the draft Civil Code 1888 met in Japan 
subsequent to the development of family law principles that were based on the 
Napoleonic Code 150  based on concerns that the rights espoused therein were 
incompatible with the Japanese iye system.151 The family/market dichotomy therefore 
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led to a nationalist centered regulation that still largely characterizes family law today 
especially evident when one considers efforts to harmonize private law in the 
European Union, for instance. We can also make reference here to the above-
mentioned Six Widows case152 that highlights reluctance in relation to the imposition 
of foreign law on family situations compared to other fields of law connected to 
commercial transactions. From the social perspective, “the family and the home were seen as 
safe repositories for the virtues and emotions that people believed were being banished from the world of 
commerce and industry”.153 
The social aim for the family sphere then was not to further the market but to 
instill morality and retain a certain level of national custom and tradition in society. It 
was an institution upon which high expectations were thrust which all centered on the 
“something more than contract” underlying assumption. Something more than 
contract it was, but structurally, the act of marriage was highly important to the 
institution. Therefore, the social function of the family sphere demanded that the 
family be founded on marriage and governed by the morality of altruism. 
The rights and obligations established by the morality of altruism that 
underpinned family law may seem far from what we know today but are informative 
in terms of the residual effects of the family market dichotomy. John Locke, already in 
his ‘Social Contract’, in an attempt to determine the true origin, extent and end of 
civil government154 outlined that as a result of the marriage contract, parents had a 
duty to care for children, that children should be subject to their parents’ will until 
they were capable of fending for themselves, that the objective of parental domination 
was to render children “most useful to themselves and others” and that fathers should 
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Law in Singapore: Cases and Commentary on the Women's Charter and Family Law (1990), 106, 275 and 
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be considered the final arbiter of all marital discrepancies.155 From this we can 
decipher the dual function of the family in terms of its internal private governance and 
its role in terms of society and the functioning of the market. Let us examine these 
functions in turn. 
B. The Family and the Social Dynamic 
Imagine, if you will, Savigny’s systematization from a different angle based on the 
premise that “in families are embraced the germs of the state and the completely formed state has 
families, not individuals for its constituent parts”.156 Or, to put it another way, families, 
during this time frame, were considered constitutive elements of the state - there to 
carry out the will of the state in disregard of the will of individual actors. Families, or 
households – the semi-public space functioning in the production wheel – paved the 
way for an expression of individual will – usually only by male members – which fed 
the private law sphere. The system was such that the horizontal, internal family 
relationships, as we will see below, were left to self-governance i.e. strictly private, so 
long as the social family cog was in good functioning order. It provided a dual 
function: to house that for which contract law was inappropriate or inadequate and to 
facilitate the free market. Let us take some concrete examples. 
Institutional support of the free market 
Recent research conducted at the University of Durham157 reveals very telling quotes 
from so-called “improvement pamphlets” that were distributed in early C19th 
Ireland. One such pamphlet from 1811 narrates the story of two female friends. Rose 
warns her friend Nancy that: 
                                                
155 This will be dealt with in more detail below.  
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must not every poor man’s wife work in and out of doors, and do all she can to help her 
husband? And do you think you can afford tea, on thirteen pence a day? Put that out of 
your head entirely, Nancy; give up the tea for good and for all 
In another pamphlet, Lady Seraphine, the improving landowner, comments on the 
absence of tea cups in the kitchen of a peasant cabin, to which the woman of the 
house replies: 
We were never used to tea, and would not choose that our little girl should get a notion of 
any such thing. The hankering after a drop of tea keeps many poor all their lives, so I 
would not have any things in the cabin which would put us in mind of it 
So, tea drinking by women was stifling economic growth. Women who partook in 
such an act were not only wasting their time and money but were being distracted 
from their duty to care for their hard working husbands! Who would have thought 
that the practice of tea drinking in early C19th Ireland would reveal so much about 
internal family dynamics on the one hand and the family’s interaction with social 
structures on the other.  
The principal notion to derive from these passages is the male-breadwinner 
family model which emanated at a time when it was believed that men were to bring 
home the bread as it were and women were to provide the care giving function.158 
This not only gives us some indications concerning the patriarchal system of 
governance within the family but it also allows us to note the importance of the 
household and its ‘proper’ function in supporting the market. This traditional 
conservative model reinforced the supremacy of men and the subordination of women 
in family and social structures. It rendered the division of labor heavily gendered and 
cultivated a societal ideal that it was inappropriate for women to join the workforce 
and that men should be the primary breadwinners for their wives and children. 
Indeed, this is the premise upon which most research was conducted until more 
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modern times.159 According to this model, the patriarch was charged with providing 
for the family in economic terms whereas unpaid work was charged to the 
wife/mothers. This normative basis underscored policy making and even fostered an 
internalization of this patriarchal structure as an ideal to be strived for.160 This 
patriarchal basis and male breadwinner model was in fact supported by both private 
law and public policy. To exemplify, we can make reference here to the marriage ban 
that persisted in Ireland until the 1970s that stipulated that employed women upon 
marriage were banned from holding public office positions based on the premise that 
their place after marriage was the household and their function had shifted to a care-
giving one. The effects of patriarchy will be dealt with more extensively below. Here 
though, we should note the importance of the family in terms of the market in the 
sense that the market was supported by male-breadwinners in the realm of contract 
law who were in turn supported by their female counterparts – their spouses. 
Therefore, based on the formation of formal ties of marriages, the wheels were set in 
motion so that the market could be fed with integral actors without which it could not 
function.  
Procreation  
With focus largely on the development of a free market and no social welfare 
structures in place during this time, caring for the aged was an issue that preoccupied 
the minds of many. In consideration of this, in addition to low infant survival rates, 
families tended to focus on significant scale procreation as one of the main objectives 
to be pursued post-matrimony and families tended to be large so as to increase the 
opportunity of one child at least being able and willing to take care of the elderly. 
Children were automatically assigned this responsibility by virtue of being born – it 
was a kind of pay back system, a moral duty owed by children to their parents in 
payment for the care and support that was given to them in the early years of their 
lives. This notion was indeed reflected in Ireland up until 1974 when legislation was 
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finally introduced overturning the ban on contraceptives,161 introduced as a result of 
McGee v. The Attorney General. This case finally lead to the recognition in Ireland that 
even within marital bonds, procreation is a choice and not a requirement of the 
marital relationship, emphasising the importance of autonomy and self-determination 
regarding procreation. 
Not only this but also, the family was supposed to be self-sufficient in the sense 
that not only was food cooked within the household it was grown there, not only was 
cloth woven there but the thread was also spun there.162 In order for this semi-
economic structure to work efficiently, actors were required and this mind-set 
contributed to procreation being one of the principal objectives.  
This serves to illustrate the importance of the household structure in terms of 
assuming the functions that the market was not equipped for. 
C. The Family and the Private Dynamic  
As we have noted above, the private nature of the family dominated the approach to 
its regulation during the first globalization owing to the lip-service attitude of public 
intervention mainly focused on the institutionalization of marriage. In practice, this 
led to a patriarchal approach to the governance of family matters and the rights and 
duties to be fulfilled within the marital structure. This is clearly reflected in the myriad 
of examples illustrated below reflecting the horizontal dynamics within the family. 
Patriarchy 
As we have seen, it was thought that tea drinking was not only a concern in terms of 
its negative effects on the internal economics of the household but that it could even 
be seen as an express form of revolutionary feminism. In fact, as we mentioned above, 
Parson’s discomfort in bundling wives with all other contract law deviants has been 
suggested as one of the first major advances in feminist thinking. The feminist attack 
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will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter II. Here, I use the delinquency of tea 
drinking to illustrate gender imbalances within the family structure as a result of and 
indeed fortifying the patriarchal system to which internal family relationships were 
subjected. 
The ‘early modern’ system of family law, as described by Kennedy in 
reference to Blackstone, dictated that patriarchy in the family was equivalent to ‘will’ 
in contract in that “the patriarch was legally obliged to support his wife and children, entitled to 
their obedience, which he could enforce through moderate physical punishment, had arbitrary power 
with respect to many aspects of their welfare and property and was protected against sexual and 
economic interference by third parties”.163 Will governed contracts whereas patriarchy (the 
will of the husband) and the natural obligations that came with the natural desire of 
men to complete themselves regulated the family. This system gave rise to a number 
of particularities that exemplify the private nature of the family even though it had 
been pushed to the periphery of the private law core. Take for instance former Article 
213 of the French Civil Code of 1804 concerning the duty of obedience. It read: 
The wife is obliged to live with her husband, and to follow him wherever he judges 
appropriate to reside164 
The duties of protection and obedience remained until 1938 and even until 1970 the 
Code stipulated that the husband was the head of the family which meant that until 
1965 a wife in France had to seek her husband’s permission to work outside the home 
and until 1985 the husband retained the right to manage the couple’s communal 
property.165 A similar situation can be noted in Ireland where, as we have already 
noted, women, until the late nineteenth century had no legal rights to hold property in 
their own name independent from husbands. 
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This patriarchal system established as the norm was further reflected in and in 
fact characterized much of the little regulation that existed at the time. 
Domestic Violence  
The very private nature of relationships that existed within the household structure 
meant that domestic violence was frequent and no laws were in existence that 
protected women from it. As Kennedy points out, the male was entitled to obedience 
as the patriarch which could be enforced through physical punishment. This is 
reflected in early Irish Brehon law, for example, in that a husband was legally 
permitted to hit his wife to “correct” her.166 In fact, in Ireland, until the 1970s, a 
women who was hospitalized after being beaten by her husband faced a choice of 
either returning home to her abuser or becoming homeless since there were no legal 
tools in place to order abusive spouses to stay away from the family home, leaving 
many women little choice but to seek refuge elsewhere or simply to endure the violent 
nature of their relationships.167 
Coverture 
The system of coverture ensured that a woman’s legal rights were subsumed by her 
husband upon marriage. Therefore, women, upon marriage lost their self-
determination and a husband was assumed to have the right to have sexual 
intercourse with his wife and consent was not, in the eyes of the law, legally relevant. 
This was first articulated in 1736 by English Chief Justice Matthew Hale in History of 
the Pleas of Crown: 
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for 
by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this 
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kind unto her husband which she cannot retract.... [I]n marriage she hath given up her 
body to her husband...168 
Not only did a woman lose her autonomy in terms of sexual relations upon marriage 
as a result of the system of coverture but she also passed her autonomy in relation to 
most aspects of life onto her husband. This is illustrated nicely by considerations of 
women’s presence in terms of buying and selling at the marketplace169 in that their 
role is significant and, as commented, in fact predominant.170 However, what is 
reflected here in reality is not the role of the wife in relation to her rights and duties in 
consideration of the external dynamics but rather the role of the wife in terms of the 
household and its relation with the external dynamics. For instance, any woman at the 
marketplace, who, for instance, overspent, would most certainly be refused credit, as 
she had no independent legal personality. She was, as we have seen, considered 
deviant in the sense that she was treated like a child, a slave or a lunatic incapable of 
entering legal relations due to her subordination entirely to the will of her husband 
coupled with her impaired ability to make rational choices. Therefore, the system of 
coverture not only restricted her autonomy in relation to her horizontal relationship 
i.e. towards her husband, but also in terms of her vertical relationship i.e. towards 
those beyond the private family bubble. In essence, despite the elevation of individual 
will during Classical Legal Thought, the property based subjugation of women 
remained intact meaning that the family remained at the periphery of private law, 
because apart from the marriage contract, it remained hermetically sealed from the 
restructuring/reconceptualization of the law that came about due to the rise of the 
will theory of contract. 
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Adultery 
At this point, we can clearly note the patriarchal pattern that emerges on examination 
of these selected examples. Adultery by women was another area where the norm was 
characterized by female subordination.171 Adultery was specifically penalized under 
the notorious tort of “criminal conversation” according to which a man had a right of 
action for damages against a person who had sexual relations with his wife. This 
indicates the notion – also inherent in the above example – that a woman, upon 
marriage became the property of her husband. Interestingly, damages were awarded 
in relation to the effort the husband made in seducing and enticing his wife to marry 
him in the first place. Case law substantiated that if it took a fortune to seduce a wife, 
it would indicate that she was not likely to be won over and would therefore indicate 
her greater value to a husband, as compared with a wife who yielded to the first 
suggestion or temptation.172 
Marital Breakdown 
We have already seen that women, due to gender imbalances and the patriarchal 
structure to which the marital relationship was subjected, were viewed as the property 
of their husbands. In terms of real property however, we can additionally note than 
upon the failure of a marriage, where divorce was permitted, mothers were invariably 
entrusted with custody of any marital children whereas property rights remained with 
the husband. Indeed, under Irish law, until 1976173 a married woman had no right to 
a share in her family home, even if she was the breadwinner. Her husband could sell 
the home without even gaining her consent. 
V. Concluding Remarks  
The above analysis approaches the family from a pre-classical and post-classical point 
of view. We have delineated some if the historical particularities that characterised the 
                                                
171 Mill, John Stuart. The Subjection of Women, (1869). 
172 Forster v. Forster (1864) 33 L.J.C.P. 150 
173 Family Home Protection Act 1976 
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family before the globalization of German legal thought and the systematization of 
law. From this, we are left with a clear impression of where exactly family regulation 
stood after the globalization of Classical Legal Thought. In sum, contract law was 
venerated “as the legal space in which to maximise space for the will of the parties” and family 
law was venerated “as its opposite, the space for the untrammelled will of the state imposing 
ascriptive statuses saturated with duty”.174 Contract law therefore was universal according 
to the highly influential thoughts of Savigny while family law gave voice to the spirit of 
the people leading to a localisation of the foundations of family law. Contract law was 
characterised by a profound preference for individualism and supported a laissez faire 
ideology. In terms of equality, the equal autonomy of contract law did not extend to 
the family, in which patriarchal property-based subordination remained untouched. 
The construction of the family and the regulation of familial ties that was to ride the 
wave of the second globalization - The Social - was one characterised by the 
institution of marriage, the local nature of norms, customs and traditions that 
governed the family, and profound inequalities between the parties to the private 
marital bubble which Classical Legal Thought failed to penetrate as it marched 
towards accommodating capitalism and the rise in global trade, the fulfilment of will 
and the creation of an individualist, liberal approach that disregarded the family in all 
but its function as a cog, an aid mechanism for the proper functioning and support of 
industrialization. 
The Social, to which we will now turn, set out to attack this dichotomy so 
firmly entrenched by the systematization of law.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
174 Halley, “What Is Family Law?,” May 8, 2013. 
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Chapter II:  Attacking the Classical Family via 
Social Law 
If you assume given stages of development in production, commerce or consumption, you will have a 
corresponding form of social constitution, a corresponding organization, whether of the family, of the 
estates or of the classes – in a word, a corresponding civil society.175 
I) Introduction 
Thus far, we have learned that Classical Legal Thought entrenched the 
family/market dichotomy based on a veneration of contract law as the web and woof 
of life – a space within which the will theory could flourish – while pitting family law 
in complete opposite – the site of status leading to the development of certain familial 
duties within the private bubble that contained the family while simultaneously 
acknowledging the institutional public dynamic of the household. In short, contract 
and the family developed according to two parallel paths even though both remained 
within Savigny’s private law system. This chapter aims to take the Classical Family 
into the social sphere in an attempt to decipher how, if at all, the globalization of a 
social consciousness affected the regulation of the family on the back of developing 
states and their interplay with concurrent civil societies which occurred at the 
beginning of the C20th significantly influenced by a rise in capitalism and globalized 
markets. 
                                                
175 Marx made this point in a letter to Pavel Vasilyevich Annenkov on 28 December 1846. See K. 
Marx & F Engels, 1982, Collected Works vol. 38. London cited by Ginsborg, Paul. “Unchartered 
Territories, Individuals, Families, Civil Society and the Democratic State”, in Nautz, Jurgen, Ginsborg, 
Paul. & Nijhuis, Ton. The Golden Chain: Family, Civil Society and the State (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2013). By way of clarification, I intend this citation, as will become clear, to convey how in fact the 
conditions that emerged on the back of the rise in capitalism and globalized markets were crucial in 
revolutionizing other areas of private law – as demonstrated below the master/servant relationship – 
but were insufficient to penetrate the dichotomy that isolated the family from the core of private law.  
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In order to delineate the effects of this change on domestic relations, we will 
firstly depict the particularities that characterized the globalization of what Kennedy 
terms The Social, including, for instance, the move from economic development as 
the overall goal to the idea of interdependence; from the individualism that 
characterized Classical Legal Thought to an increased demand for group rights and 
collective concerns; and the move from formal equality to social justice. We will note 
the shifts from contract as the web and woof of life in terms of regulation to social 
aspirations that emanated from the construction of societal spaces and the interaction 
between the state, the economy and the private sphere considering the new approach 
to collective concerns, values, interests and purposes.176 Subsequently, we will place 
the family within these developments analyzing, as we previously did for Classical 
Legal Thought, characteristics and changes in regulation offset by the rise of the social 
and this new approach to regulation. 
We will see that the family law exceptionalism established during the first 
globalization somehow managed to reinstate itself in the discourse notwithstanding 
socialization efforts and essentially family law remained at the periphery of the private 
law core reaffirming the establishment of legal duties based on the well-entrenched 
patriarchal structure of family relationships. In effect, the principal characteristics of 
the regulation of the family remained embedded in marriage as an institution on the 
one hand and the localization of family law regulation on the other as inferred from 
Montequieu’s Spirit of the Laws outlined in Chapter One.177 The social aspirations 
that completely changed the face of contract law as we will see found no room for 
manoeuvre when it came to the peculiar, moralistic, and localized family sphere. 
                                                
176 Ibid. p. 3. 
177  Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat baron de. Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), which depicts the two underlying factors of family regulation, marriage being 
the first and its variable character influenced by tradition, culture, gender structures and the customs 
underpinning the society, where the act of marriage took place, being the second. See Chapter I, 
Introduction.  
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II) The Potential Of The Social 
To recall here, the construction of the family/domestic relations that was to ride the 
wave of the social was characterized by both a private and social dynamic 
fundamentally based on traditional roles entrenched in patriarchy attributed to family 
members in terms of both their private (horizontal) relations within the family 
structure and, in terms of vertical regulation, a superficial lip-service approach in 
terms of the public institutional dynamic of the family and the state’s approach to this 
apparent noble institution. We have already noted the results of this in that it 
effectively excluded women from the marketplace by way of offering them a role in 
the equally important domestic sphere; encouraged them to be generous and 
nurturing but discouraged them from being strong and self-reliant; and effectively 
insulated them from the world’s corruption while simultaneously denying them from 
the world’s stimulation. 178  In terms of children, their legal situation was also 
characterized by the formal bonds that existed between their parents on the one hand 
and on the other their role, in the absence of a welfare states, in caring for the aged 
and participating as sort of factors of production within the household in view of the 
efficient functioning of the market. This led, as we have deduced from the analysis of 
the classical family, to feudalist and oppressive legal provisions governing the 
internal/private dynamics while the social institutional function of the family espoused 
the goal of shielding the internal, private relationships from the individualism that 
characterized the rest of private law.  
The globalization of a more socially inclined disposition in terms of the 
approach to law and regulation had the potential to alter this owing to the shift from 
formal equality that characterized the first globalization to a new conception of social 
justice that was taking hold during the second. Additionally, the replacement of right, 
will, and fault with social welfare and of morality with society provided stable 
foundations upon which the family/market dichotomy could be attacked. 
                                                
178 Olsen, “The Family and the Market.“ p. 67. 
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Importantly, for our purposes here, this new recognition of the importance 
of equality - equality capable of reformulating the foundations of civil society - was 
intended not only to infiltrate the internal, horizontal family dynamics but also the 
external vertical dynamics. Equality then constituted one of the principal concerns 
in the delineation of a proper functioning and inclusive civil society. 
 However, as we will see, still in the 1970s, taking Ireland as the example, 
women were still forced to renounce their jobs in the public service upon marriage; 
were not permitted to collect children’s allowance since the 1944 legislation that 
introduced the payment of such benefit specified that it should be paid to the father; 
could not obtain a barring order against a violent partner; had no right to a share in 
the family home which could even be sold by husbands without the consent of the 
wife; could not refuse to have sexual intercourse with their husbands as it was assumed 
that a husband possessed the right to have sex with his wife; and were not entitled to 
the same hourly rate for employment as a male counterpart.  From this we can 
already preempt the failure of the social to alter in any significant way the dynamics of 
internal, horizontal dynamics.  Additionally, the notion that procreation was one of 
the principal goals of family formation persisted significantly, limiting autonomy 
between spouses in terms of, for example, contraception, exemplifying a persistent 
narrow approach on the part of the state to the purpose, structure and function of the 
family structure thereby exemplifying a constricted approach in terms of altering the 
regulation of the vertical dynamics. 
What then did the globalization of the social do in terms of the internal and 
external dynamics of the family? In order to answer this question, let us first turn to 
the characteristics of this consciousness so as to decipher how it managed to infiltrate 
the private law sphere shifting the focus from individualism to collective interests, 
from formal justice to social justice, while at the same time firmly establishing the 
family market dichotomy that would eventually be tackled by the third globalization 
as we will see from the subsequent chapter.   
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III) The Impetus For The Social 
The dissatisfaction that arose in revolt of Classical Legal Thought began to ferment in 
the late 1800s and provided a forum which allowed for the embrace of a new legal 
consciousness. Beginning in the early 1900s therefore and lasting until the end of 
World War II179, a reconstruction process was set in motion based on fundamental 
shifts from the idea of economic development and individualism to the idea of 
interdependence and group rights, from formal equality to social justice and from 
private law as its core to social legislation. The concept that emanated from the 
second globalization reached beyond the goal of protecting David against Goliath and 
rather attempted to embed a collective element grounded on more than the 
protection of individuals but rather the protection of individuals as constitutive 
elements of particular groups of society. The social, in these terms, constituted an 
outright attack on the individualist nature of Classical Legal Thought and its tendency 
to abuse deduction in terms of the deductively watertight ideological basis attempting 
to instead instill social elements in the place of the will. 
In terms of our scope, we understand the second globalization of legal thought 
as the development of a legal consciousness that bestrode private law, for example, 
with such categories as labour law within the framework of developing methods that 
potentially could reign-in the freedom of contract ideology and the regulation of 
private relations based solely on the will of the parties. The result of this, as we will 
see, was that freedom of contract remained intact. However, in certain circumstances 
further obligations were imposed on, for example, employers.180 These obligations 
were essentially based on the recognition of social responsibilities and the 
development of the idea of social protection. In regulatory terms, the law of the free 
market – the web and woof idea that imperialized contract law - assumed the role of a 
new regulatory regime where market freedoms were balanced against radiating 
social concerns that aimed at protecting groups in society e.g. workers, women, the 
disabled - we may say those previously considered contrary to the idea of individual 
                                                
179 Kennedy, D. “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought”, p. 37. 
180 Collins, Hugh. Regulating Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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freedom by Classical Legal Thought. Finally, the social has taken it upon itself to 
tackle that which did not fit nicely within the will theory and it provided a space for 
actors in shifting from individualism to collective concerns in consideration of the 
distributive and protective effects of the new social justice ideology. French scholars181 
pioneered this movement with a view to saving liberalism from itself182 and once they 
set the discourse in motion it became clear that the role of judges, considered so 
critical to the classical period, was outflanked by agencies and legislative efforts during 
this globalization. 
What did this mean for the classical status/contract distinction resulting from 
the marriage as “something more” debate and the locally entrenched regulation of the 
family? In short, the social reconstructed the debate replacing the will theory and 
individualism with social concerns and collective interests. It involved the recognition 
that law derives not from abstract principles but rather from the project of using law 
to address social needs.183 It concerned a modernization of the language used to deal 
with legal relationships illustrated here via the fact that the master/servant 
relationship during the globalization of the social assumed a social form and began its 
transformation into labour law as depicted below.184 It essentially was a reconstruction 
project that was premised on an outright attack on the deductive and apolitical nature 
of classical legal thought. 
                                                
181 Kennedy notes that although German-speaking theorists instigated the social it was the French who 
took it upon themselves to globalize it. He makes reference to Raymond Saleilles, De La Declaration de la 
Volonte, (1901), Francois Geny, Method of Interpretation and Sources of Private Positive Law (Louisiana State 
Law Institute trans., 2ed. 1963) 1903, Leon Duguit, “Theory of Objective Law Anterior to the State”, 
in Modern French Philosophy, VII The Modern Legal Philosophy Series (1916), Edouard Lambert, La 
Fonction du Droit Civile Compare, (1903), Josserand, De L’Esprit des Droit et de Leur Relative: Theorie Dite de 
L’Abus Des Droit (1927, 1939), Emmanuel Gounod, Le Principe de l'autonomie de la Volonté (1912), and 
Georges Gurvitch, L'idee du Droit Social (1932).  
182 Kennedy, D. p. 38 citing Wieacker, Franz, History Of Private Law In Europe With Special Reference To 
Germany (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1967); White, G. Edward. “From Sociological 
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America”, 58 
VA. L. REV. 999 (1972); Arnaud, André-Jean. Les Juristes Face a la Société du XIXieme Siècle a Nos Jours 
(1975); Horwitz, Morton J. The Transformation Of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis Of Legal Orthodoxy 
(1992); Buen, Néstor De. La Decadencia Del Contrato (1965); Kennedy, Duncan. & Belleau, Marie Claire. 
“François Gény aux Etats Unis”, in Gény, Francois (ed.) Mythes et Réalités (2000); Kennedy, Duncan. 
“From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form", 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000); Jamin, Christophe. Une Brève Histoire Politique des Interprétations 
de L'article 1134 du Code Civil, 1134 Du Code Civil, Le Dalloz, 901 (March 14, 2002).  
183 Halley, “What Is Family Law?,” May 8, 2013, p. 210. 
184 Deakin, Simon. “The Changing Concept of “Employer” in Labour Law” (2001) 30 Indust.L.J. 72. 
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The analysis of the social attack will be conducted here via examples of how 
the social consciousness gripped the market side of the dichotomy and flourished. 
From this scrutiny, it becomes clear that the family’s exceptional nature resisted much 
of the new social condition and the dichotomy was again, even after several 
commendable attempts185, firmly reinstated as the unruly child of private law.  
Let us turn to the master-servant relationship to illustrate. 
IV) Socializing The Market Side Of The Dichotomy 
The master/servant relationship, as we have seen once housed in Blackstone’s 
oeconomical structure, already during the first globalization migrated away from 
domestic relations and towards contract governed by will. We illustrated this 
significant shift in the previous chapter via the case of Chappell v Trent whereby two 
servants’ claims to their master’s property which had been bequeathed to them was 
decisively rejected based on the recognition that this relationship no longer fit within 
the evolving nature of domestic relations. Therefore, it evolved from the household 
master/servant construction to a contractual construction based on will. 
The conditions defining late-C19th social structures took this evolution one 
step further. According to Kennedy, a social transformation was unfolding “consisting of 
urbanization, industrialization, organizational society, globalization of markets, all summarized in 
the idea of interdependence”186 paving the way for a new conception of the web and woof 
idea that would eventually lead, as we will illustrate here, to modern employment law.  
 
                                                
185 Halley describes how the dichotomy was intentionally and collectively attacked by sociological 
jurisprudence in an attempt to change the focus of domestic relations law, by legal realists, in an 
attempt to understand the economic functions of family law, and eventually by the feminist movement 
in its critique of the public/private distinction. See Halley, “What Is Family Law?, May 8, 2013. pp. 
194-195.  
186 Kennedy, Duncan. “The Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought”, p. 38. 
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A. From Master/Servant to Modern Employment: An Interdependent 
Approach  
During classical legal thought, the goal was economic development and the expression 
of free will in conducting one’s private affairs. The core idea that emanated from the 
social however was the idea of interdependence. As noted, it drew from urbanization, 
industrialization, organizational society and the globalization of markets 187  in 
formulating a critique of the will theory for being individualist and ill-equipped to deal 
with the new social condition. It was argued that the idea of interdependence could 
not be satisfied by the will theory and the imperialism of contract law that had, until 
this point, legally speaking, supported the market. The web and woof market structure 
therefore was in a state of failure – it was struggling to produce appropriate results 
given the new, modern conditions of interdependence. The search therefore was well 
underway for new regulatory techniques which would eventually lead to a shift from 
adjudication - in avoidance of the highly criticized abusive deduction that 
characterized the first globalization - to administration: 
After a brief flirtation with the judge…the hero figures of the social current became, in 
principal, the legislators who drafted the multiplicity of special laws that constituted the 
new order, along with the administrator who produced and enforced the detailed 
regulations that put legislative regimes into effect188 
This new approach had significant effects on the master/servant relationship. In 
effect, the contract law field was socialized by way of administrative law and input 
from the developing nation state. Let us take here, by way of example, workplace 
accidents and legislative attempts to recognize and correct the inadequacy of leaving 
employment relations solely to strict, classical contract law.  
                                                
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. p.43 
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i. Workplace Accidents  
The origins of legislative attempts in this field stemmed from the industrial revolution 
and the socialization of employment relations pioneered by the very active Marxist 
and socialist movement that pushed for social protection for workers in Germany. 
Although the socialists in the end were oppressed, key features of the left’s agenda 
were cleverly adopted including Employers’ Liability Law in 1871189 and Workers’ 
Accident Insurance in 1884. This new path to socialization eventually swept through 
Europe - albeit at different rates – and took a firm grip in the industrialization 
processes that were already underway, altering employment relations to a degree that 
could not even have been perceived during the first globalization in terms of the 
master/servant relationship. 
The advance of workplace accidents legislation lucidly illustrates the social 
bridging mechanism between the increasing complexities of modern business on the 
one hand and the development of the nation state on the other. The measured 
acceptance that the modern industrial society required social protection gradually 
spread and in 1880 the British Prime Minister William Gladstone pushed through the 
Employers’ Liability Act. His attempts were furthered in 1897 with the passing of the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act that essentially considered the already developed 
German model by establishing a “no-fault” doctrine of compensation and extended 
the scope of compensation to accidents occurring connected to railways, mining and 
quarrying, factory and laundry work. Prior to the passing of the 1880 Act - i.e. the law 
as it was according to a more classical conception of employment relations - a 
workman injured by an accident while engaged in employment activities could base 
his legal action for damages against his master only in cases where the master 
knowingly employed an incompetent servant or in cases where the master prohibited 
plant or machinery in the knowledge that it was unsafe and dangerous. Therefore, the 
legal situation of injured employees was quite limited, formalistic and narrow in terms 
                                                
189 For an overview, see Timothy G.W. and Jochen S., Incentives that Saved Lives: Government 
Regulation of Accident Insurance Associations in Germany, 1884-1914 (August 9, 2012). Yale University 
Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 1013; Yale Economics Department Working Paper No. 104. 
 
  
92 
of its approach to protection of injured parties and the assumption of risk doctrine. 
Recognition however of the shortcomings of this situation, for instance the results of 
the Doctrine of Common Employment according to which a workman could not 
recover compensation for any injuries caused by a fellow servant, led to the passing of 
the Employers’ Liability Act 1880. This act extended the scope of protection for 
employees in recognition of the increase of workplace accidents inevitably caused by 
increased industrial activities and the mechanization of production by rendering 
employers liable for damages caused: 
i. By some defect in the machinery or plant which ought to have been put right 
by the master or his foreman; 
ii. By the carelessness of a foreman; 
iii. Through obeying an order which caused the injury; 
iv. Through a fellow workman obeying a rule or order of his master, or; 
v. By the carelessness of a man in charge of any engine, points, or signal on a 
railway. 
In sum, what we can note from this illustration is the change in approach to what was 
once a simple construction of a master/servant relationship: during the globalization 
of classical legal thought it was strictly private and based on will characterized by a 
laissez faire ideology. The social crisis however, especially in terms of the emergence of 
workplace disputes as a result of industrialization, reformulated not only the linguistic 
approach to the actors equating the master with the capitalist employer and the 
servant with organized labour but it also reformulated the governance of this 
relationship by way of statutory and administrative innovations. 190  This fresh 
approach gradually led to a metamorphosis of the master/servant relationship as we 
can discern the birth of a thoroughly modern field of law leading to what would 
become known as labour law.191 
                                                
190 Halley, “What Is Family Law?,” May 8, 2013 p. 201  
191 Ibid. p. 203  
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ii. Medical Accidents  
Additionally, with a view to illustrating the change in approach resulting from the 
development of a social consciousness in terms of nation state-building, we can make 
reference to medical accidents which not only turned the regulation of the medical 
profession i.e. the vertical dynamic on its head but also assisted in instigating a 
complete reform of tort law in terms of the private relationships between medical 
practitioners and their patients. Prior to the nationalisation of health care systems, the 
doctor/patient relationship was a contractual one in which the patient sought help 
and assistance from the medical professional. Health care systems in Europe were 
largely mosaics of private, municipal and charity schemes192 with doctors retaining 
their professional autonomy193 and consequently liability for any harm caused. This 
containment of the doctor/patient relationship within a contractual sphere did not 
give rise to many medical negligence claims. Indeed, just over one hundred years ago 
it was stated in the case of Farquar v Murray194 that the action before the court was 
particularly unusual, the judge stating “it is an action of damages against a medical man. In 
my somewhat long experience I cannot remember having seen a similar case before”.195 
The nationalisation of health care, which occurred post World War II or 
thereabouts in most European countries however brought major alterations to the 
landscape of health care and its delivery. The private, contractual relationship that 
existed between the doctor and the patient was infiltrated by a third party: the state. 
As a result of this, the principle of collective responsibility permeated the delivery of 
health care and a shift in responsibility resulted. For example, the establishment of the 
National Health Service (NHS) in 1948 in the UK was based on the principle of equality 
with the state assuming the obligation to provide free health care to the entire 
population.196 This in turn led to a shift in liability for medical accidents as the 
                                                
192 Lo Scalzo, A., Donatini, A., Orzella, L., Cicchetti, A., Profili, S., & Maresso, A. Italy: Health system 
review. Health Systems in Transition, (2009) p. 13.  
193 In fact, this was one of the major hurdles to the nationalization of health care in the UK and France 
in that doctors were fearful of giving up their professional autonomy. 
194 Farquar v Murray, 3F, 859-64, cited in HURWITZ, B. “Learning from primary care malpractice: 
past, present and future”, Qual Saf Health Care, 2004; 13; 90-91. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Health Care systems in transition: UK p. 5.
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doctor/patient relationship was catapulted from the private sphere to the public 
assuming a necessary shift in terms of regulation and adjudication. 
In summary, what we can deduce here is that the rise of social legislation 
explicitly contradicted the classical, laissez faire ideology that the private relationships 
were restricted to the will of the parties. In noting the fermentation of the social in 
terms of the master/servant relationship, we can discern that contract law, as we 
know it from the previous chapter, was progressing rapidly and embracing social 
aspirations influenced, for example, by social insurance against industrialist accidents 
as a compulsory element of the wage bargain, the rise of the labour union as an 
involuntary association, and the recognition by the state of collective interests. This, in 
effect, justified “jettisoning individualist and formalist notions”197 and paved the way 
for inroads linking the once strictly private nature of relationships with considerations 
pertaining to group rights, social rights, social justice, social welfare and a regulatory 
sphere somewhat alternative to the free market that monopolized legal thinking 
during the first globalization.  
V) Socialising The Family Side Of The Dichotomy  
The general consensus from existing literature with regard to the impact of the social 
consciousness is that while contract law progressed and flourished in its new social 
environment, status – the family as “something more” - lagged behind.198 Halley, in 
reference to Baily and Labatt’s structural overhaul of master/servant notes that  
they opened the floodgates of the social and reconstructed the ancient topic by an open-
eyes recognition of social legislation. Domestic relations meanwhile, sailed placidly on, 
adding chapters about Married Women’s Property Acts but manifesting no felt need to 
reframe the field because of them199 
                                                
197 Kennedy, “The Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought”, p. 42 
198 In fact, this had been predicted by Henry Sumner Maine in his work, Ancient Law: Its Connection with 
the Early History of Society, and its Relation to Modern Ideas 168-69 (Frederick Pollock ed., London, John 
Murray 1912) 1861. For a summary see Halley, “What Is Family Law?, May 8, 2013 pp. 71-74. 
199 Halley, “What Is Family Law?,” May 8, 2013, p. 201. 
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In fact, in terms of the development of family law as a recognised independent legal 
discipline, it was only in the 1960s that the battle was finally won in establishing the 
field.200 The fundamental issue was that, despite efforts, nobody could get to grips 
with family regulation and its relation to expanding markets, interdependence and the 
new influences of globalization. As we have noted, the relationship between master 
and servant easily embraced the social langue and transformed into what would 
eventually become known as labour law. The web and woof idea of contract lost its 
relevance leading to the demotion of the will theory. However, this reconstruction 
process had little effect on contract’s other – status. Whereas will was pushed out of 
the contract side and replaced by social legislation it was firmly reinstated on the side 
of status by way of a crisp preservation of the will of the state in terms of the role of 
the household against the will of individual parties201 resulting in a preservation of the 
classical family market dichotomy characterized by embedding the regulation of the 
family in the local dimension on the one hand and marriage that housed the 
institution of the family on the other. 
As explained by Kennedy, the reconstruction process became dramatically 
ambiguous when it came to the family and sexual relations202 in that the institutional 
side of the family structure leant itself well to the social ideology on the whole, based 
on the far-reaching consequences that the role of the family had in terms of 
interdependence. That stated, however, the private nature of the relationships within 
the family structure and the fact that regulation stemmed from local custom, tradition 
and religion meant that attempts to break down the dichotomy largely failed and the 
traditional patriarchal structure remained in place despite welfare state attempts to 
socialize the institution. 
This stated, some socially inclined indents – indeed, indents that are in theory 
quite significant – were made into the fortress that has long “protected” the family 
                                                
200As O. Kahn-Freund stated in his opening address to the first Family Law Workshop in 1966, 
“A battle has been necessary to introduce it in England.”, cited in Mueller-Freienfels, “The Emergence 
of Droit de Famille and Familienrecht in Continental Europe and the Introduction of Family 
Law in England” Journal of Family History, Vol. 28, No. 1, (2003). 
201 Halley, “What Is Family Law?,” May 8, 2013 p. 209. 
202 Kennedy, “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought”, p. 50. 
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from the market. However, as pointed out by Kennedy, the agenda largely 
concentrated on reinforcing the traditional family and aiding the enterprise of child 
rearing with the goal of strengthening the nation against its enemies.203 Preemptively 
then, these indents which we will discuss below had little effect in terms of unshackling 
the family from the market/family straightjacket.   
A. UK 
As noted in Chapter I, the household was an integral element of the proper 
functioning of the market. In Britain, the welfare state that was developed, in terms of 
the family at least, was based on a robust gender differentiated model of family life 
founded in the male-breadwinner ethos. The social consciousness that developed at 
the time revolved around a social citizenship – the crux of which was opportunity in 
terms of paid labour which in turn provided access to economic welfare and security. 
Considering the male breadwinner model of family life that was entrenched at the 
time however, the provision of care – a function largely reserved to women and, as 
already mentioned, one which effectively excluded them from the marketplace by way 
of offering them a role in the equally important domestic sphere encouraging them to 
be generous and nurturing but discouraged them from being strong and self-reliant 
and effectively insulated them from the world’s corruption while simultaneously 
denied them the world’s stimulation – was not included in the concept of paid labour. 
In pitting care in the home against employment the male was reinstated as the 
“normal” citizen and their dependents – women and children were excluded from this 
Marshallian concept of citizenship, participation in the market, and social welfare 
benefits.204  
                                                
203 Kennedy, “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought”, p. 52 
204 With regards to this Marshallian concept of citizenship, see Naomi Finch, “Family Policy in the UK, 
Welfare Policy And Employment In The Context Of Family Change”, Social Policy Research Unit, 
University of York. We can also make reference here to the Beveridge Report which became a 
blueprint for a new welfare state in Britain. See O’Brien, Marese. “The Beveridge Report: its impact on 
women and migrants”, Socheolas: Limerick Student Journal of Sociology. Vol. 2(2), April 2010.   
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B. IRELAND  
A similar situation can be extracted from evidence in Ireland as we have alluded to by 
way of reference to examples outlined above of the exclusionary position of women in 
terms of both the private and the social dynamics of family regulation. The model of 
family life incorporated into the Irish Constitution is one in which the woman cares 
for home and children. This reflected the social reality of the time where, at the risk of 
repetition, women had to renounce their jobs in the public service upon marriage; 
were not permitted to collect the children’s allowance since the 1944 legislation that 
introduced the payment of such benefit specified that it should be paid to the father; 
could not obtain a barring order against a violent partner; had no right to a share in 
the family home which could even be sold by husbands without the consent of the 
wife; could not refuse to have sexual intercourse with their husbands pursuant to the 
assumption that husbands were assumed to possess the right to have intercourse with 
wives; and were not entitled to the same hourly rate for employment as a male 
counterpart. Additionally, it is interesting to note that Ireland 205  established a 
significant for-profit childcare provision sector as opposed to a state non-profit sector 
which is more common in other European countries. Other family allowances 
typically associated with a more social approach to family regulation and the labour 
market were slow to take hold.  
C. ITALY 
Similarities concerning the impermeability of the family market dichotomy can also 
be discerned from the situation during The Social in Italy. Evidence suggests that the 
family, in its role in terms of the proper functioning of the market, assumed an 
important function in relation to the understanding of the family or the household as a 
market facilitating institution. In this sense, families, or better, households – the semi-
                                                
205 A similar situation exists in the UK where in the mid 1990s, only 2% of childcare for children under 
3 years of age was publicly funded. This approach was largely influenced by consecutive Conservative 
governments with little change until the appointment of the Labour government in 1997. See Finch, 
Naomi. ibid; Skinner, C. (2002) “Childcare Provision” in Bradshaw, J. (ed.) The Well-being of Children in 
the UK, The Save the Children Fund; Skevik, A. “Children of the Welfare State: Individuals with 
Entitlements, or Hidden in the Family?” Jnl Soc. Pol., 32, 3, (2003) 423–440 Cambridge University 
Press. 
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economic cog in the wheel of production – increasingly served the expression of 
individuals within the unit. However, this was largely an avenue only open to male 
members of the structure as a result of the persistence of the male breadwinner model.  
The most salient commonality we can discern here is the allocation of market 
functions to men and care functions to women indicating that the era of rights and the 
hopes of socializing the family both in terms of its internal and external dynamics 
were doomed to failure due to nation states feverously clinging onto their traditional 
conceptions and definitions of what exactly constitutes a family on the one hand and 
the belief that the family as a unit was better served by local law on the other. 
That stated, although the social and its underlying commitment to equality 
and social justice did not entirely overcome the male breadwinner ethos, it did 
concentrate more on the family as a whole reflecting perhaps an increased recognition 
of the relevance of the external/institutional dynamics of family regulation. Take for 
example male trade unionists’ claims to a family wage.206 Interestingly, however, the 
rise of this social demand in fact leant itself well to further embedding gender 
inequalities as pointed out by Coote and Campbell: 
As long as the myth of the family wage persists, there is bound to be a conflict between 
women and men in the trade union movement. For if men see themselves and 
breadwinners-in-chief, how are they to view the prospect of women gaining equal 
opportunity and equal access to all jobs?207 
That stated, in Italy certain socialization efforts into the dichotomy can be discerned 
from – for instance - Italian case Cass. 13329/2001208 which held that where an 
employee’s salary is not sufficient to guarantee a free and dignified existence for 
                                                
206 Lewis, J. “The Changing Context for the Obligation to Care and Earn”, in Maclean, M. 
(ed.), Family Law and Family Values, (Hart Publishing, 2005). 
207 Coote and Campbell, Sweet Freedom: Struggle for Women's Liberation, (Picador Books, 1982). 
208 Cass. 26 Oct. 2001, n. 13329, (2001) 41. 
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him/her and his/her family, then that same employee may take up employment with 
another company.209  
In summary, from the above examples we can discern that although the social 
made some progress in terms of the family, it was not significant enough to dissolve 
the dichotomy. In fact, the efforts made further entrenched gender imbalances and, as 
one can imagine, did little to accommodate non-traditional family structures that, 
during this time, were placed on a constitutional pedestal. In fact, the veneration of 
the traditional family in national constitutions continued to exceptionalize the family 
from the rest of private law as we will see and the instillation of the family founded on 
marriage and the local character of family law rules reinforcing the dichotomy and as 
can be discerned from national case law left the family in a quarantined position that 
would eventually be tackled only by the third globalization. 
VI) The Constitutionalization Of Private Law 
The constitutionalization of private law is a phenomenon that took hold towards the 
end of the social and in the post-war period in Europe.210 It represents an infusion of 
legal ideas resulting from the rise of modernity, civil society and the nation state on 
the one hand and their clash with legal principles established in conjunction with 
individualism and the laizzez faire ideology that had dominated on the other. Its 
potency is one which has shook traditional private law frameworks changing the 
landscape of private law relationships indeed to an extent yet unclear and much 
debated amongst private law legal scholars in moving well beyond the vertical 
dimension of fundamental rights and their role in protecting citizens against the state 
as the puissance absolute et perpétuelle.211 
                                                
209  See Mak, C., Sanchez, Galera., M.D., & Wunsch, S., “The Italian Report”, in  G. 
Brüggemeier, A. Colombi Ciacchi & G Comandé (eds.) Fundamental Rights and Private Law in 
Europe Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
210 Therefore, in terms of Kennedy’s template, there is a sort of overlap which cannot be avoided since, 
we may argue, the social consciousness set the tone and instigated the process which will be investigated 
in more depth in Chapter III and in part II. 
211 Bodin, J. Les six livres de la République, (Lyon, 1576) 
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Prior to the constitutionalization at the EU level however, a similar process 
took place at the national level. Here, we specifically refer to the process whereby the 
family was constitutionalized, thereby further insulating it from contract and indeed 
the social. In fact, the influence of national constitutions has shaped the relationship 
between fundamental rights and the development – or stagnation – of national family 
law. With this in the background, and of course our analysis in terms of the flourishing 
of the market side of the dichotomy, we will proceed to examine how the differing 
national contexts influenced family law and how they, during the second 
globalization, maintained family law exceptionalism via the rejection of the social 
within the private structure of the family and rejection via the constitutionalization of 
the institutional structure of family regulation. 
A. IRELAND 
In 1937, the fundamental laws of Ireland were enshrined in Bunreacht na hEireann. It 
was a reflection of the time, stemming from the economic and social reality of a 
largely rural society where agriculture provided the basis for the economic structure. 
50% of those in employment in 1937 were in agriculture, 33% were employed in 
services and 17% in industry.212 Net emigration was beginning to rise, mortality was 
high and the overall standard of living in Ireland at the time was inconceivably 
different to what can be discerned today, despite the recent economic turmoil.  
The prevailing opinion at the time in relation to the family was rooted in 
tradition. A family was founded on marriage between one man and one woman, the 
principal scope was procreation and it largely functioned on the male breadwinner 
model. The drafters of the Constitution therefore were inveigled into drafting a 
document that left little room for broader horizons when it came to the protection of 
the myriad of family types and structures in Ireland today, many of which are not 
welcomed or even accepted when trying to attain equal treatment in the law.213 It is 
argued here that this persistent rejection has its origins in the recapitulation of the 
                                                
212 The All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution: Tenth Progress Report: The Family, p19. 
213 The family in the Irish constitution is basically an arrogation of civil authority to the Church. The 
provisions of the Constitution were, more or less, penned in CS McQuaid’s office as he advocated 
enshrining the absolute claims of the Catholic Church in the Constitution.  
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classical characteristics of the family in that it is a social institution founded on 
marriage and one that should reflect local law in terms of what was considered 
positive isolation from the market. 
The principal constitutional article dealing with the family is Artcile 41 which 
states the following: 
1. 1° The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of 
Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, 
antecedent and superior to all positive law. 
2° The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and authority, as 
the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the 
State. 
2. 1° In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the 
State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. 
2° The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by 
economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home. 
3. 1° The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on which 
the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.214 
 
On a first reading, it is already clear that the traditional conception of the 
family i.e. that it is a moral institution; based on marriage; it should protect the family 
                                                
214 Eventually, the provision pertaining to divorce was introduced reading :2° A Court designated by law 
may grant a dissolution of marriage where, but only where, it is satisfied that at the date of the institution of the 
proceedings, the spouses have lived apart from one another for a period of, or periods amounting to, at least four years during 
the five years there is no reasonable prospect of a reconciliation between the spouses such provision as the Court considers 
proper having regard to the circumstances exists or will be made for the spouses, any children of either or both of them and 
any other person prescribed by law, and any further conditions prescribed by law are complied with. 
3° No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law of any other State but is a subsisting valid marriage 
under the law for the time being in force within the jurisdiction of the Government and Parliament established by this 
Constitution shall be capable of contracting a valid marriage within that jurisdiction during the lifetime of the other party to 
the marriage so dissolved. 
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against the market; it is characterised by gender inequality; and based on the male 
breadwinner model, permeated the social consciousness in terms of the family. In fact, 
the State’s pledge to guard “with special care the institution of marriage on which the family is 
founded”215, certainly affirms Shatter’s pronouncement that “since 1937 the family has been 
placed on a Constitutional pedestal”216. The continuation of a classical interpretation of the 
family has subsequently been shaped and further instilled by judicial interpretation of 
the constitutional provisions. The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala217 - the leading case 
that proscribed any sort of liberal interpretation - clarified that the family referred to 
in the Constitution is one based on marriage and the formal bonds created through 
marital unions. Furthermore, O’Higgins CJ, in the case of G v An Bord Uchtala, 
reaffirmed this concept stating that Article 41 “refers exclusively to the family founded on 
marriage”.218 In fact, as recently as 2006, the All Party Oireachtas (Parliamentary) 
Committee on the Constitution in contemplation of family reform described the 
family as follows: 
The traditional family enshrined in the Constitution is the nuclear family consisting of a 
married couple, a man (the breadwinner) and his wife (a mother concerned with 
household duties) and their dependent children whose physical and moral development is 
based on the stable lifelong commitment of the parents and the values they transmit to 
their children. The traditional model is built on the lifelong union of a man and a 
woman, formalised in a marriage ceremony; in its primary form the man assumed the 
role of the head of the family while the wife, dependent upon him for physical 
maintenance, established primacy in the care and upbringing of the children; the children 
were expected to absorb the values of their parents and be subservient to them.219 
                                                
215 Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 41.3.1. 
216 Shatter, A. Shatters Family Law, (Butterworth, 1997), Ch. 1. 
217 The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtala (1966) IR 567. 
218 G v An Bord Uchtala (1980) IR 32. 
219 See The All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution: Tenth Progress Report: The 
Family, (2006) p. 55-56. See also, KIERNAN, K. “The Diversity Initiative – Welcoming the 
Diversity of Family Life in Ireland”, available online at:  
www.equality.ie/indexasp?IocID=90&docID=197; Ryan, F.W. “Marriage at the Boundaries of 
Gender: The Transsexual Dilemma Resolved?” 1, Irish Journal of Family Law, 2004; Mee, J. & 
Ronayne, K., Report on the “Partnership Rights of Same Sex Couples”, The Equality Authority 
(2000); Ryan, F. “Sexuality, Ideology and the Legal Construction of Family: Fitzpatrick v 
Sterling Housing Association”, 3, Irish Journal of Family Law, (2000). 
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This is the type of family that the Constitution identifies as the “natural primary, 
fundamental unit group of society” and as the “moral institution possessing certain inalienable and 
imprescriptible rights” which are “antecedent and superior to all positive law”. It is also the type 
of family that Article 42 applies to in stating that: 
1. The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the child is the Family and 
guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their 
means, for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their 
children. 
 
2. Parents shall be free to provide this education in their homes or in private schools or in schools 
recognised or established by the State. 
 
3. 1° The State shall not oblige parents in violation of their conscience and lawful preference to 
send their children to schools established by the State, or to any particular type of school 
designated by the State. 
2° The State shall, however, as guardian of the common good, require in view of actual 
conditions that the children receive a certain minimum education, moral, intellectual and 
social. 
4. The State shall provide for free primary education and shall endeavour to supplement and 
give reasonable aid to private and corporate educational initiative, and, when the public good 
requires it, provide other educational facilities or institutions with due regard, however, for the 
rights of parents, especially in the matter of religious and moral formation. 
 
5. In exceptional cases, where the parents for physical or moral reasons fail in their duty 
towards their children, the State as guardian of the common good, by appropriate means shall 
endeavour to supply the place of the parents, but always with due regard for the natural and 
imprescriptible rights of the child. 
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Here, finally, we can note a constitutionally based indent on the conception of the 
classical family in terms of the intricacies of the coexisting private dynamic on the one 
hand and social/institutional dynamics on the other. Indeed, it is from this 
constitutionalization of the family that some of the administrative efforts mentioned 
above, for example, free education220, came to be. Article 42 in effect nominates the 
family as the educator of the child and imposes a parental duty to provide such 
education. It also gives to every child the right to free primary education provided for 
by the State so that every child receives a certain minimum education. O’Dalaigh CJ 
in the Supreme Court decision in Ryan v The Attorney General defined education in the 
following way, “education essentially is the teaching and training of a child to make the best possible 
use of his inherent and potential capacities, physical, mental and moral”.221 O’Higgins CJ laid 
down some other rights in his judgement in G v An Bord Uchtala, to live and be fed; to 
be reared and educated; to have the opportunity of working and of realising his or her 
full potential as a human being.222  
Although we have noted above a certain upshot of the constitutionalization of the 
family on the dichotomy, particularly with reference to the legal relationship between 
marital parents and their children, the limitations stemming from the insistence on a 
classical interpretation of the family and its exceptionalization persisted. In fact, as we 
will note from the following Irish case law examples classical notions of the family 
remained entrenched and guided the development of family regulation for some time 
reinstating over and over again the dichotomy. Not even the social – which permitted 
contract to take significant strides – shook the exceptionalization of family law in 
Ireland and it remained quarantined with morals, tradition, religion and local custom.  
For example, it was not until 1974 that the right to marital privacy in terms of 
procreation was finally recognised in the case of McGee v The Attorney General223 
decisively concluding that even within marital bonds, procreation is a choice and not 
                                                
220 For example, free second level education was introduced in Ireland in 1968. 
221 Ryan v The Attorney General (1965) IR, 294, p. 350. 
222 G v An Bord Uchtala , (1980) IR 32. 
223 McGee v The Attorney General (1974) IR 284. 
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a requirement of the marital relationship, finally emphasising the importance of 
autonomy and self-determination regarding procreation. 
Furthermore, it was not until 1996 that Murphy J. in the case of WO’R & EH 
v Án Bord Uchtala224 stressed that the subject of people living together outside of 
wedlock is no longer a fount of “grave embarrassment” and since, at least for a 
noteworthy portion of the population, the traditional marital family does not provide 
an apt model on which to base plans for current and future social needs, calls were 
eventually made for change. The fact that it took until 1996 for the Irish Courts to 
pronounce that cohabitation was not an embarrassing problem indicated that the 
social had little effect on the classical definition of the family that had been enshrined 
in the Constitution in 1937. In fact, as we will see, it was not until the third 
globalization – more specifically concerned with balancing difference - that the Civil 
Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 was finally 
enacted in Ireland. 
More evidence of the failure of the Social in breaking down the dichotomy can 
be found in The Law Reform Commission’s 2004 consultation paper on the Rights 
and Duties of Cohabitees.225 It pointed out the real effects of such an exclusionary 
stance. For instance, cohabitees until 2010 were not afforded the same property rights 
as spouses. Prior to the enactment of the 2010 Act, when an unmarried couple split 
up, unless the other party could prove a resulting trust over the property, the family 
home and other assets would go to the person who was in possession of the legal title 
to the assets in question. To claim any rights, the other party had to establish that 
he/she made a contribution to the purchase price of the property with an intention of 
gaining a share in the title. Other contributions were considered but of course were 
difficult to prove generally placing women in a disadvantageous position directly 
resulting from the Constitution, as we will see. Say, for instance, a mother involved in 
a non-marital relationship decided to stay at home for the purposes of rearing the 
children (as is perfectly acceptable for a mother of a marital family as per the 
                                                
224 WO’R & EH v An Bord Uchtala (1996) 2 IR 248, p. 286. 
225 Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on the Rights and Duties of Cohabitees, LRC CP 
32-2004. 
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Constitution226), she would gain no beneficial interest in the property in the event of a 
separation for the work she carried out. Additionally, we can refer to the Family 
Home Protection Act 1976 which excluded cohabitees from its scope of protection 
since they did not fall under the Constitutional definition of the family. 
Another more contentious family construction in Ireland and a field 
significantly affected by the dichotomy and failure of national family law to consider 
peripheral family law issues is that of same-sex couples. It is clear from the above that 
“a wide range of legal privileges and obligations are triggered by the status of marriage”227 and 
therefore since this door was shut to same sex couples, they were discriminated against 
in many areas including paying higher income tax; paying higher capital gains tax; 
paying higher stamp duty; paying higher inheritance and gift tax if they make gifts or 
bequests to each other; facing difficulties in situations where a non-Irish spouse cannot 
easily work and live in Ireland; discrimination in pension benefits; in cases of domestic 
violence they are less protected by the law because they cannot claim barring orders 
under the Domestic Violence Act 1996; they may not be recognised as next of kin if 
their partner is hospitalised; the partner of a deceased gay person will have no 
entitlement equivalent to that of a spouse to a share in the estate of the deceased; in 
the case of pregnancy, the partner of the pregnant person will not be entitled to 
parental leave; they can adopt but only as a single person; the child of a gay couple is 
disadvantaged because he or she cannot legally be recognised as a child of both 
parents. Again, the social and its potential to deconstruct the barriers enforced by the 
family/market dichotomy failed to infiltrate due to the delicate, moral, traditional 
characteristics that were attributed to the family in Ireland. The classical definition 
along with the classical treatment of cases persisted.  
B. UK  
The UK has no written constitution and therefore the legal position of the family and 
the development of regulation and the socialization of it followed a slightly different 
                                                
226 Article 41.2.2. The State shall, therefore endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by 
economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of her duties at home. 
227 Mee, John. & Ronayne, Kaye. Report on the “Partnership Rights of Same Sex Couples”, The 
Equality Authority, June 2000.  
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path. The results however, at least during the second globalization are largely the 
same in that, as we have already noted, until the 1960s family law as a discipline did 
not even exist in the UK.228 In a sense, we are dealing here with a country that 
seemed to embrace the philosophy of the welfare state but adopted a very cautious 
and slow approach to regulating and indeed establishing the family as a unit and 
developing a legal discipline to go along with it. It would seem that consecutive 
governments were reluctant to interfere with traditional family values while 
simultaneously eager to deal with the social effects of industrialization in constructing 
the welfare state. Eventually, however, the idea that the development of a welfare state 
and a welfare society required a coherent approach to modeling conjugal and 
parental relationships229 took hold and the dam was breached facilitated by the sexual 
revolution which, among other factors, swept away much of what was left of the 
classical system of domestic relations. 
In terms of the constitutionalization of the family in the terms described above 
in relation to developments in Ireland, the absence of any human rights or 
constitutional charter significantly obstructed any similar development. In fact, it was 
not until the enactment of the Human Rights Act, modeled on the European 
Convention on Human Rights that the family assumed its constitutional position.  
This, however, is more precisely attributable to the Third Globalization to which we 
will come. 
C. ITALY 
In Italy, a particular mesh of private and public concerns similarly characterizes the 
family. As stipulated by C. A. Jemolo, the family constitutes “un’isola che il mare del diritto 
                                                
228As O. Kahn-Freund stated in his opening address to the first Family Law Workshop in 1966, 
"A battle has been necessary to introduce it in England.", cited in  Mueller-Freienfels, “The Emergence 
of Droit de Famille and Familienrecht in Continental Europe and the Introduction of Family 
Law in England” Journal of Family History, Vol. 28, No. 1, (2003).  
229 Bernini, Stefania. “The Foundation of Civilised Society: Family and Social Policy in Britain and 
Italy between 1946 and 1960”, in Nautz, J., Ginsborg, P., & Nijhis, T. The Golden Chain, Family, Civil 
Society and the State, pp. 145/146. 
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può lambire, ma lambire soltanto”.230 This is again due to the special dynamics of the 
family already recognized during the first globalization and the very local character 
grounded in culture and tradition of family regulation that, as we will see, persisted 
during the second globalization in Italy. 
The principles governing the family were enshrined in the Italian Constitution 
in 1948 and have remained unchanged since then. Article 29 states that:  
The Republic recognizes the rights of the family as a natural society founded on 
matrimony. Matrimony is based on the moral and legal equality of the spouses within 
the limits laid down by law to guarantee the unity of the family.231 
Article 30 goes on to purport that: 
It is the duty and right of parents to support, instruct and educate their children, even 
those born outside of matrimony. In cases of the incapacity of the parents, the law 
provides for the fulfillment of their duties. The law ensures to children born outside of 
marriage full legal and social protection, compatible with the rights of members of the 
legitimate family. The law lays down the rules and limitations for ascertaining 
paternity.232 
Finally, Article 31 concludes by asserting that: 
  
The Republic assists through economic measures and other provisions the formation of 
the family and the fulfillment of its duties, with particular consideration for large 
                                                
230 (The family constitutes an island that the sea of law can lap, but lap only) See Jemolo, C.A.  La 
famiglia e il diritto, in Ann. Sen. Giur. (Università di Catania, 1948), III. Additionally, we can make 
reference to F.D. Busnelli, Famiglia e arcipelago familiare, in Riv. Dir. civ., 2002, 509 e ss.; Ang. D’Angelo, Il 
bambino nella famiglia ricomposta. Percorsi di riscoperta della solidarietà familiare, PhD Thesis, on file with the 
author.  
231 “La Repubblica riconosce i diritti della famiglia come società naturale fondata sul matrimonio. Il 
matrimonio è ordinato sull'eguaglianza morale e giuridica dei coniugi, con i limiti stabiliti dalla legge a 
garanzia dell'unità familiare.” 
232 “E' dovere e diritto dei genitori, mantenere, istruire ed educare i figli, anche se nati fuori del 
matrimonio. Nei casi di incapacità dei genitori, la legge provvede a che siano assolti i loro compiti. La 
legge assicura ai figli nati fuori dal matrimonio ogni tutela giuridica e sociale, compatibile con i diritti 
dei membri della famiglia legittima. La legge detta le norme e i limiti per la ricerca della paternità.” 
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families. It protects maternity, infancy and youth, promoting the institutions necessary 
thereto.233 
We can deduce some interesting effects of the social consciousness from the Italian 
Constitution analogous to the social indents highlighted above in reference to the Irish 
Constitution. Most particularly, we can make reference to the State’s pledge to assist 
through economic measures and other provisions the formation of the family and the 
fulfillment of its duties, with particular consideration for large families indicating 
increased attention to the vertical dynamics of the state/family relationship. 
Additionally, the stipulation at the Constitutional level in relation to the duty and 
right of parents to support, instruct and educate their children certainly goes some 
way to constitutionalizing this horizontal dimension of the private relations within the 
family.  
That stated, let us parallel Article 29 of the Italian Constitution with Article 41 of the 
Irish Constitution which corresponds to a similar legal situation: the family at the 
receiving end of constitutional protection in Italy is that based on the marriage of a 
man and a woman. It is a fundamental condition that must be fulfilled before 
protection can be granted to spouses. 
As a result of this, reluctance has been expressed in extending protection to 
‘new’ family types, especially civil unions or same sex marriages which has indeed led 
to some inequalities for civil partners and for same sex couples, not only in terms of 
private relationships and the rights and duties normally attributed to the marital 
couple but also in terms of other aspects of daily life. For example, in Italy, adoption is 
to a large extent reserved for married couples, the only exception being that of 
“particular cases”.234 This is substantially the result of the traditional, constitutional 
                                                
233 “La Repubblica agevola con misure economiche e altre provvidenze la formazione della famiglia e 
l'adempimento dei compiti relativi, con particolare riguardo alle famiglie numerose. Protegge la 
maternità e l'infanzia e la gioventù, favorendo gli istituti necessari a tale scopo.”  
234 Art 44 l. Law No. 184/1983. 
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interpretation of the family rooted in the bonds of marriage235 as stipulated by Article 
29.236 
An interesting case was recently heard before the Corte Costituzionale237 in Italy. 
The case concerned the refusal of the local administration in Venice to recognise a 
same sex marriage and was referred to the Constitutional Court on the three points of 
law to be considered i.e. whether the recognition of a same sex marriage would be in 
conflict with the civil code, whether Article 3 of the Italian Constitution prohibits 
discrimination based on sexual orientation in cases of same sex marriage and also, the 
court sought guidance from the Constitutional Court regarding the gender neutral 
marriage stipulation in Article 29 of the Constitution. The case was declared 
inadmissible, citing the inappropriateness of deciding this issue in the courts and 
inferring that the matter is one for the discretion of Parliament reflecting the 
institutional choices238 that are being made by Member States. Thus, it is clear that 
The Social in terms of regulating the family changed very little in terms of the 
fundaments of family law. 
On the back of this analysis of the constitutionalisation of the family, a very 
significant development in terms of the external dynamics of the family and the 
relationship between the family and states, we can conclude that however significant, 
it did little to dis-embed the dichotomy save for the few examples concerning the 
socialization of the regulation of the family mentioned above. 
                                                
235 For a discussion on the divide between de facto families and marriage see F.D. Busnelli, 
(2002) “La famiglia e l’arcipelago familiare”, Rivista di diritto civile, p. 509; F.D. Busnelli & M. 
Santilli,(1993) “La famiglia di fatto”, in G. Oppo, G. Cian & A. Trabucchi (eds.), Commentario al 
diritto italiano della famiglia, VI, 1,  p. 757. 
236 For a discussion of the constitutional family in Italy see F.D. Busnelli, (2002) “La famiglia e 
l’arcipelago familiare”, Rivista di diritto civile, p. 509; C. Grassetti, (1950) “I principi costituzionali 
relativi al diritto familiare”, in P. Calamandrei & A. Levi (eds.), Commentario sistematico alla 
Costituzione italiana; A.M. Sandulli, (1992) “Rapporti etico-sociali, art. 29”, in G. Cian, G. Oppo, 
A. Trabucchi (eds.), Commentario al diritto italiano della famiglia, I; M. Bessone, G. Alpa, A. 
D’Angelo, G. Ferrando, M.R. Spallarossa, (2002) La famiglia nel nuovo diritto; M. Fortino, (2004) 
Diritto di famiglia. I valori, I principi, le regole. 
237 Corte Costituzionale, ord. 15 April 2010, n. 138. 
238 Komesar, N. Law’s Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
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VII) Preempting The Potential Of Europe’s Role 
The titles above refer to the failed attempts of The Social due to the fact that it was 
the classical notion of the family that was constitutionalized which in fact further 
embedded the family/market dichotomy intensifying the family’s quarantined 
position. That stated, through the shift from formal equality which characterized 
classical legal thought to social equality and moreover, via the infiltration of EU 
law,239 the scope of law began to shift in terms of using law to meet social needs. This 
can be noted as the very early stages of the third globalization that further developed 
into balancing and managing difference. Let us for now though, limit our analysis to 
the national setting and the effects of equality on family regulation.  
A. IRELAND 
In Ireland, it was not until legislation on equal pay was introduced in 1974 and 
employment equality legislation followed in 1977, both as a result of European 
directives, that remuneration rates between men and women were formally equalized. 
This, considering the male breadwinner model of the family that had been entrenched 
since even before the first globalization, finally began to break down the walls of the 
exceptionalized family in terms of equal treatment of the constitutive adult members. 
Moreover, the recognition of the need for equal treatment at the European level 
finally paved a way for the social revolution to take hold within the family in terms of 
both its private and institutional dynamics, catapulting peripheral family law issues to 
the supranational level which we will see in Part II. 
The EU influence on national conceptions of equality came with anti-
discrimination legislation. Anti-discrimination in itself is a very powerful tool and one 
that has developed into what might be referred to by now as a separate legal 
discipline.240 Moreover, it has repeatedly been referred to by the CJEU, which has 
                                                
239 Which, as we will see in Part II, provided the necessary legitimizing links in terms of EU 
involvement in the peripheral cases which are analysed in Chapter IV.  
240 See for example the extensive work of Schiek, D.,  Waddington, L., and Bell, M., (eds.) with 
the collaboration of Choudhury, T., De Schutter, O., Gerards, J., McColgan, A., and Moon, 
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played an integral role in developing the principle of non-discrimination, as a general 
principle of EU law by which241 all discrimination based on nationality is prohibited 
by the European Union Treaties.242 This was considered as a fundamental stepping-
stone in removing barriers to free movement within the internal market243 and has 
also played a key role in Union citizenship. Initially the principle of non-
discrimination was limited to sex discrimination in employment.244 However, this 
principle was gradually extended in both primary and secondary law based on the 
general principle of non-discrimination that the CJEU derived from the general 
principles of law, fundamental rights and indeed taking into consideration the 
common constitutional traditions of the Member States. 
On the basis of this, the Treaty of Amsterdam reinforced existing provisions in 
the EC Treaty on preventing pay-related discrimination between men and women 
contained in Article 141.245 In fact, it went beyond this by delineating a new role for 
the EU in promoting equality between men and women in general in Articles 2 and 
                                                                                                                                      
G., Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination 
Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007). 
241 See Maduro, M.P., “The European court of Justice and Anti-Discrimination Law”, European 
Anti-Discrimination Law Review, Issue No. 2, Oct 2005. And also  Micklitz, H-M. The Politics of 
Judicial Co-operation in the EU – Sunday Trading, Equal Treatment and Good Faith (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), where the analysis in relation to non discrimination and gender equality 
in the UK demonstrates that the British courts have, more or less, followed the rulings of the 
CJEU, shaping equality developments in the UK. See also Micklitz, H-M. “Judicial Activism of 
the European Court of Justice and the Development of the European Social Model in Anti-
Discrimination and Consumer Law”, on file with the author. 
242  Article 12 EC. This article directly prohibits any discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality. It concerns the equal treatment of all citizens of member states of the EC in any 
member state. 
243 The principle of non-discrimination applies also therefore to the free movement of goods in 
Article 90 EC. 
244 Ibid. 
245 The basic provision in the EC Treaty is that “Each Member State shall . . . ensure and . . . 
maintain the application the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal 
work”(Treaty of Rome Article 141). Following this The Equal Pay Directive 
(75/117/EEC) provides that “the principle of equal pay for men and women outlined in Article 
[141] .... means, for the same work or for work to which equal value is attributed, the 
elimination of all discrimination on grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of 
remuneration” (Article 1) and the The Equal Treatment directive (76/207/EEC) is designed to 
put into effect “the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, including promotion, and to vocational training .....”. Further, a new 
amending equal treatment directive 2002/73/EC was made on 23rd September 2002 designed 
to modernise the Equal Treatment directive (76/207/EEC)  
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3246. In a ground-breaking new Article, Article 13, the Treaty empowered the EU 
to combat all discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion, disability, 
age and sexual orientation. On the basis of Article 13 of the EC Treaty, the Council 
adopted a directive designed to combat discrimination based on racial or ethnic 
origin (Directive 2000/43/EC) and a directive banning discrimination in employment 
on the grounds mentioned in Article 13 with the exception of sex (Directive 
2000/78/EC).  Protection therefore at the supranational level is quite extensive.247 
From the national end of the spectrum, we can identify that the 
comprehensiveness of non-discrimination legislation in the Member States is 
beginning to concretise and indeed we can note more emphasis on managing 
difference. In Ireland,248 the Constitution enshrines a guarantee of equality in Article 
40.1:249  
All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law. This shall not be held 
to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to differences of 
capacity, physical and moral, and of social function. 
However, in the past, the Irish judiciary have been reluctant to realise the potential of 
this provision exemplified by the case of Murphy v. Attorney General250. In fact, many 
early advances in equality law have in fact seeped into the Irish legal system via cases 
brought before the European Court of Human Rights, and, as noted, more recently 
by the anti- discrimination principles emanating from the both the primary and 
secondary law of the European Union and case law of the CJEU. This is evident from 
                                                
246 Article 2 EC Treaty requires Member States to promote equality between men and women. 
Article 3 paragraph 2 EC Treaty demands that the EC shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and 
promote equality, between men and women in all its activities. 
247 We can make reference here also to the Employment Equality Act 1996. 
248 For a comprehensive report on non discrimination in Ireland and its development, please see 
O’Farrell, O., Report on Measures to Combat Discrimination: Directives 2000/43/EC and 
2000/78/EC, Country Report, Ireland, 2008, European Network of Legal Experts in the Non 
Discrimination Field. 
249 All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law. This shall not be held to 
mean that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to differences of capacity, 
physical and moral, and of social function. 
250 Murphy v. Attorney General [1982] IR 241. 
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the domestic, secondary legislation in Ireland which consists of the Equality Acts251, 
prohibiting discrimination across nine grounds, including direct and indirect 
discrimination, 252  by victimisation, harassment, instructions to discriminate, the 
procurement of discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, gender, age, disability, 
sexual orientation, marital status, family status and membership of the Traveller 
Community. 
B. UK 
In relation to the UK, it is hardly surprising given its history and the fact that it is 
considered the most multi-cultured253 of the Member States, that anti-discrimination 
legislation was introduced quite early as opposed to what we have seen in Ireland and 
since the UK has no written constitution254 it is reliant on legislation to make up the 
body of equality law. The Race Relations Act 1976255 (with subsequent amending 
legislation) prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, 
colour, race, national origin and nationality in employment and occupation, access to 
goods and services, education, housing and the performance of public functions. The 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995256 (with subsequent amending legislation) prohibits 
direct discrimination and unjustified less favourable treatment on the grounds of being 
disabled in employment and occupation, access to goods and services, education, 
housing and the performance of public functions. It also requires reasonable 
accommodation to be made for disabled persons across these areas. 
Regulations were also introduced in 2003 to give effect to the Equality 
Framework Directive 2000 257  by prohibiting discrimination in employment and 
                                                
251 The Equal Status Acts 2000 and 2004 available online at:  
 http://193.178.1.9/index.asp?locID=106&docID=226 
252 In fact the notion of indirect discrimination was unknown in Ireland, and indeed in all 
Member States apart from the UK, until the supranational development. 
253 The 2001 National Census highlighted that 7.9% of the total population is made up of ethnic 
groups. 
254 However it has enacted the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporating the ECHR into UK law. 
255 The Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA 1976). It applies in England, Scotland and Wales. 
256 The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA 1995). It applies in England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (in relation to employment). 
257 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation. 
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occupation on the basis of religious belief or sexual orientation. Previously, 
discrimination on the grounds of religious belief was only prohibited if it constituted 
indirect race discrimination. The subsequent Equality Act 2006258 has extended 
protection against discrimination on the grounds of religious belief to education, 
housing, the provision of goods and services and to the performance of public 
functions. The Equality Act 2010259 has recently been passed. Its aim is to combine all 
of the equality enactments within Great Britain and provide comparable protections 
across all equality strands. 
C. ITALY 
In Italy260, the 1948 Constitution261 includes a general principle of equality requiring 
equal treatment irrespective of, among other things, race and religion, and in general 
irrespective of “personal and social conditions”. 
The first legislative enactment of advanced anti-discrimination law came in 
1998 with the enactment of the Immigration Act. 262  This law provides for a 
comprehensive set of remedies against racial, ethnic and religious discrimination by 
forbidding direct and indirect discrimination by individuals and public authorities. 
The protection afforded by the act extends to discrimination on the ground of 
nationality. 
                                                
258 Equality Act 2006.  
259 Equality Act 2010. 
260 For a comprehensive report on non-discrimination in Italy and its development, please see 
Simoni, A., Report on Measures to Combat Discrimination: Directives 2000/43/EC and 
2000/78/EC, Country Report, Italy, 2008, European Network of Legal Experts in the Non 
Discrimination Field. 
261 Article 3 provides that: (1) All citizens have equal social status and are equal before the law, 
without regard to their sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, and personal or social 
conditions. (2) It is the duty of the republic to remove all economic and social obstacles that, by 
limiting the freedom and equality of citizens, prevent full individual development and the 
participation of all workers in the political, economic, and social organization of the country. 
262 Decreto legislativo 25 luglio 1998, n. 286 Testo unico delle disposizioni concernenti la 
disciplina dell’immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero. 
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In order to transpose Directives 2000/43/EC263 and 2000/78/EC264, in July 
2003 two decrees, legislative decree 215/2003 and legislative decree 216/2003 were 
approved by the Italian government.265 They practically reproduce the text of each 
Directive. Decree 215/2003 is thus applicable, within all fields mentioned in Directive 
43/2000 in relation to discrimination on ground of race and ethnic origin, while 
decree 216/2003 applies within the field of employment to discrimination based on 
religion and belief, sexual orientation, disability and age.  
From this outline of relevant equality provisions in the national systems, we 
can see a clear shift from the formal, contract equality that characterised the first 
globalization to the emergence of legislation aimed at protecting certain vulnerable 
groups in society – generally those that had been considered deviant according to 
classical ideology. As we will see from national case law examples however, not even 
the rhetoric of equality, which, as we will see gained much momentum during the 
third globalization, could disconnect the family from marriage and local law. 
VIII) Continued Discontent 
Although attempts to infiltrate the family were made by the social, discontent with the 
legal situation of many “patchwork” families in relation to new structures and 
ideological underpinnings can be evidenced via some interesting cases that have come 
before national courts in recent times – some of which stem directly from migration 
and the cross pollination of legal traditions, religion and culture and others which 
already existed at the national level but have been exacerbated by migration.  
 
                                                
263 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. 
264 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation. 
265 Decreto legislativo 9 luglio 2003, n. 215 Attuazione della direttiva 2000/43/CE per la parità 
di trattamento tra le persone indipendentemente dalla razza e dall’origine etnica (published in 
Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 186 of August 12, 2003). Decreto legislativo 9 luglio 2003, n. 216 
Attuazione della direttiva 2000/78/CE per la parità di trattamento in materia di occupazione e 
di condizioni di lavoro (published in Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 187 of August 13, 2003).   
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In 2006 the High Court of Ireland, in the case of Mc D. v L. & Anor,266 found 
that a lesbian couple and their child, conceived via sperm donation, were a “de facto 
family”, opening up the possibility of expanding upon the Irish definition of the 
family, one that might concentrate on the substance of the family rather than its 
constitutional form. Shortly after this revolutionary pronouncement though, the same 
case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Ireland267 which categorically rejected the 
notion that there exists an institution of a de facto family in Ireland, maintaining the 
exclusionary ethos of Irish law. 
Another interesting case that has been presented to the German Federal 
Constitutional Court268 concerned the constitutionality of a provision which allowed 
for “stepchild-adoption” in registered same-sex partnerships. Interestingly, the court 
in this case did not make reference to the sex of the parents, illustrating a significant 
advance with the Court basing its reasoning on the substance of the relationship 
within the family and by so doing untying the constitutional straightjacket within 
which family law is normally bound.269 
In a similar vein, the Corte Costituzionale270 in Italy heard a case concerning the 
refusal of the local administration in Venice to recognise a same sex marriage. Three 
points of law to be considered i.e. whether the recognition of a same sex marriage 
would be in conflict with the civil code, whether Article 3 of the Italian Constitution 
prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in cases of same sex marriage and 
also, the court sought guidance from the Constitutional Court regarding the gender 
neutral marriage stipulation in Article 29 of the Constitution. The case was declared 
inadmissible, citing the inappropriateness of deciding this issue in the courts and 
                                                
266 Mc D. v L. & Anor (2008) IEHC 96. 
267 Mc D. v L. & Anor (2009) IESC 81. 
268 Constitutional Court Decision, No. 1 BvL 15/09 of 10.08.2009. For a summary of the case in 
English, please see http://www.non-discrimination.net/content/media/DE-17-FlashRep-
BVefGzuAdop.pdf. 
269 On the issue of stepchild adoption, recent calls for reform of the field in Ireland are very telling in 
that the legislation in force currently requires mothers to adopt their own children when their new 
partners apply to adopt them, meaning that if a husband wishes to adopt his wife’s child from a 
previous relationship, the woman must give up her legal rights and adopt her own child as part of what 
is known as the “step-family” process. 
270 Corte Costituzionale, ord. 15 April 2010, n. 138. 
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rather inferring that the matter is one for the discretion of Parliament reflecting the 
institutional choices271 that are being made by Member States. 
In addition, the mutable and immutable characteristics of the family caused by 
the cross pollination of diverse cultures, religions, definitions and traditions have given 
rise to other interesting debates. This cross fertilisation can especially be noted in 
relation to religion and education. One need only mention the very controversial 
issues of religious symbols and religious dress that have been highly publicised and 
reported by the media in recent times.272 One particular case however deserves 
attention here since it involves the intricacies of religion, education, and the role of the 
family both in terms of its public and private dynamics. The Jews’ Free School case273 in 
the UK reached the Supreme Court in 2009. It concerned a test of ‘Jewishness’ 
conducted by the admissions board of the Jews’ Free School. The Chief Rabbi applied 
a test based on maternal descent which resulted in a boy, who was a practicing 
Orthodox Jew, being refused admission to a Jewish school because his mother had 
converted to Judaism in a ceremony not recognised by the Chief Rabbi. The majority 
of the Supreme Court concluded however that the JFS admission policy discriminated 
on the grounds of ethnic origin and was, in consequence, unlawful. We can make 
reference here to another similar case which came before the Dutch Supreme Court, 
the Maimonides case274 concerning the right to education. Similarly in this case, the 
admission of the young boy to the particular school was based on a test measuring the 
‘Jewishness’ of the applicant. The school in question here, a Jewish-oriented 
                                                
271 Komesar, N., Law’s Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
272  A very recent and interesting case can be noted here. It concerns a decision of the 
Administrative Court of Amsterdam which allowed for a penal deduction of welfare allowances 
for a Muslim man who refused to cut his beard to a maximum length of 3-5 centimeters and in a 
second case concerning the same man, refused to shake hands with women. The case can be 
found by following this link: 
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BK7175&
u_ljn=BK7175 and a summary in English here: 
 http://www.non-discrimination.net/content/media/NL-24-Flash%20Report%20NL-
02%20Welfare%20benefits%20Muslim%20man.pdf.  
273R (on the application of E) (Respondent) v Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS 
and others (United Synagogue) (Appellants), [2009] UKSC 15. 
274 See De Vosg, B.J. “The Netherlands Report” in Brüggemeier, A., Colombi Ciacchi & G 
Comandé (eds.) Fundamental Rights and Private Law in Europe Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
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Maimonides school, refused to admit the student because the student’s mother was 
not an orthodox Jew. The court inferred from this that neither was the boy. The 
Dutch Supreme Court held that, although the State is obliged to respect the parents’ 
choice of religiously or philosophically inspired educational system, the school was not 
in the same way obliged.  
These cases highlight the phenomenon of what has already been referred to as 
‘intercultural’ or ‘international’ families, in the sense that as a result of global 
migration, family relationships are experiencing the interminglement of religions, 
traditions and cultures, and difficult legal questions are arising there from. Further, we 
can note the case that came before the Corte di Cassazione275 in 2008 in Italy concerning 
the Islamic legal tradition of the Kafalah. Specifically, the question in this case 
contemplated whether or not the Kafalah tradition could be recognised in deciding on 
family reunification notwithstanding its exclusive contractual nature and the problems 
arising from the impossibility of judicial intervention concerning the factual situation 
of the wellbeing of the child and/or the capability of the guardian. In addition to 
illustrating issues of migration, this case also serves to highlight the intricate problems 
that have arisen as a result of socializing attempts. 
These cases not only serve to highlight a certain restlessness in terms of 
national, political processes and debates on advancing family law but they also 
highlight the failure of the social in that the issues coming before the courts are 
considerably different from those that were contemplated one hundred years ago 
however little advance has been made either at the legislative level or the adjudication 
level to provide legal protection.  
IX) Concluding Remarks 
We began this chapter by highlighting the potential of the social in breaking down the 
family/market dichotomy. We conclude by highlighting its failure in that the 
                                                
275 Sezione Prima Civile, 20 March 2008 n. 7472. In this case the Cassazione accepted the 
Kafalah tradition with a view to meeting the ends of family reunification and reversed the 
decision of the Ministero degli Affari Esterni.  
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conception of the family established by the first globalization was enshrined by 
national constitutions i.e. the family based on marriage, regulated locally, quarantined 
from the market ideology, based on tradition, custom, values, and morals. Because of 
this constitutionalisation, there was little room to break the dichotomy and, as we 
have seen, judicial interpretation of the constitutional family did little to change this. 
The internal dynamics remained entrenched in the sense that the male-breadwinner 
model remained the central focus, relationships within the family were tainted by the 
patriarchal approach that because internalized by Classical Legal Thought resulting 
in the oppression of women that was even constitutionalized as we noted in the case of 
Ireland. The family therefore and its members remained in the constitutional straight 
jacket. 
However, as we noted in the end, social justice i.e. the social justice concept 
that was being developed at the EU level in terms of equality was beginning to take 
shape towards the end of Social and beginning of the Neo-formalist period in Member 
States. We will argue that it was not until this neo-formalist approach took hold that 
certain real and constructive indents were made finally attacking the impasse we have 
described until now. 
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Chapter III:  Deconstructing The Classical 
Family 
 Duncan Kennedy’s third globalization of legal thought embraced two contradictory trends. It 
maintained the social, but now without the rationalist assumption that social interests would 
eventually be correctly subserved by the emergence of legal rules that would optimally adjust them: they 
were now politicized as conflicting social interests, and the best that law could do would be to balance 
them in the least bad way that lawmakers could ascertain276 
I) Introduction 
Thus far, we have delineated the particular development of domestic relations from 
originally being housed in Blackstone’s oeconomical relations to the subsequent shift 
in legal thinking caused by the classical theorists, particularly Savigny, leading to the 
notorious status/contract distinction and finally the successive transformations that 
occurred during the twentieth century, which, as argued here, were not enough to 
unshackle the family from its straightjacket therefore leading to a persistent isolation 
in terms of law-making and adjudication based on the firmly entrenched dichotomy 
that had been established by classical legal thought. We can say that the family, even 
after the social attack, retained its impermeable character and its quarantined position 
in terms of the overall structure of private law not only at the national level but also 
supranationally as noted in the previous chapter when family regulation was 
juxtaposed with the development of the master/servant relationship into labour law. 
In this chapter, it is argued, as can be anticipated from the preceding chapter, 
that the third globalization, coined by Kennedy as neo-formalism, has the potential to 
break down the fortress that isolates family law and in doing so develop an 
understanding of the family as more than just the traditional family based on marriage 
but rather as a field that should take note and be regulated in accordance with the 
                                                
276 Halley, “What Is Family Law?,” May 8, 2013. p. 263. 
  
122 
peripheral issues that necessarily affect both the internal and external dynamics of 
family relations. Essentially, what we are concerned with is the possibility of 
dismantling the dichotomy with a view to reconstructing a more inclusive approach to 
family regulation and adjudication.  This attempt will be conducted via the four key 
innovations that Halley points to in reference to the shifts that characterise the third 
globalization: the focus on rights; specifically rights to equality; preferably based on 
the Constitution; to be realised through adjudication.277 
Bearing this in mind, in order to set the scene for Part II of this research, this 
chapter aims to delineate the ingredients proposed as possessing this potential we talk 
of. In following the format of the previous two chapters, we will firstly refine what is 
meant by what Kennedy terms neo-formalism, redubbed by Halley as the ‘the concon 
consciousness’278 with a view to constructing the framework within which the case law of 
the European Union Court of Justice can be analysed in reference to peripheral 
family law cases. Subsequently, we will analyse what is proposed as the EU’s move 
towards a new version of the Social in terms of integrating anti-discrimination and 
fundamental rights into legal reasoning providing a new version of the social ideal. We 
will discuss, through some case law examples, the developing rights rhetoric. In doing 
so, we will precisely note where this thesis goes beyond Kennedy’s neo-formalism 
through noting, in an introductory manner, the potential of EU citizenship as a basis 
for a new societal ideal and the process of identity building.  
II) Neo-Formalism 
Neo-formalism centres on an increased importance weighted on human and 
democratic rights, the rule of law, and pragmatism as the legal ideal.279 This third 
globalization, what Kennedy refers to as the contemporary period, is more concerned 
with recognising and managing difference.280 In Kennedy’s own words: 
                                                
277 Ibid. p. 264. 
278 Ibid. p. 3. 
279 Kennedy, “The Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought”, p. 63. 
280 Ibid. p. 65. 
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Between 1945 and 2000, one trend was to think about legal technique, in the aftermath 
of the critiques of CLT and the social, as the pragmatic balancing of conflicting 
considerations in administering the system created by the social jurists. At the same time, 
there was a seemingly contrary trend to envisage law as the guarantor of human and 
property rights and of intergovernmental order through the gradual extension of the rule of 
law, understood as judicial supremacy281 
In terms of rights, this period sees a shift from individual rights and property rights 
that characterized the first globalization, and from group rights and social rights that 
marked the globalization of the social consciousness to an increased focus on human 
rights in terms of policy analysis, policy making and, more importantly for our scope 
here, adjudication. Inherently linked is the transformation in terms of the notion of 
equality. As discernable from the preceding chapters, classical legal thought was more 
focused on personal freedom and the systemization of law leaving little room for 
notions of equality, which, in turn, was very formalistic. This evolved, however, with 
the rise of social law and a more socially orientated view of justice underpinned the 
equality ideal. In this third globalization, what we witness is the rise of equality based 
on anti-discrimination, born from the original EU Treaty agreement and its 
prohibition of discrimination based on nationality, growing into a more extensive 
body of non-discrimination legislation covering not only nationality but additionally 
sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, 
political or other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age or sexual orientation. 282  The details of this development will be 
discussed in more detail below and will of course be illustrated in Part II via the case 
law of the CJEU. For now, in terms of highlighting the characteristics of this neo-
formalist/concon consciousness, suffice it to say that not only has anti-discrimination 
provided a supranational basis for the development of new approach to equality, it 
                                                
281 Ibid. p. 22. 
282 Charter of Fundamental Rights Article 21: 1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other 
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall 
be prohibited. 2. Within the scope of application of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
and of the Treaty on European Union, and without prejudice to the special provisions of those 
Treaties, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. 
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has in fact been acknowledged as a field of law in its own right283 paving the way for a 
legal framework based on equality in consideration of social reality. 
The fundamental basis then in terms of balancing and managing difference 
emanates as rights. Rights cut across the previous division between the social and 
classical legal thought because they possess the potential to give rise to more 
satisfactory solutions when juxtaposed with earlier outcomes pertaining to the classical 
period and the social. For example, we can rely on our market rights at the CJEU 
level to undermine or reduce the scope of social regulation - think here of the Sunday 
Trading case or the general critique of CJEU as undermining national social policy284. 
This rights discourse opens the door to individual empowerment via access and means 
of rights’ enforcement. They have the potential to give voice to people who previously 
would not exist in classical legal thought paving the way for social inclusion and 
“access justice”285 going beyond neo-formalism. 
What we witness from this rights approach is a dual collective and individual 
approach in terms of both the distributive and protective effects of the path rights, 
equality and justice have followed. We can take the example here of the right to 
personal autonomy deemed so imperative during classical legal thought. However, 
there was no concurrent recognition of unequal bargaining power. The significant 
shift and recognition of the need for a more rights based approach to autonomy is 
exemplified through the “The Unfair Contract Terms Directive”286 which introduces 
a notion of good faith when it comes to the conclusion and execution of consumer 
contracts in Europe. The goal is to prevent significant imbalances when it comes to 
the rights and obligations of consumers on the one hand and sellers and suppliers on 
the other. It outlines a list of examples of specific terms that may be regarded as unfair 
and are therefore considered non-binding for consumers. This approach therefore 
recognizes a situation whereby parties to contractual relationships do not always come 
                                                
283 Schiek, Dagmar. “From European Union non-discrimination towards multidimensional equality 
law for Europe”, in Schiek, Dagmar. & Chege, Victoria. European Union Non-Discrimination Law: 
Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law (Routledge, 2009)  p. 3. 
284 Micklitz, The Politics of Judicial Co-Operation in the EU. 
285 Micklitz, The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law. 
286 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
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to the “bargaining table” as equals and in a sense one party’s inability to exercise 
“correct autonomy” gives rise to the need for certain protective measures. In terms of 
our discourse here, this right to personal autonomy, in consideration of rights in 
conjunction of protection of weaker parties, is considerably debilitated.287 
It is important to state from the outset, and as we will see this becomes a 
fundamental element in terms of the resolution of peripheral family law cases, that this 
third globalization is founded on an identity-based notion of rights. We can think 
about rights for women and as illustrated, for consumers and other ‘vulnerable’ 
groups. This relates to our discourse in terms of the reconstruction of the path to 
asserting one’s rights. For example, during the first globalization we can safely say that 
the path to be followed was one based on a formalistic consensus of wills – full stop. 
The social, in making some moves towards the integration of social justice made room 
for collective considerations and utilitarian approaches to the settlement of disputes. 
Here, however, we see an identity-based notion of rights i.e. I am a woman and a 
consumer and therefore I possess certain rights, not I possess rights per se. This differs 
from the Social in that it reintegrates the social into the legal system at the level of 
arguments about constitutional rights and balancing policy and identity. What are 
political disputes are portrayed as legal disputes about the scope of ones rights but 
they take the Social into account due to their sensitivity towards potentially 
disadvantaged groups, for example, employment legislation in Ireland that contains 
anti-discrimination clauses about travellers, women, ethnic minorities etc. 
At this point, let us recall the impetus of this research: the family has changed 
and is changing, both in structure and substance and with regards to its values and 
ideologies and influences and that those differences must be recognised and granted a 
legal basis, or in other words, legally managed. Additionally, the external dynamics of 
the family and its regulation with regard to its market function in terms of the internal 
market, in light of increased migration within the EU, has given rise to the need to 
discuss a new forum within which peripheral family law disputes can be settled. 
                                                
287 Teubner, G. 
“Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law”, (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239‐285. 
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 In relating this to the outer dimension of the figure illustrating the hypothesis 
of this thesis set out in the introduction, we can indeed connect the peripheral family 
law issues that are coming before the CJEU to this neo-formalistic/concon 
globalization in the sense that, as noted, the family in terms of both internal and 
external dynamics has changed significantly in recent times and consequently via 
rights discourse, access to diverse paths of justice have necessarily been opened. The 
resolution of disputes is no longer confined to the patriarchal system which certainly 
left no room for equality and moreover completely ignored the peripheral subtleties of 
family functions. In terms of the internal dynamics, not only are new family 
compositions on an unequal footing with traditional, constitutionally defined families 
at the national level but they are also facing difficulties when they migrate within 
Europe since their composition and structures are often not recognised by national 
family legal orders creating tensions when it comes to the external dynamics. The EU, 
even though not specifically granted competence in family law issues has been forced 
to use its market based tool box to resolve the peripheral family law issues arising as a 
result of free movement. In fact, according to Kennedy: 
The European Court of Justice is neo-formalist in its interpretation of the canonical 
“freedoms” of movement of goods and persons in a “single market” in part, as is widely 
recognized, in order to drape its legislative power in the cloak of legal necessity288 
It is argued here that this “interpretation” is being conducted via the “necessary” 
application of anti-discrimination and more recently fundamental rights in 
consideration of the fluid structure of the EU that permits one to go beyond the 
competences debate289 in delineating the impact of such judicial reasoning. 
Why though has the Court taken it upon itself to do so? On which basis is the 
Court assuming this neo-formalistic approach to peripheral legal issues? I argue that 
the basis for this stems from the general neo-formalistic langue assumed when the 
                                                
288 Kennedy. p. 69 
289  This point is made by G. Comande in “The Fifth European Union Freedom: Aggregating 
Citizenship…around Private Law” Hans-W. Micklitz, The Constitutionalization of European Private Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2014) in presenting his idea that “a plurality of agents, institutions and legal 
dynamics is relentlessly aggregating a European Citizenship”.  
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Court is confronted with many new, perhaps one might say not strictly market, issues 
that are coming before it. As a result of this, the Court is confronted with breaking 
down the barriers which national states established during the first and second 
globalizations with a view to defending their particular understanding of the family, its 
nature, structure and ideological basis.  
III) The Union’s Move Toward Recoding The Social  
Article 69 of the ECSC Treaty provided for the free movement of all workers in the 
coal and steel industries and also included a provision on the prohibition of 
discrimination. This prohibition however only applied to workers who were in 
possession of a recognised qualification in coalmining or steelmaking. The prohibition 
of discrimination in relation to access to employment was accompanied by a 
prohibition on discrimination based on nationality in relation to remuneration and 
working conditions. Subsequently, the European Economic Community came into 
being. The Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), 
was signed in Rome on 25 March 1957 and entered into force on 1 January 1958. It 
led to the provisions that were adopted by Member States in giving effect to article 69 
of the ECSC Treaty being repealed due to the general character of the free movement 
of workers contained in the EC Treaty. From the title of the Treaty and the notion of 
establishing a European Economic Community, we can decipher the market 
standpoint by which this Treaty which underlined the Treaty. It provided for the 
abolition of obstacles to free movement where movement necessitated the pursuit of 
economic activity.  
With the passing of time, however, we note from both primary and secondary 
legislation the weakening of the economic dimension of free movement. This was 
essentially caused by the intensification of the integration process in Europe, a change 
in the objectives of the EC which, as previously mentioned, it was argued were social 
as opposed to solely economic and most importantly for our purposes the broad 
interpretation that the Court gave to both primary and secondary EC law. In relation 
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to secondary legislation, this change in objective is exemplified by Directive 
90/364/EEC290 which conferred a right to enter and reside to nationals of Member 
States who did not already enjoy this right under other provisions of Community law 
provided that sufficient resources were available to the migrant and that he or she was 
covered by sickness insurance. The Directive also extended this right to reside to 
family members, defined at that time as the spouse of the applicant and their 
dependant descendants and dependant relatives in the ascending line of the holder of 
the right of residence and his/her spouse. Equivalent rights were also extended to 
students and retired persons though directives 93/96/EEC291 and 90/365/EEC292 
respectively. Furthermore, Directive 2004/38/EC293 on the right to move and reside 
freely within the EU, coined ‘the Citizens Directive’, further bolstered the free 
movement rights of EU citizens. From these Directives, we can note the extension of 
the rights to move and reside beyond the scope of economic activity solely. For our 
purposes, these developments not only paved the way for arrival of peripheral family 
law cases at the supranational level but they also legitimized EU adjudication in the 
various fields under examination that necessarily impact family life. This will be 
examined in Part II. For now, we will proceed to delineate the neo-formalistic tools at 
the Court’s disposal aimed at integrating a new version of the Social.  
A. Anti-Discrimination 
All discrimination based on nationality is prohibited by the European Union 
Treaties.294 This was considered as a fundamental stepping-stone in removing barriers 
to free movement within the internal market295 and has also played a key role in 
Union citizenship. Initially, the principle of non-discrimination was limited to sex 
                                                
290 Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence, Oj L 180, 13/7/1990, 26 
291 Council Directive 93/96/EEC of October 1991, OJ L 317, 18/12/1993, 59. 
292 Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990, OJ 1990 L 180, 13/7/1990, 28. 
293 Directive 2004/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States. 
294 Article 12 EC. This article directly prohibits any discrimination on the grounds of nationality. It 
concerns the equal treatment of all citizens of Member States of the EC in any Member State. 
295 The principle of non-discrimination applies also therefore to the free movement of goods in Article 
90 EC. 
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discrimination in employment.296 However, this principle was gradually extended in 
both primary and secondary law based on the general principle of non-discrimination 
that the CJEU derived from the general principles of law, fundamental rights, and 
indeed taking into consideration the common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States.   
On the basis of this, the Treaty of Amsterdam reinforced existing provisions in 
the EC Treaty on preventing pay-related discrimination between men and women 
that were contained in Article 141.297 In fact, it went beyond this by delineating a new 
role for the EU in promoting equality between men and women in general in Articles 
2 and 3.298 In a ground-breaking new Article, Article 13, the Treaty empowered the 
EU to combat all discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion, 
disability, age and sexual orientation. On the basis of Article 13 of the EC Treaty, the 
Council adopted a directive designed to combat discrimination based on racial or 
ethnic origin (Directive 2000/43/EC) and a directive banning discrimination in 
employment on the grounds mentioned in Article 13 with the exception of sex 
(Directive 2000/78/EC).  This is not to mention the equality provisions now 
enshrined in the Charter to which we will come below. Protection, therefore, at the 
supranational level is quite extensive. 
B. Fundamental Rights 
When the EU was created, the original treaties did not contain any reference to the 
protection of human rights as it was thought that the creation of an internal market 
                                                
296 Ibid. 
297 The basic provision in the EC Treaty is that "Each Member State shall . . . ensure and . . . maintain 
the application the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work"(Treaty of 
Rome Art 141). Following this The Equal Pay Directive (75/117/EEC) provides that "the principle of 
equal pay for men and women outlined in Article [141] .... means, for the same work or for work to 
which equal value is attributed, the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of sex with regard to all 
aspects and conditions of remuneration" (Art 1) and the The Equal Treatment directive 
(76/207/EEC) is designed to put into effect "the principle of equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, including promotion, and to vocational training .....". Further, a new 
amending equal treatment Directive 2002/73/EC was made on 23rd September 2002 designed to 
modernise the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC). 
298 Art. 2 EC Treaty requires Member States to promote equality between men and women. Art. 3 
para. 2 EC Treaty demands that the EC shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and promote equality, 
between men and women in all its activities. 
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would not require recourse to a body of human rights provisions. However, on 
recognition that encouraging the free movement of persons, goods and services 
essentially lead to more than an efficient functioning of the market, the European 
Court of Justice as it was then, increasingly decided cases with human and 
fundamental rights aspects. In an effort to render effective a more rights-based 
approach and in order to substantiate EU citizenship, the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was proclaimed in 2000, the content of which reflects 
significantly the European Convention on Human Rights and more generally 
protection afforded to nationals of Member States by their various Constitutions. The 
Charter, originally a declaration of compliance with human rights, became a legally 
binding document in 2009 when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. 
The development of these legal tools and their interpretation by the Court 
indicates, as we will see, the general assumption of a rights rhetoric at the 
supranational level which in turn paves the way for neo-formalist interpretation 
focused on managing the paradigm shift from internal market concerns to 
globalization and the need to respond to social concerns299 as we will see from the 
following case law analysis that serves to delineate the permeation of rights discourse, 
rhetorical or not,300 in the early case law of the court. 
IV) Shifting Interpretations… 
Kennedy’s third Globalization talks of balancing difference. This, I argue, is being 
played out via the more general rights rhetoric that is developing at the EU level. 
Originally, the idea behind the European Economic Community revolved around 
establishing an internal market according to which legally relevant principles would 
enjoy mutual recognition and regulatory barriers would be demolished so as to 
provide an optimal forum within which the goals of a properly functioning market 
could be achieved.301 On the surface, these economic aspirations remain the parole 
                                                
299 Micklitz, The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law, p. 62. 
300 This will be dealt with in more detail in Part II. 
301 Collins, H. The European Civil Code: The Way Forward, (Cambridge University Press, 2008) p. 22. 
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espoused by Europe and its institutions, which, it may be argued camouflages its 
reasoning with the language of economic freedoms. However, on close examination of 
the treaties and case law, we can discern a certain deflection from the formal 
economic requirements. Much evidence of the Union’s shift in this direction can be 
provided here. 
A. Economic to Social 
First of all, it is clear from the changes introduced by the Treaty on the European 
Union, which at the time was considered as a merely a symbolic move, that the 
supranational institutions’ aspirations have shifted from an economic to a more 
politically and socially orientated objective. The case law examination of the 
citizenship provisions that follows, by way of introduction below and more profoundly 
in the direction of family regulation in Part II, clearly exemplifies that the move was 
not just a symbolic one. In fact, it can be argued that the introduction of EU 
citizenship provisions, even though ancillary to national citizenship, have proven to 
provide not only a path that individuals can follow with the purpose of exercising 
participation in the EU but also it has provided the Court with an avenue through 
which the EU’s social agenda can be expressed. In fact, I argue that it is via the 
Citizenship provisions that the Court has entered the sphere of the family via 
peripheral issues, finally making some indents to the family/market dichotomy. We 
will see that this argument, resulting in the development of a new societal ideal, in fact 
goes well beyond the neo-formalistic langue related to the interpretation of anti-
discrimination provisions and fundamental rights.   
B. Protecting Fundamental Rights  
Secondly, the Union’s pledge to protect fundamental rights has obviously impacted 
the Court’s interpretation and reasoning of cases. This impact has and is expected to 
intensify in the future. The pledge referred to here is contained in the Treaty of the 
European Union according to which the Union is based on the values of human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the aim of which is to 
strengthen the protection of fundamental rights by making those rights more visible 
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and more explicit for citizens, provided another important stepping stone in the 
fundamental rights area. It collates personal, civic, political, economic and social 
rights into one all-encompassing document which has become legally binding on the 
Union since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. In addition to this, the 
Treaty of Lisbon also establishes the legal basis for the Union’s accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights essentially meaning that the Strasbourg 
Court will assume competence to review the acts of the EU institutions. 
However, even before these legislative progressions were set in motion, the 
Court had already made inroads into the area of fundamental rights reflecting a 
general trend to incorporate them into the jurisprudence of the Union. Indeed, this 
general trend can even be witnessed in the area of private law302 in which the Court 
has tended towards a more frequent reference to fundamental rights. To take some 
early judgements by way of example, the Court, in the case of Erich Stauder v City of 
Ulm303 recognised that fundamental human rights are indeed enshrined in the general 
principles of Community law and are within the scope of protection granted by the 
Court. Subsequent recognition can be noted in the case of Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel304 in which the 
court furthered its position in stating that respect for fundamental rights forms an 
integral part of the general principles of law protected by the CJEU and the protection 
of such rights must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of 
the community. Other cases including Omega 305  and Schmidberger 306  denote a 
                                                
302 G. Brüggemeier, A. Colombi Ciacchi & G Comandé (eds.) Fundamental Rights and Private Law in Europe 
Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), G. Brüggemeier, A. Colombi Ciacchi & G Comandé 
(eds.) Fundamental Rights and Private Law in Europe Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), C. Mak, Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law. A comparison of the impact of fundamental rights on 
contractual relationships in Germany, Italy the Netherlands and England, (Kluwer Law International, 2008); Jan 
M. Smits. "Private Law and Fundamental Rights: A Sceptical View"in T. Barkhuysen and S. 
Lindenbergh. Constitutionalisation of Private Law (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2006). 9-22. Available at: 
http://works.bepress.com/jan_smits/5. 
303Case C-29/69 Erich Stauder v City of Ulm. 
304Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel. 
305 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen – und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürger- meisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn. 
306Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich. 
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considerable shift from a strict interpretation of internal market objectives to perhaps 
a more socially orientated stance by the Court.307  
C. Equal Treatment 
Thirdly, the Union’s strife for and development of equal treatment, described below, 
has led to a significant body of anti-discrimination law in Europe. What is more 
pertinent for our purposes are the interesting case law developments, particularly in 
the private law sector.308 Take for instance the Feryn309 case in which the Court ruled 
that a public declaration by an employer stating that he would not employ persons of 
a certain ethnic or racial origin, constitutes direct discrimination in respect of 
recruitment within the meaning of Article 2(2) (a) of Council Directive 2000/43/EC 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial 
or ethnic origin. We can also make reference to the Wood310 case. Here, the Court 
held that EU law prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality which would 
result in citizens of other Member States, who live and work in France, being 
excluded from receiving compensation from a French State fund intended to help 
victims of crimes. To take one more example, we note the case of Mangold311 
concerning age discrimination within the scope of the Framework Employment 
Directive312. The case illustrates the expansive approach granted to the principle of 
equality by the CJEU, even though the period for transposing the Framework 
Employment Directive into national law had not yet expired, the CJEU ruled that the 
general principle of equal treatment in EC law prohibited a national measure from 
                                                
307 On this however, see also the Viking (Case C-438/05) and Laval (Case C-3341/05) cases. 
308Among some of the most interesting cases concerning non discrimination, please see Case C-144/04, 
Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm; Case C-555/07 Seda Kucukdeveci v Swedex; Case C-54/07 Centrum voor 
gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismbestrijding v Firma Feryn NV; Case C-164/07 James Wood v Fonds de garantie 
des victimes des actes de terrorisme et d’autres infractions; Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge; Case C-
353/06 Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul v Leonhard Matthias Grunkin-Paul and Standesamt Stadt Niebüll; 
Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen. See also Eriksson, A., “European 
Court of Justice: Broadening the Scope of European Non Discrimination Law”, 7, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 2009. 
309Case C-54/07 Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismbestrijding v Firma Feryn NV . 
310Case C-164/07 James Wood v Fonds de garantie des victimes des actes de terrorisme et d’autres infractions. 
311 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm. 
312 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation. 
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discriminating on the basis of age. Therefore, we note that indeed even the CJEU has 
embarked on the quest of balancing difference. 
 In fact, earlier intervention by the CJEU would seem to have enhanced the 
neo-formalist based reasoning, especially when we consider the wide interpretation, or 
as some say the manipulation,313 the Court gave to Article 141 which provided for 
equal treatment between men and women in the area of remuneration. It is not my 
intention here to deal with the so-called competence creep 314  or the issue of 
legitimacy.315 Rather, it suffices to bring to attention at this point that the scope of 
Union law has shifted.  
We have noted the change in the scope of Union law and the basis for it. 
However, what has this meant in reality? This can once again be examined through a 
neo-formalist interpretation of developments in terms of the master/servant 
relationship.  
D. From Master/Servant To Modern Employment 
As we noted in the previous chapter, the social transformed contractual relationships 
between private parties. The result of the third globalization goes even further. In fact, 
as suggested by Collins,316  the extensiveness of social regulation in the field of 
employment law now tends to overshadow its private law origins.  In fact, anti-
discrimination and the constitutionalization of equal treatment at the EU level has 
elevated these legal relationships to an inconceivable level from the perspective of 
                                                
313 Pollicino, O., “Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of the Principle of Equality 
Between Judicial Activism and Self Restraint”, German Law Journal, Vol 5, No. 3, 2004. 
314 For this please see, Maduro, M.P. “Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context 
of Constitutional Pluralism”, European Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2007; Giorgi F., & Triart N., 
“National Judges, Community Judges: Invitation to Journey Through the Looking Glass – On the 
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European Law Journal, Vol 14, No. 6, 2008; Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: 
Towards a European Jurisprudence, Clarendon, Oxford, 1993, pp43-85: Herzog R., & Gerken L., Stop the 
European Court of Justice, available at http://euobserver.com/9/26714/?rk=1  
 
316 Collins, Hugh. “Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation”, in 
Collins, H., Davies, P., & Rideout, R. (eds), Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation (2000) 2,p. 7. 
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classical legal thought317. This process began when the ECJ developed its innovatory 
concept of direct effect permitting the enforcement of individual rights enshrined in 
the treaties in national courts. This position was confirmed in terms of equal pay in 
Defrenne v SABENA318 effectively altering the concept of contractual autonomy shifting 
the contours of private law which would eventually develop into a field of law not only 
subject to the Defrenne logic but which would also be subject to the unwritten, hotly 
debated general principles of EU law which include the principle of equal treatment 
and respect for fundamental rights. Juxtaposing this neo-formalist position of the 
Court with the original scope of the Treaties informatively exemplifies the extent to 
which the aspirations of the EU have developed: 
…it must be concluded that the economic aim pursued by Article 119 of the Treaty, 
namely the elimination of distortions of competition between undertakings established in 
different Member States, is secondary to the social aim pursued by the same provision, 
which constitutes the expression of a fundamental right. 319  
Suffice it to say that via the development from equal pay to a genuine concept of 
equal treatment expressed via the general principles and fundamental rights, 
significant steps have been taken by the court altering the dynamics of private law 
and reintegrating the social in terms of balancing rights.320 
V) …And Beyond  
EU Citizenship adds a new layer in our attempt to reveal the effects of the third 
globalization on the family – a layer that – as is argued here – goes beyond the 
Kennedy’s neo-formalism in constructing a societal ideal according to which private 
law and family law are coming closer together. The case law in this direction implies a 
connection to the EU that was perhaps inconceivable when the internal market was 
                                                
317  Bell, Mark. “Constitutionalization and EU Employment Law” in Micklitz, H.W. The 
Constitutionalization of European Private Law. 
318 C-149/77 - Defrenne v Sabena 
319 Case 50/96 Deutsche Telekom AG v Lilli Schröder 
320 The Schmidberger case acts as an example here. This line of case law will be developed in more 
detail below.  
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established by way of attempting to create a social sphere within which the EU can 
extend its powers of regulation. 
The introduction of EU citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 was 
considered by many as merely a symbolic move by the Union and one which would 
not confer many substantive rights on its addressees.321 This widely held belief 
stemmed from the fact that the Treaty itself made citizenship of the Union depend on 
nationality of a Member State stating that “Citizenship of the Union shall complement and 
not replace national citizenship”. Therefore the benefits of Union citizenship from the very 
beginning were always to be enjoyed as dependent on individual legal systems and 
nationality of Member States. This restrictive view was also supported by the fact that 
free movement and residence rights had already been extended beyond economic 
connotations by secondary law as noted above.322 
The notion of citizenship, however, has to some extent paved the way for the 
emergence of the ‘European Social’ and in fact, has permitted the European 
institutions to take on a role which national states shied away from during the second 
globalization in rejecting the assumption of the role of social engineers in the area of 
family law. The Treaty of Maastricht lessened the economic connotations that had 
provided for the foundational ethos of the Union. Article 17 of the TEU (now Article 
20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) states: 
1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional 
to and not replace national citizenship. 
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the 
Treaties. 
And Article 18.1 (now Article 21.1 of the TFEU) provided: 
                                                
321 With this said, the Treaty did specifically confer some substantive rights on those eligible for Union 
citizenship, such as the right to vote in Parliament elections, the right to petition and the right to a reply 
in the language of a request. 
322 Council Directive 93/96/EEC of the Council of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for 
students and Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees 
and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity. 
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1. Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties 
and by the measures adopted to give them effect. 
These provisions at first sight may not seem so far-reaching especially considering that 
the rights to move and reside had already been extended to non-economic actors 
through secondary law as noted above. Therefore, the innovation of European 
Citizenship did not immediately herald major practical consequences. However, the 
Court has since repeatedly pronounced that Union Citizenship is intended to be the 
fundamental status323 of nationals of the Member States. Moreover, for our purposes, it 
is as a result of the Citizenship provisions that many of the peripheral family law cases 
explained above have come before the CJEU. Also, if we look to the history of the 
Union, and of course after an intense examination of the case law of the Court, we 
can demarcate the exact scope of these measures. On closer examination, the 
importance of the citizenship provisions can be deduced from the fact that movement 
and residence moved from a legislative footing to a Treaty footing, resulting in 
significant consequences indeed, as we will see. 
The case of Martinez Sala 324  was heralded as the first significant 
pronouncement concerning EU citizenship. Indeed the case itself is points to the legal 
avenue peripheral family law cases are coming before the Court. It concerned a 
Spanish woman who was resident in Germany who was unemployed and claiming 
child benefit allowance. An issue arose in relation to the German authority’s refusal to 
grant the benefit based on the fact that she did not possess a valid residence permit at 
the time of the claim. Essentially, the Court held the residence requirement to be a 
limiting condition. In reliance on Article 17 and 18 of the EC Treaty and on the 
principle of non-discrimination based on nationality contained in Article 12 of the 
same, the Court held that nationals of a Member State could rely on their European 
citizenship for protection against discrimination on grounds of nationality by another 
Member State.  
                                                
323 Emphasis added. 
324 Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern Case C-85/96. 
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This case is significant for our purposes since, by including the situation of 
Mrs. Martinez Sala within the scope of application of the EC Treaty, the ECJ 
enlarged that scope in two respects. First, the simple fact that Mrs. Sala was a Union 
citizen lawfully residing in another Member State was enough for her to fall under the 
scope of application of the EC Treaty. Secondly, the ECJ ruled that a benefit 
previously granted only to workers should also be granted to non-economically active 
persons in the EU. We note also from this case the first steps of the Court in assuming 
tentative responsibility concerning the allocation of welfare benefits325 to migrating 
families in Europe. 
It is important to note, however, that there was a certain degree of reluctance 
on the part of the Court, exemplified by the Konstantinidis 326 , Boukhalfa 327  and 
Shingara328 cases, to use the citizenship logic to grant benefits to European citizens. 
Indeed, for some time the Court largely reverted to economic reasoning even though 
the Advocates General in these cases specifically relied on the citizenship provisions. 
The Court in all three cases refused to follow this logic and based its judgments on 
economic considerations, clinging to the pre-Maastricht economic ethos of the Union. 
The Grzelczyk329 case signified a significant stepping stone in the evolution of 
EU citizenship and we note from it the development of a general principle in the 
Court’s jurisprudence, i.e. that discrimination on ground of nationality will not be 
                                                
325 The Trojani case is another important case in the area of granting welfare benefits and in 
developing the relationship between non-discrimination and European Citizenship in the realm of 
social security benefits. The case concerned a French national who was lawfully residing at a Salvation 
Army hostel in Belgium. While residing there, he undertook various jobs amounting to approximately 
30 hours per week in return for his board, lodging and an allowance of 25 euro per week. He applied 
for the Belgian minimex subsistence allowance which was granted to those with inadequate resources. 
This allowance however was refused on the basis that Mr. Trojani was not of Belgian nationality nor 
was he a worker as defined by Council Regulation 1612&68. The ECJ however, in following the 
reasoning in Martinez Sala, was of the opinion that he was exercising his right under Article 18(1) EC 
Treaty and therefore came within the scope of the citizenship provisions. As a result, the Court held 
that as a citizen of the EU Mr. Trojani could rely on Article 12 of the EC Treaty to claim the minimex 
benefit. 
326 In this case the court refused to follow the Opinion of AG Jacobs that migrants should always be 
protected by fundamental rights as general principles of Community law. Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig 
und Landratsamt Calw Ordnungsamt  Case C-168/91. 
327 Boukhalfa v BRD Case C-214/85. 
328 Shingara v Radiom, Case -65 and 111/95 
329 Grzelczyk v Centre public d-aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-a-Neuve Case C-184/99. 
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permitted against EU citizens who have exercised their free movement rights. The 
applicant in the case was a French national who had studied in Belgium for three 
years and who had also worked there so as to sustain himself financially. In his final 
year, Mr. Grzelczyk ceased to work so as to concentrate on his studies and therefore 
applied for the minimex allowance. Similar to the previous case, he was refused the 
allowance based on the fact that he did not fulfill the conditions set out in Belgian law, 
i.e. in order to claim the allowance one must either be of Belgian nationality or a 
worker. The question referred to the Court centered on whether or not the refusal was 
contrary to the EC Treaty provisions on citizenship in combination with the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality. The Court essentially held 
that Articles 12 and 18 EC precluded preconditions such as those in the case at hand. 
The importance of the decision for our purposes lies in the fact that it recognized 
expressly that EU citizenship permits nationals of other Member States lawfully 
residing in the host Member State to access social benefits. 
Bidar330 is another important development in area of citizenship, particularly in 
relation to student’s rights. Essentially, this case concerned the application of a student 
of French nationality for a maintenance loan in the UK. Mr. Bidar’s application was 
refused on the ground that he was not settled in the UK: settled meaning that he 
would have had to be living in the UK for four years for purposes other than full-time 
education. The question referred to the Court was whether a student applying for a 
student loan in the UK could invoke the principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
of nationality laid down in Article 12 EC Treaty. In response to this question, the ECJ 
held that a student, being a resident in a host Member State, could rely on the right of 
equal treatment contained in Article 12 EC Treaty. The Court stressed that a change 
in a student’s financial position cannot automatically adversely affect his/her right of 
residence. In consideration of this, the Court held that it would be unlawful to deny a 
French citizen access to student loans. The Court did however note that a Member 
State could legitimately impose certain conditions on the success of the application 
such as integration into the host Member State therefore implying a minimum 
residence period.  
                                                
330 Bidar v London Borough of Ealing Case C-209/03. 
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In the D’Hoop331 case, the Court had to consider the case of a return migrant. 
Ms. D’Hoop was a Belgian national who, after completing her baccalaureate in 
France, returned to Belgium to continue her studies. On completion of these studies, 
she requested a tide over allowance which was available in Belgium for students in the 
process of entering the labour market for the first time. The Belgian national 
employment office refused the allowance on the basis that Ms. D’Hoop had 
completed her secondary education in France. This decision was appealed by the 
applicant to the Tribunal du Travail de Liege which referred a question to the ECJ. 
Specifically, the court requested a judgment on whether Community law precludes a 
Member State from refusing to grant the tide-over allowance to one of its nationals 
since that national completed her secondary education in another Member State. The 
Court ruled that the Belgian legislation did in fact contravene Article 12 and 18 of the 
EC Treaty demonstrating once again the strength of these provisions when applied 
simultaneously and moreover the assumption of a sort of welfarist role by the Court 
based on the citizenship and non-discrimination provisions. 
In fact, the Court has also assumed this role in relation to job seeker’s 
allowance. The Collins 332  case concerned an applicant who had dual Irish and 
American nationality who moved to the UK with a view to seeking employment 
there. After one month he applied for jobseeker’s allowance which was refused based 
on the fact that he was not an habitual resident in the UK. The ECJ, however, was of 
the opinion that the applicant in fact fell within the scope of application of Article 39 
EC Treaty as a national of a Member State and therefore was entitled to equal 
treatment in seeking employment.  
Another development in relation to students took place in 2005 when the 
Ioannidis333 case was referred to the Court. After completing his secondary education 
in Greece, Mr. Ioannidis moved to Belgium in 1994 where he undertook studies and 
obtained a diploma in physiotherapy. After completing a vestibular course in France 
in 2001 he returned to Belgium and applied for the tide-over allowance. The 
                                                
331 D’Hoop v Office Nationale de l’Emploi Case C-224/98. 
332 Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Case, C-138/02. 
333 Office national de l’emploi v Ioannis Ioannidis,  Case C-258/04. 
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application was refused. The question referred to the Court was whether it is contrary 
to Community law to refuse the tide-over allowance to a national of another Member 
State on the ground that he completed his secondary education in another Member 
State. In response to this question, the ECJ stated that nationals in another Member 
State seeking employment indeed fall within the scope of Article 39 EC Treaty and 
therefore can rely on the prohibition on discrimination. 
In fact, from this selection of case law we note the emergence of a Grundfreiheit 
ohne Markt,334 a de-economisation of the scope of the Union. The initial skepticism in 
relation to the novelty of EU citizenship no longer stands when we look to the actual 
role the Court is assuming in the allocation of social advantages, which prior to the 
introduction of EU citizenship were confined to the competence of Member States. 
In terms of fundamental rights and their impact, in the years before the 
Charter became legally binding, there was some confusion as to the purpose, scope 
and effect of the instrument. For many years, the Court and Advocates General has 
made specific reference to the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
general principles of EU as sources of fundamental rights protection in the EU.  The 
Charter, even though it remained non-binding at this point, provided the CJEU with 
an additional instrument, a toolbox of rights that could be considered and utilised by 
the Court as readymade general principles. In effect, as we will see from the pre-
Lisbon case law examples, the Charter was used an instrument for identifying 
fundamental rights as general principles of Community law. As set out in Parliament v. 
Council: 
the principal aim of the Charter, as is apparent from its preamble, is to reaffirm ‘rights 
as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international 
obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the 
Community Treaties, the [ECHR], the Social Charters adopted by the Community and 
                                                
334 Wollenschlager, F. “A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship 
and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European Integration”, European Law Journal, 
Vol. 17, No. 1, January 2011, pp. 1-34  
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by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court … and of the European Court 
of Human Rights.335 
This is particularly noticeable in reference to cases concerning anti-discrimination. As 
we have already pointed out, the EU institutions have increasingly broadened the 
scope of equality of treatment. With specific reference to the Charter, although the 
Mangold336 case did not explicitly mention it, it did provide an inkling of the direction 
into which the Court planned on going. In fact, this direction was again bolstered in 
the subsequent Kücükdeveci337 case in which it was made clear by the Court that:  
Article 6(1) TEU provides that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union is to have the same legal value as the Treaties. Under Article 21(1) of the 
charter, ‘[a]ny discrimination based on … age … shall be prohibited’.338 
Both cases, although not very forceful in their use of the Charter (in fact Mangold made 
no reference to it at all) did, however, bring into perspective the persuasive character 
that the Court granted to the Charter coupled with the general principles by 
anticipating direct horizontal effect to the general principles.339 This step anticipated 
the post-Lisbon character that the Charter was to assume i.e. that of having the same 
legal value of the treaties.  
VI) Concluding Remarks 
From the above it is clear that a shift in legal reasoning has occurred. The third 
globalization has brought the rights discourse under spotlight having unprecedented 
effects on the structure and contours of private law as illustrated via the development 
of the master/servant relationship into one of employment law overlain with social 
ideals. The constitutionalization of private law at the EU level and the elaboration of 
general principles by the CJEU have underpinned the Union’s reintegration of the 
                                                
335 Case C-540/03  Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I-05769, par. 38. 
336 Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm. 
337 Case C-555/07 Seda Kucukdeveci v Swedex. 
338 Ibid. Para 22. 
339 The Court did so based on the Defrenne doctrine. 
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social and a shift towards a more rights-based and socially orientated Union. 
Moreover, EU Citizenship makes further advances in creating a civic space within 
which the rights of nationals of Member States are provided with further protection. 
Based on these advances, I argue that the Court deconstructs the family/market 
dichotomy via the peripheral issues that it is being presented with. This argument will 
be played out in Part II to which we now turn. 
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Part Two: The Family Coming of Age  
I) Introduction 
This part of the thesis deals with issues relating to the family that have come to the 
fore since the creation of the European Economic Community. It correlates with the 
third globalization, i.e. neo-formalism, described as the globalization of a rights-based 
society. Its peculiarities, as noted in the previous chapter, include an increased 
importance weighted on human and democratic rights, the rule of law, and 
pragmatism as the legal ideal.340 In this era, Kennedy outlines that human rights have 
replaced the role played by private rights in the Classical Legal Thought globalization 
and the socially oriented fundament of the second globalization. We exemplified this 
via the rise of modern employment law and its treatment at the EU level and with 
regard to the development of the general principles of EU. The third globalization, 
what Kennedy refers to as the contemporary period, is more concerned with 
recognising and managing difference.341  
The previous chapter in fact acts as a sort of bridging point. It paved the way 
for a discussion of the principal hypothesis of this thesis which rests on the impetus 
that the regulation of the family is no longer suited to traditional methods. Families 
have shifted from the male breadwinner model to the dual earner model. In fact the 
gender division in care work342 has lessened and instead we are provided with an adult 
worker model.343 The conception that the main purpose of marriage is that of 
procreation has been put into question344. In society, there are many couples, both 
married and co-habiting who freely choose not to procreate and many couples who 
                                                
340 Kennedy, “The Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought”, p. 63. 
341 Kennedy, “The Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought”, p. 65. 
342 In the UK, for example, a spouse or partner of the woman (including same-sex relationships) 
may request a two week paid (at a fixed rate) paternity leave, demonstrating the law’s 
recognition of an increase of gender neutral care work in the home. 
343Lewis, J. “The Changing Context for the Obligation to Care and Earn”, in Maclean, M. (ed.), 
Family Law and Family Values, (Hart Publishing, 2005). 
344 Illustrated above by the example of Ireland and its lifting of the ban on contraceptives.  
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simply cannot procreate. Moreover, many people procreate outside the bonds of 
marriage345 illustrating that marriage is not a necessary condition for procreation and 
vice versa.346 This is largely due to the developed society we now find ourselves living 
in and the influence that self-determination has in the private sphere. 347  Even 
adoption law now refutes the presumption that procreation goes hand in hand with 
marriage. In Ireland348, for example, it is possible for a single person to adopt if the 
Adoption Board considers it desirable, considering the welfare of the child as its 
paramount condition. Indeed, more extensive rights regarding adoption are evidenced 
in the UK where adoption rights for homosexuals are in fact specifically legislated 
for.349 In Italy, adoption remains to a large extent reserved for married couples. 
However, there are exceptions based on the best interests of the child.350 In addition, 
                                                
345 According to the 2006 census in Ireland there were 152,500 lone parent families in Ireland. 
See http://www.cso.ie/.  In fact, a recent poll conducted by the BBC in the UK demonstrates 
that marriage levels in Britain are at an all-time low. For every three weddings there are now 
two divorces - the highest rate in Europe. Moreover, cohabitation has risen 64% in a decade, 
with almost half of children now born outside wedlock inherently signifying a decrease of births 
within the bonds of marriage. The complete results of the poll are available online at  
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_11_07familypoll.pdf   
346 Abrams, K. & Brooks, P. (2009) “Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the 
Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation”, Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, Vol. 21, No. 1 
347 See Brüggemeier, G., Colombi Ciacchi, A., & Comandé G.  (eds.) Fundamental Rights and 
Private Law in Europe Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Brüggemeier, G., 
Colombi Ciacchi, A., & Comandé, G. (eds.) Fundamental Rights and Private Law in Europe Vol. 2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
348 In Ireland, adoption is governed by the Adoption Acts, 1952, 1964, 1974, 1976, 1988, 1991 
and 1998.  
349 See article 49 and 144 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. For a European picture see 
Baraldi, M.B., (2007) “Different Families, Same Rights? Freedom and Justice in the EU: 
Implications of the Hague Programme for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Families 
and their Children”, ILGA Europe, p. 15, Box 2 outlining that Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK provide for second parent adoption whereas Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK all allow for joint adoption. 
350 Art 44 l. Law No. 184/1983 
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scientific advances, 351  for example, artificial insemination, 352  have reduced 
procreation barriers faced by lesbian couples and single people.353 
We have also witnessed a change in attitude in relation to abortion354 and 
divorce.355 Many atypical family forms have emerged and have to some extent, in 
some countries, even been recognised by the law, for instance same sex civil 
partnerships,356 the decriminalisation of homosexual activity357 of heterosexual non-
marital cohabitation358 and the right to marry for transsexuals.359 In general, there has 
been a decrease in the characterisation of cohabitation as sinful and a correlating de-
sacralisation of marriage.360 As opposed to the patriarchal attitude towards the family 
during the first globalization, we note more of an emphasis on gender-neutral 
parenting. In France for example, the term “father’s” authority has been replaced by 
                                                
351 In general here see Shapiro, J. “Changing Ways, New Technologies and the Devaluation of 
the Genetic Connection to Children” in Maclean, M. (ed.), Family Law and Family Values, (Hart 
Publishing, 2005). 
352 Waldman, E.A. (2006) “What Do We Tell the Children?”, Capital University Law Review, Vol. 
35, No. 2.; TJSL Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1020095, discussing the rights of children in 
relation to Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) that are now offering an array of ways to 
parenthood for infertile heterosexuals, gay and lesbian couples, and singletons of varying sexual 
preferences. 
353  This depends of course on whether or not national legislation provides for artificial 
insemination for same sex couples or single people. There is no Irish legislation dealing with 
assisted reproduction as yet. The Irish Medical Council’s ethical guidelines do not specify that 
unmarried partners or same sex partners are excluded from availing of fertility treatments. The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, as amended in 2008, in the UK extends clear legal 
rights to lesbian couples permitting fertility treatment and indeed granting parental rights and 
responsibilities. The actual moral implications of this will not be discussed here. For an overview 
see E.A. Waldman, ibid. Suffice to say that scientific advancements have lead to a situation in 
which marriage is not necessarily a precondition of procreation. 
354 Abortion however is another delicate issue that reflects the intricacies of institutional decision 
making. See Bradley, D. “Convergence in Family Law: Mirrors, Transplants and Political 
Economy”, Oxford University Comparative Law Forum, 2 2001. 
355 Even in Ireland, where there was much opposition, divorce was finally legislated for after a 
Constitutional Amendment in 1996; albeit in a restricted form. 
356  This is evident in many Member States, for example, the UK has enacted the Civil 
Partnerships Act 2004 which has been commended for its comprehensiveness in granting rights 
comparable to marriage to same sex couples. Spain in 2004 opened the doors of marriage to 
same sex couples. 
357 The long overdue deciminalisation of homosexuality in Ireland didn’t occur until 1993. 
358 See Cottier, M. “Registered Partnerships for Same-Sex Couples in Switzerland: Constructing 
a New Model of Family Relationships”, in Maclean, M. (ed.), Family Law and Family Values, (Hart 
Publishing, 2005). 
359 Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom, Application No. 28957/95. 
360 Reflected in the increase in the number of co-habiting couples, see note 57 above. 
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the term “parental” authority.361 These gender-neutral parenting developments362 can 
also be seen in the case law of the CJEU which will be described below. 
This is both due to and a result of families at the national level moving beyond 
the discontent concerning their integration in the overall legal structure that became 
apparent during and in the aftermath of the social. In fact, this – coupled with the 
construction of a path via the preliminary reference procedure to the CJEU – has 
catapulted peripheral family law issues to the supranational level. 
II) The Premise 
In consideration of the above, one might state that a certain gradual demoralisation of 
the family has occurred at the national level leaving the regulation of the same in a 
sort of limbo, as it becomes de-exceptionalized. This has occurred in parallel with the 
shift that we have already noted at the EU level from market-based reasoning to a 
more socially inclined, rights-based approach legally integrated via adjudication at the 
EU level – the neo-formalist langue. 
In deciphering this in terms of debunking the family/market dichotomy, Part 
II will being in Chapter IV with a case law analysis of the Court’s early conception of 
the family before taking our four categories of peripheral family law issues and closely 
examining the reasoning of the Court in resolving the issues that have come before it 
as a result of free movement and the dissolution of geographic boundaries between 
Member States. Chapter V will further this analysis in investigating the influence of 
fundamental rights especially considering the EU’s accession to the European 
                                                
361 Loi du 22 juillet, 1987. See Cardia, Vonèche L. & Bastard, B. “Can Co-Parenting be 
Enforced? Family Law Reform and Family Life in France”, in Maclean, M. (ed.), Family Law and 
Family Values, (Hart Publishing, 2005). 
362 We can also note here a very interesting case Roca-Alvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA. The 
Court here was asked to decide whether it is acceptable, according to Art. 2(1), (3) and (4) and 
Art. 5 of Council Directive 76/207 on equal treatment of men and women in employment to 
grant employed mothers leave so as to breastfeed their child whilst the same leave is granted to 
employed fathers only in situations where the wife is also employed? The Court concluded that 
the Spanish legislation in question did indeed breach the Directive and that it constituted an 
unjustified discrimination on grounds of sex.  This very clearly highlights the acceptance of 
gender neutral parenting that has occurred in recent times. 
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Convention on Human Rights and the potential cross-over effect this may have. On 
the basis of these two chapters, we place developments against the backdrop of the 
theoretical underpinnings of this research in an attempt to uncover the path of family 
regulation and the construction of new methods of adjudication that necessarily 
influence the migrating family and  infiltrate national family law systems. 
Chapters IV and V essentially speak to the neo-formalism that Kennedy puts 
forward as the new legal consciousness. Chapter VI proceeds via a critical analysis of 
EU citizenship, arguing that it that goes beyond Kennedy’s neo-formalism in an 
attempt to decipher the additional dimension it adds to the rights debate in providing 
for a new societal ideal at the EU level. 
What we will see emerging is a concept of the family as regulated by EU law 
that moves, leaps and bounds, beyond the individualism that underpinned the first 
globalization, beyond the vagueness of the social that prevented national courts from 
assuming the role of social engineers in terms of family law, to a more activist 
approach on the part of the Court in developing a post-national conception of the 
family underpinned by equality, respect for fundamental rights and most importantly, 
albeit perhaps in its early stages, a post-national conception of EU citizenship which 
gives life to the primary and secondary law of the Union.363 
  
                                                
363 MacCormick, Neil. “Beyond the Soverign State” (1993) 56 Modern Law Review, 1-18; Habermas, 
Jurgen. The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001). 
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Chapter IV: Swash and Backwash: A Post-
National Conception of the Family 
“When we come to matters with a European element, the Treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into 
the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back”364. 
I) Introduction 
This chapter seeks to explore the potential of the neo-formalist langue 
introduced in the previous chapter to debunk the family/market dichotomy. An 
attestation of the rationale for EU intervention clearly radiates from the 
statement forwarded by AG Sharpston in a recent judgment delivered by the 
Grand Chamber of the European Union Court of Justice on 8 March 2011 – the 
Zambrano case365: “when citizens move, they do so as human beings, not as robots. They fall 
in love, marry and have families” 366. The recognition that individual citizens of 
Europe cannot be considered as mere factors of production has thrust family law 
issues under the European spotlight. 
To this end, the primary and secondary law of the EU and its scope of 
application has had to adjust to provide protection not only for the factors of 
production migrating in Europe but also for the humanistic aspect that is 
inherent in the free movement of persons. We have noted that with the passage 
of time the traditional family based on marriage has evolved and different types 
of families emerged. The role of the European Union, and more specifically the 
Court of Justice in providing a legal basis for today’s families may prove to be 
pivotal. 
                                                
364 Lod Denning in H.P. Bulmer Ltd v J. Bollinger SA [1974] Ch 401 at 418. 
365 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEM). 
366 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 30 September 2010 Case C-34/09 Gerardo 
Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l‟emploi (ONEM) para 128. 
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Bearing this in mind, we will proceed by firstly demarcating The Court’s 
early conception of the family and the development of a rather broad 
understanding of family construction and structure. We will then proceed to 
examine in depth the cases pertaining to the five selected categories of peripheral 
family law issues – the swash. The cases have been chosen based on their 
relevance to the new types of family structures that have emerged in Europe and 
their reflection of elements of the third globalization. In addition, the cases have 
been selected in relation to the legal tools used by the court in its reasoning i.e. 
its use of the prohibition on discrimination, fundamental rights and European 
Citizenship. The chapter proceeds by attempting to provide some evidence of the 
reception – the backwash - of these cases in the Member States so as to decipher 
the potential of EU in the domestic family law field.  
II) The ‘European’ Family: The Swash 
One of the cruxes of EU law is the right to free movement – enshrined in the 
primary law of the EU – supported by the invisibility of geographical boundaries 
between the Member States of the EU. This, in conjunction with the decline of 
the nation-state, has led to a certain Europeanization of family law. Let us recall 
here the six wives case and the fact that just over one hundred years ago, due to 
the effects of the isolation of the family as a result of its classical character, courts 
were more than reluctant to interfere in the private, family sphere.  
The Europeanization of the family, however, has been introduced via the 
‘new’ issues that have come before the national courts but which are dealt with 
ineffectively or not at all due to the family/market dichotomy. In order to 
facilitate a delineation of the ‘swash’ argument, the cases under investigation 
have been grouped under four headings: rights of residence including family 
reunification; welfare benefits; name registration; and employment rights. It 
should be noted that many of the issues presented in these cases overlap 
rendering a rigid classification impossible. However, the attempted classification 
assists us in some way to frame the discussion of the growing body of case law at 
the EU level. 
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A. Rights Of Residence  
The case law concerning rights of residence demonstrates a clear path in terms of 
access for peripheral family law cases to the CJEU. Additionally, from the cases 
analyzed here we can note not only Kennedy’s neo-formalist approach but also 
the onset of a new paradigm within the rights rhetoric discussed above in 
Chapter III. 
Carpenter  
The Carpenter367 case is an interesting case for many reasons. In terms of our 
scope, it illustrates the more market early approach of the Court which can be 
juxtaposed with its more recent attempts to reintegrate the social. The case 
concerned the third country national spouse of a British national who applied for 
a permit to stay in the UK (note the peripheral nature of the question referred), 
an application which was rejected. Since Mrs. Carpenter was unable to rely on 
Directive 73/148368, the Court, in my opinion heavily influenced by unity of the 
family concerns, was forced to explore other avenues through which the case 
could be interpreted. Although significantly criticized for its decision, the Court 
chose to decide the case in consideration of Mr. Carpenter and in particular his 
exercise of rights conferred on him by Article 49 EC Treaty. More specifically, 
the Court considered his economic activities including his occasional provision of 
services in other Member States. In so doing, the Court held that EC law 
recognizes the right to family life to those providing services in the EU and that 
to deport Mrs. Carpenter would essentially cause a breach of that right and 
would also constitute a barrier to his freedom to provide services since Mrs. 
Carpenter maintained care giving functions to Mr. Carpenter’s children while he 
exercised his freedom to provide services. The Court made an important 
                                                
367 Carpenterv Secretary of State for the Home Department Case C-60/00. 
368 Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement 
and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to 
establishment and the provision of services. 
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reference to the respect for family life provided for by the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms stating that to 
deport Mrs. Carpenter would cause: 
… An interference with the exercise by Mr. Carpenter of his right to respect for his 
family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 
(hereinafter “the Convention”), which is among the fundamental rights which, according 
to the Court’s settled case-law, restated by the Preamble to the Single European Act and 
by Article 6(2) EU, are protected in Community law.369 
In other words, the Court maintained that if Mrs. Carpenter were deported this 
would effectively result in an infringement in Mr. Carpenter’s right to provide 
services which would be contrary to EU law. Effectively then, the unity of this 
family was upheld not in consideration of its importance per se but rather in 
consideration of Mr. Carpenter’s market rights. The Court, therefore, even 
though it had limited tools at its disposal, granted this particular reconstituted 
family stronger protection surreptitiously via the use of market freedoms. 
Chen 
The second important case to consider here is the well renowned Chen370 case. It 
concerned a Chinese national (Mrs. Chen) who travelled to Northern Ireland to 
give birth. The child acquired Irish citizenship by virtue of the constitutional 
changes introduced in 1998, namely the introduction of jus soli. The family 
subsequently moved to Wales and applied for a residence permit which was 
refused. The application was appealed and referred to the ECJ (note the 
peripheral nature of the question referred). The Advocate General opined that a 
young child as a national of a Member State has a right to reside in another 
Member State insofar as he/she has sickness insurance and sufficient resources 
not to become an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the host Member State. 
                                                
369 Paragraph 41 
370 Chen and Zhu v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Case C-200/02. 
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Furthermore, Advocate General Tizzano reasoned that a child’s right of 
residence would be ineffective if the parent was denied right of residence. 
The Court reasoned that on the basis of Article 18 of the EC Treaty, 
Catherine Zhu as an EU Citizen had an inalienable right to reside in a place of 
her choice in the EU and that to deny residency rights to the parents of a minor 
child would effectively render this right ineffective. In other words, the right of 
the mother to reside with her child came under the scope of the “effet utile” 
residence right of the child. Again we can note the underlying importance of one 
of the fundaments of family law, i.e. the preservation of family unity which 
obviously infers physical proximity and the right of children to company, care 
and parentage. By recognising the child’s independent rights in this case but also 
that these rights would be rendered ineffective without the support of parents, 
the Court effectively granted the right of the family to remain together based on 
the citizen status of the child.   
Two points can be made here. First, if the issue at hand were to be left to 
the national legal system, this particular family would not have been granted 
resident rights based on a rigid interpretation of immigration rules. Secondly, the 
very existence of EU rights provided an avenue for this issue to reach the EU 
level in effect permitting a disconnection from the nation state and instead 
connecting it to the developing body of citizenship rights at the EU level.  
Metock 
The well renowned Metock case371 proved to be an important advance in issues 
concerning European involvement in family law. The main issue in the case 
                                                
371 Case C-127/08, Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. The case 
concerned a refusal by the Irish Minister for Justice to grant residence cards to the non-EU 
spouses of EU nationals based on the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) 
Regulation 2006 (S.I. No. 2) (“2006 Regulations”), which transposes Directive 2004/38 into 
Irish law. Under Regulation 3(2) of the 2006 Regulations, the spouses of EU citizens were only 
entitled to a right of residence in Ireland if they had previously been lawfully resident in another 
Member State. For a concise discussion on the case see E. Fahey, (2009) “Going Back to Basics: 
Re-Embracing the Fundamentals of the Free Movement of Persons in Metock”, available online 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371516, and also N. Cambien, (2009) Case C-127/08, 
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concerned the reconciliation of residence rights and immigration control.372 In 
transposing the Directive on free movement of Union citizens,373 Ireland added a 
condition which provided that third country nationals seeking to reside with 
Union citizens are eligible to do so only if they have already been lawfully 
resident in another Member State. The compatibility of this condition was 
questioned in four cases before the High Court of Ireland where the applicants 
had arrived and sought asylum which was refused. The applicants subsequently 
married Union citizens who were resident in Ireland.374 On marrying the EU 
nationals, each of the third country nationals applied for residency on the basis 
of being a spouse of a Union citizen. Obviously then the condition concerning 
lawful prior residence (note the peripheral nature of the specific question) in 
another Member State came into question.  
The Court found that the residence application of a family member of a 
Union citizen should not be conditional on prior residence in another Member 
State. It specifically pointed out that the Citizens Directive applied to all Union 
citizens exercising their free movement rights and to their family members. It 
held that family members, according to the Directive, cannot be distinguished 
according to prior lawful residence. The Court stressed that a non-Community 
spouse of a Union citizen who accompanies or joins that citizen can benefit from 
the Directive, irrespective of when and where their marriage took place and of 
how that spouse entered the host Member State. Particularly interesting is the 
Court’s clarification that the Directive in question does not specify on issues of 
family formation375. In effect, it held that the Directive does not require that the 
                                                                                                                                      
Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Colum. J. 
Eur. L. 15, 321.   
372 For a detailed discussion of the case see Costello, C., “Metock: Free movement and “Normal 
Family Life’ in the Union”, Common Market Law Review, 46: 587-662, 2009 
373 Directive 2004/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States. 
374 None of the marriages were marriages of convenience. 
375 We can make reference here to Case C-578/08 Rhimou Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandese 
Zaken  which dealt with the interpretation of the transposition of Council Directive 2003/86/EC 
of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification  and in particular Articles 2(d) and 
7(1) of it. The Raad van State asked whether the directive allows a distinction to be made 
between a family relationship which arose before the resident’s entry into the Member State and 
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Union citizen have founded a family at the time when s/he moves in order for 
his family members, who are nationals of non-member countries, to enjoy the 
rights established by the Directive. In other words, the Directive has become “an 
instrument for both family formation and family reunification”.376 The reasoning of the 
Court proves very interesting and a comprehensive tool in protecting the unity of 
the family. It stated that “if Union citizens were not allowed to lead a normal family life in 
the host Member State, the exercise of the freedoms they are granted by the Treaty would be 
seriously obstructed”. Therefore, according to market-based tools, the Court 
permitted the primary law of the Union to triumph over the exclusionary effects 
of national law firmly reconnecting the family to the supranational sphere. 
Zambrano 
We mentioned at the beginning that the case law delineated here indicates a new 
paradigm in terms of Kennedy’s neo-formalism. This new paradigm is clearly 
introduced here via the Zambrano case, which, for our purposes exposes how 
primary law, particularly the citizenship provisions in going beyond the 
prohibition on discrimination, can grant more comprehensive protection to 
modern family issues in consideration of their reconceptualization.  
The case concerned a Columbian national and his wife who had been 
refused refugee status in Belgium. The Belgian authorities did however make a 
                                                                                                                                      
that of a family relationship formed after entry. Advocate General Sharpston was not convinced 
by the argument of the Netherlands government making specific reference to fundamental rights 
and moreover to the general principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment. She asserted 
that “it might seem foolhardy to assert that the difference between a family relationship which arose before the 
sponsor’s entry into the Member State and one which arose later can never justify difference in some regard” in 
effect precluding the notion brought forward by the Netherlands legislation. In addition, the 
Netherlands government argued that families that were formed previous to the entry of the 
sponsor to the Member State are more deserving of favourable conditions in relation to the 
social assistance requirement as opposed to those families not yet constituted at the time of 
entry. Here, importantly, the Advocate General again made reference to the principle of non-
discrimination in refuting this claim, in what, according to the foregoing, might be termed a 
neo-formalist reading. The Court agreed with the Advocate General in stating that “Article 2(d) 
of the Directive defines family reunification without drawing any distinction based on the time of marriage of the 
spouses, since it states that reunification must be understood as meaning the entry into and residence in the host 
Member State by family members of a third-country national residing lawfully in that Member State in order to 
preserve the family unit, “whether the family relationship arose before or after the resident’s entry’”.  
376 Costello, C. “Metock: Free Movement and ‘Normal Family Life’ in the Union”, Common 
Market Law Review, 46: 587-662, 2009. 
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refoulment order considering the on-going civil war in Columbia. While appeals 
regarding the refugee determination were ongoing, Mr. Zambrano fathered two 
children, both gaining Belgian nationality based on a provision of Belgian 
nationality law which at that time stated that any child born in Belgium who had 
not reached the age of majority and who would otherwise be stateless will be 
Belgian. During this time, Mr. Zambrano was also in gainful employment.377 On 
becoming unemployed, the applicant applied to the National Employment Office 
(ONEm) for an unemployment benefit which was refused based on the fact that 
he had not accumulated enough worked hours prior to becoming unemployed. 
This was effectively the result of certain periods of employment being 
disregarded since he was not a legal resident at the time. However, Mr. 
Zambrano argued that by virtue of EU law he derived a right of residence (note 
the peripheral nature of the issue referred) based on the fact of being a parent to 
EU citizens and that therefore he should have been exempt from the work permit 
condition. 
The legal question then revolved around whether Mr. Zambrano, as a 
parent of an EU citizen child, derived a right of residence by virtue of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. If this question were to be answered 
in the affirmative, then the further question would be whether he can be exempt 
from having to obtain a work permit. 
All the Member States that made written submissions and the 
Commission argued that this was a wholly internal situation which did not come 
within the scope of application of EU law since the citizen children in this case 
had never exercised their free movement rights.378 The Court, however, held 
that the Citizens Directive was not applicable in this case and instead turned to 
the citizenship provisions for guidance. Although difficult to state with 
confidence, we can perhaps wonder whether this reliance on the citizenship 
                                                
377 This was later terminated as a result of immigration investigations. 
378 This Directive shall apply to all Union citizens who move to or reside in a Member State other than that of 
which they are a national, and to their family members [defined as a spouse, those in registered partnerships 
recognised by both Member States; direct descendants under 21 and dependent direct relatives in the ascending 
link]. 
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provisions indicates a desire on behalf of the Court to accommodate the 
Zambrano family just as was likely in the Carpenter case when the Court, even 
though Mrs Carpenter’s avenue was blocked, shifted the focus onto Mr. 
Carpenter’s economic rights. Regardless of the Court’s motives – which we can 
only attempt to infer, it went on to recognize that EU citizenship is “intended to be 
the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States” citing Article 20(1) of the 
TFEU. In effect the Court, in relying on previous case law, held that Article 20 
of the TFEU precludes measures that have the effect of depriving citizens of the 
enjoyment of their substantive rights under EU law. In applying this to the facts 
of the case at hand, if Mr. Zambrano were to be deported then this would 
effectively mean that the citizenship rights of the minor children would become 
ineffective. The Court stated that: 
Article 20 TFEU is to be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a Member State from 
refusing a third country national upon whom his minor children, who are European 
Union citizens, are dependent, a right of residence in the Member State of residence and 
nationality of those children, and from refusing to grant a work permit to that third 
country national, insofar as such decisions deprive those children of the genuine enjoyment 
of the substance of the rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen.379 
From a family law perspective then, this reasoning stands to reason when one 
considers one of the foundations of family law, particularly concerning the rights 
and duties owed to parties within the private sphere i.e. that it is in the best 
interests of the child to have the company care and parentage of their parent 
ascendants. In fact, this was bolstered by Advocate General Sharpston’s 
reference to Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights380 and 
relevant international provisions including Article 17 of the International 
                                                
379 Paragraph 45 
380 Article 7 states “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home 
and communications” and Article 24.3 states “Every child shall have the right to maintain on a 
regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that 
is contrary to his or her interests”.  
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;381 Article 9.1 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child;382 Article 8 and Article 3 of Protocol 4 to the European 
Convention of Human Rights.383 
From a fundamental rights perspective, the question in the case was really 
quite simple: would there be a breach of the fundamental right to family life if 
the parents were to be deported? Unfortunately, but perhaps understandably, the 
Court itself did not engage in a profound discussion of the fundamental rights 
aspect. However, we can decipher that in basing its decision on previous case law 
concerning family issues, the court did not have to take a hugely significant step 
here. Already, as we have seen in Carpenter and Chen, the court upheld the 
importance of family life in recognising, what have been criticised as dubious, 
links to the Treaty in order to protect family life and the right of migrants.  
In effect, via a proper realization of citizens’ rights – including 
fundamental rights – the Court is, via its deliberation of what are, on the one 
hand, EU law issues and simultaneously, for our purposes, peripheral family law 
issues on the other, reconnecting the unruly teenager we spoke of in Part I to the 
post-national sphere. This is neo-formalism par excellence whereby rights are the 
medium through which the family is reconceptualised. The economic goals of the 
EU essentially require the free movement of goods, services and people which in 
                                                
381 Article 17 states “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
2. Everybody has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”. 
382 Article 9.1 states “States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or 
her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review 
determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary 
for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a particular case such 
as the one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or where the parents are living 
separately and a decision must be made as to the child’s place of residence”. 
383 Article 8 states “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others”. Article 3 of Protocol 4 states “No one shall be expelled, by 
mean either of an individual or of a collective measure, from the territory of the State of which 
he is a national. No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which 
he is a national”. 
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turn has developed into a social understanding of the internal market as rightly 
pointed out by Advocate General Sharpston in stating that “when citizens move, they 
do so as human beings, not as robots. They fall in love, marry and have families”384. To this 
end, the primary law of the EU and its scope of application has had to adjust to 
provide protection not only for the factors of production migrating in Europe but 
also for the humanistic aspect that is inherent in the free movement of persons. It 
is within this realm that Zambrano takes a significant step essentially recognising 
that movement is not a necessary prerequisite to trigger the scope of EU 
citizenship rules therefore expanding its scope to wholly internal situations. The 
effects of this interpretation of primary law on family law therefore have the 
potential to be significant. 
B. Welfare Benefits 
The area of welfare benefits is one of the more pronounced areas in which we 
can note the increased occurrence of peripheral family law issues. The right to 
education conferring rights of residence, pension rights and sickness insurance, 
for instance, pave the way for a consideration of the changing concept of 
relationship bonds.  
Baumbast 
We being here by outlining the Baumbast 385  case and more specifically the 
Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in the case who recognised, for the 
purposes of interpreting Regulation 1612/68, 386 the changing nature of the 
family and in particular the social acceptance that had occurred since the Reed387 
case of extra-marital cohabitation and also, at least to some extent the 
                                                
384 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 30 September 2010 Case C-34/09 
Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEM) para 128. 
385 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Case C/413/99. 
386 Regulation No 1612/66 EEC of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement 
for workers within the Community. 
387 Case C-59/85 - Netherlands v Reed in which the Court was called upon to decide whether a partner in 
a cohabiting relationship could be considered equivalent to a spouse. The Court was of the opinion that 
the partnership at issue did not come within the concept of family rights effectively excluding this family 
construction from the “European family”. 
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recognition of homosexual partnerships. The case concerned two families, the 
first of which concerned a marriage breakdown and consequent divorce and the 
other concerned a stepchild whose father worked away from the family home. 
The main question in the proceedings revolved around the rights to education in 
the host Member State for the children and rights of residence for the children’s 
carer. From the family law perspective, though, the case raised an interesting 
question in relation to family relationships with the Advocate General noting 
that Regulation 1612/68 emanates from a time when “family relationships were 
relatively stable” and any provisions contained therein concerned the protection 
of the traditional family or in other words, the classical notion of the family that 
persisted through the Social aided by the constitutionalization of the marital 
family as we have seen. However, in recognising that “considerable social 
developments have occurred which are likely to have considerable influence on the view to be 
formed as to the nature and scope of the provisions of the Regulation” and that the Court 
must consider these developments, the AG argued that “relevant rules of law risk 
losing their effectiveness”. Indeed, the Court reasoned that to deprive the parents of 
rights of residence would effectively deprive children of their Community right, 
notably basing its reasoning on the Regulation as opposed to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the right to education contained in it. Therefore, we 
can note here the Court’s acceptance of the changing nature of the family and its 
use of the European Economic Constitution toolbox in resolving the issue at 
hand. 
London Borough of Harrow v Nimco Hassan Ibrahim, Secretary of State for the Home Department 
and Maria Teixeira v. London borough of Lambeth 
A more recent case is the joint case of London Borough of Harrow v Nimco Hassan 
Ibrahim, Secretary of State for the Home Department 388  and Maria Teixeira v. London 
borough of Lambeth389 concerning free movement and the child’s right to education. 
The CJEU, concurring with Advocate General Mazak, in this case decided that a 
                                                
388 Case C-310/08. 
389 Case C-480/08. 
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parent caring for a child of a migrant worker who is in education in the host 
Member State has a right of residence in that State and that this right is not 
conditional on the parent having sufficient resources not to become a burden on 
the social assistance system. Importantly, the Court made reference to the 
respect for family life in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and in reference to the Baumbast 
and R case390 it recalled that the child of a migrant worker, in pursuing his/her 
education in the host Member State, has the right to be accompanied by his/her 
primary carer, thereby granting a right of residence to the carer, rejecting the 
UK government’s argument that Baumbast only protected the residence rights of 
economically active primary carers of children. Here then, we see a shift from 
economic reasoning to an approach more in tune with the social reality of 
migrating families. Indeed, the peripheral family law issues we speak of here are 
creating a real path to a new European socialization of ‘modern’ family issues. 
Commission v Anton Pieter Roodhuijzen 
Another interesting case reflecting the ‘modern’ family issues which are coming 
before the court is that of Commission v Anton Pieter Roodhuijzen.391 In this case, the 
Court of First Instance of the European Communities, held that in situations 
where a European official can demonstrate that his/her partnership constitutes a 
union and that their status as non-marital partners has been recognised by a 
Member State then the partner can in fact benefit from the sickness insurance 
scheme of the communities. The access path via sickness insurance paved the 
way for a supranational consideration of an atypical family structure at a time 
when many national courts were struggling with a lack of legislative or 
constitutional recognition of the same. Indeed, it is important to note here that 
this case concerned a partnership of opposite sex. In relation to same sex couples, 
prior to this case, the case law of the CJEU in relation to the recognition of same 
sex families had shown signs of much evolution. The Court in the case of Tadao 
                                                
390 Case C-148/02 
391 Case T-58/08 
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Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Buhen392 held that a life partner of the same 
sex might be entitled to a survivor’s pension under an occupational pension 
scheme (note the peripheral nature of the issue referred). In particular the Court 
held, in consideration of Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, that a refusal to 
do so would constitute direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
where surviving spouses and surviving life partners are in a comparable 
situation. 393  What we see developing here is a neo-formalist approach to 
peripheral issues based on the shift in interpretative methods bringing difficult 
family law questions under the spotlight. The neo-formalist langue is employed 
by the Court in reasoning these cases essentially, via a reintegration of the 
equality debate, granting protection to those atypical families that would 
otherwise be left outside the scope of the law.   
K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health 
This supranational approach can also be exemplified via the neo-formalist 
approach to sexual identity. In K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and 
Secretary of State for Health394 the Court held that national legislation which, in 
failing to recognise transsexuals’ new sexual identity, denies them the right to 
marry, is contrary to community law. The court stated that inequalities occur 
when a person is prevented from satisfying a condition upon which the award of 
a benefit (note the peripheral avenue) protected by Community law depends. 
Importantly, the Court again in this case made reference to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights in its reasoning.395 
 
                                                
392 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Buhen C-267/06 
393  For an analysis of the case law in this area see G. N. Toggenburg,  “‘LGBT’  go 
Luxembourg: on the stance of Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender Rights before the 
European Court of Justice” (Judgment in the Case C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. 
Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, CJEU April 1, 2008) European Law Reporter 5, 2008. 
394 K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health Case C-117/01 
395 Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom, Application No. 28957/95.  
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Joseph Griesmar v French Republic 
Gender-neutral parenting has also found its way before the Court and the neo-
formalistic langue has been used to balance the rights of parties that who find 
themselves at a disadvantage resulting from gender discrepancies. In the case of 
Joseph Griesmar v French Republic396 the Court held that civil servants who are 
fathers and mothers must be treated equally when their retirement pensions (note 
the peripheral nature of the reference) are being calculated. The exclusion of 
men from entitlement to the service credits granted to retired civil servants who 
are mothers is contrary to the principle of equal pay if those fathers can prove 
that they brought up their children. To a certain extent it may even seem 
obvious but nonetheless necessary to point out the importance of this real 
reintegration of the social dimension of rights based on recognition of the 
changing nature of the family and moreover in this case the role reversals 
witnessed in terms of the internal dynamics of the family.397  
Another interesting case concerning gender-neutral parenting is that of 
Roca-Alvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA.398 The Court here was asked to decide 
whether it is acceptable, according to Art. 2(1), (3) and (4) and Art. 5 of Council 
Directive 76/207 on equal treatment of men and women in employment to grant 
employed mothers leave so as to breastfeed their children whilst the same leave is 
granted to employed fathers only in situations where the wife is also employed. 
The Court concluded that the Spanish legislation in question did indeed breach 
the Directive and that it constituted an unjustified discrimination on grounds of 
sex.  This very clearly highlights the acceptance of gender neutral parenting that 
has occurred in recent times and the Court’s neo-formalist interpretation of this 
new structure of the family. 
                                                
396 Joseph Griesmar v French Republic Case C-366/99 
397 McGlynn, Clare. Families and the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) p. 83  
398 Case C-104/09 Roca-Alvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA 
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C. Name Registration  
Name registration is generally perceived as a national competence. However, 
more recently, a significant body of supranational case law has developed in this 
field and calls have been made for a more coherent approach to the area:  
…And, given the increasing mobility of citizens throughout the territory of the European 
Union, which is not merely a single market but a single area of freedom, security and 
justice, it is clear that conflicts of interest involving the determination and use of personal 
names can (and probably will) arise with increasing frequency unless and until some 
adequate solution is found399 
Garcia Avello 
This field was first considered by the ECJ basing its reasoning on the principle of 
anti-discrimination based on nationality in the case of Garcia Avello400 clearly 
exemplifying the force of European citizenship and non-discrimination when 
coupled together. The dispute arose between Mr. Avello and the Belgian State 
concerning an application to change the surname of his children, a private 
international law issue, who were in possession of dual nationality (Belgian and 
Spanish). The CJEU concluded that since the children, as EU citizens, were 
residing in another Member State exercising their free movement, this provided 
them with a sufficient link to Community law enabling them to be afforded 
protection under Article 12 EC Treaty. This illustrates the capacity of EU 
citizenship provisions to set aside national rules when necessary to facilitate the 
free movement of families. Indeed, even when matters recognised as inherent 
competences of the Member States come before the CJEU, it is clear that 
compliance with EC law is vital, illustrated by the case of Grunkin and Paul401 in 
which the CJEU reiterated that national legislation, in this case concerning the 
refusal to register a double-barrelled surname, which disadvantages those who 
                                                
399 Advocate General Sharpston Case C-353/06 Grunkin-Paul v Standesamt Niebull. 
400 C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge. 
401 C-353/06 Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul v Leonhard Matthias Grunkin-Paul and Standesamt 
Stadt Niebüll. 
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wish to exercise their freedom to move and reside in another Member State, 
constitutes a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 18(1) EC on every 
citizen of the Union. 
At first glance, this may appear to be a more technical issue related to free 
movement. However, it penetrates both the internal and external dynamics of 
the family law sphere by giving content to the genuine enjoyment of rights 
conveyed by virtue of EU citizenship.402  
D. Employment 
At the beginning of the year, the Grand Chambre of the CJEU delivered its 
judgement in relation to two preliminary references, namely Z403 and CD,404 
which questioned whether a woman is entitled to maternity leave in instances 
where a surrogate carries the child. The issue of surrogacy therefore came before 
the court via EU provisions on employment law (note the peripheral path) 
providing an access route for the supranational consideration of equal treatment 
and social rights within the family structure.405 
The Z Case 
The Z case concerned a teacher in an Irish school who had applied for paid 
maternity leave after her baby was born through a surrogacy mother in 
California. Her application however was refused and on appeal the national 
court requested direction from the Court in Luxembourg in consideration of 
whether or not the national decision not to grant the mother leave was contrary 
to the Pregnant Workers Directive or whether it constituted discrimination on 
grounds of sex or of disability. It ruled that the mother in question does not fall 
within the scope of the Pregnant Workers Directive, as the directive “presupposes 
                                                
402 See Comande, Giovanni. “The Fifth European Union Freedom: Aggregating Citizenship…around 
Private Law” in Micklitz, The Constitutionalization of European Private Law. 
403 C-363/12, Z. v A Government Department and The Board of management of a community school. 
404 C-167/12, C.D. v S.T. 
405 Finck M. & Kas B., Case note: Surrogacy leave as a matter of EU law: CD and Z, on file with the 
author.  
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that the worker concerns has been pregnant and has given birth to a child”. It said that, 
while maternity leave is also intended to ensure that the special relationship 
between a woman and her child is protected, that objective concerns only the 
period after pregnancy and childbirth. However, the court said member states 
are free to apply “more favourable rules” for such mothers, if they so wish. 
In addition, the court found no evidence of discrimination on the grounds 
of sex as the father would not be entitled to such leave either. Similarly, while 
expressing sympathy that “a woman's inability to bear her own child may be a source of 
great suffering for her”, the Court rejected the argument that Ms Z has been 
discriminated against on the grounds of disability, in light of the fact that the 
woman had no uterus and could not support a pregnancy. According to the 
judgment: 
The concept of ‘disability’ within the meaning of that directive presupposes that the 
limitation, from which the person suffers, in interaction with various barriers, may 
hinder that person’s full and effective participation in professional life on an equal basis 
with other workers 
The CD Case 
In the CD case, a similar approach was taken in that the Court refused to equate 
the situation of commissioning mothers to those who have carried a child. 
Although the Advocate General proposed the following solution… 
In a case such as that in the main proceedings, an intended mother who has a baby 
through a surrogacy arrangement has the right to receive maternity leave under Articles 2 
and 8 of Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of 
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers 
and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding after the birth of the child 
in any event where she takes the child into her care following birth, surrogacy is permitted 
in the Member State concerned and its national requirements are satisfied, even where the 
intended mother does not breastfeed the child following birth; the leave must amount to at 
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least two weeks and any other maternity leave taken by the surrogate mother must be 
deducted.406 
The Court did not follow this logic. However, it must be noted that surrogacy is 
a relatively contemporary issue in family law giving rise, as noted by Advocate 
General Wahl,407 to a number of socio-cultural, ethical, medical and legal questions 
and one which has most certainly evolved at a hastier pace than legislative attempts at 
the national level to deal with the intricacies concerned. This situation, and we must 
stress it is one of national competence, spearheads some very complex legal and social 
uncertainties concerning, for instance, the commercialization of surrogacy and the 
associated risk of creating a black market; the risk to children, born as a result of 
surrogacy agreements, existing in a legal vacuum with unclear or no rights in terms of 
parenting, welfare, etc.; the contractual nature of such agreements and the legal 
implications if parties don’t adhere to the agreement for instance, what if the 
surrogate mother changes her mind and decides to keep the child she gave birth to 
according to the Mater semper certa est  principle?; What if the commissioning mother 
changes her mind?408  
In consideration of these issues, and of course the legal uncertainly that exists 
in the various Member States in terms of legislative efforts in this area,409 it is hardly 
surprising that the Court decided in the way it did. In fact, even though Advocate 
General Kokott argued that a link could be with EU law in making reference to the 
                                                
406 Opinion of AG Kokott in C-167/12, C.D. v S.T at para. 76. 
407 He noted from the outset of his opinion at para 1 that surrogacy is “an increasingly common form of 
medically assisted reproduction” that “constitutes a sensitive political and social issue in a number of 
Member States.” 
408 For an overview of these and related issues, see Katarina Trimmings and Paul Beaumont, 
International Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation at the International Level (Hart 2013); Deepa Kharb, 
“Assisted Reproductive Techniques Ethical And Legal Concerns’ 4 The Internet Journal of Law, Healthcare 
and Ethics; Margaret E. Swain, “Surrogacy and Gestational Carrier Arrangements: Legal Aspects’ in 
James M. Goldfarb (ed), Third Party Reproduction (Springer, 2014). 
409 See Report by the European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, A Comparative Study on the 
Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States, 2013 which points out that While EU action in the area 
may be considered, a global approach may be more effective to regulate the global aspect of current 
surrogacy practices. 
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rights of the child contained in Article 24 the Charter of Fundamental Rights410 and 
Article 3(3) TEU,411 the Court did not make this linkage. 
For our purposes here, the judgment is interesting for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it demonstrates the peripheral path family law issues are taking in arriving at 
the EU legal order. Secondly, it could be argued that even though we have thus far 
illustrated the reach of the neo-formalist langue by way of the Court’s 
pronouncements, this langue can only go so far in terms of family law. In other words, 
it would be argued, that it has managed to infiltrate national family law riding the 
wave of equal treatment based on economic integration but in terms of the balancing 
of fundamental rights against social policy and national legislation (or lack of as the 
case may be) it stops short of offering full and effective rights to individuals. This is not 
to say that the Court should or can, legitimately, follow such a path. It is simply to say 
that the implementation of fundamental rights at the EU level still faces barriers in 
terms of the arguably persistent ties to the economic basis of the Union. The role of 
citizenship in light of the precarious nature of the implementation of the Charter and 
fundamental rights in general will be examined below. For now, suffice it to highlight 
that it is precisely here, where the rights rhetoric gains an additional dimension - the 
European legal order runs into some difficulties. 
III) Jurisprudential Evolution 
This delineation of the selected case law goes some way to in confirming 
Kennedy’s notion that a more neo-formalist langue is developing and a move 
towards balancing difference is evident, especially in terms of anti-
discrimination. In fact, this is specifically reflected in the case law above that 
                                                
410 Article 24(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: 1. Children shall have the right to such 
protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views 
shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and 
maturity. 2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private 
institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. 3. Every child shall have the right 
to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, 
unless that is contrary to his or her interests. 
411 Stipulating that the EU shall promote “protections of the rights of the child.” 
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makes reference to non-discrimination, the tool expanded on by the Court with a 
view to managing difference, one of the fundamentals of the third globalization.  
To summarise, the principle of equality has been applied by the Court to 
recognise the changing role of individuals within the family unit shifting the 
internal/vertical dynamics with family structures based on a new, post-national 
approach to the external/horizontal dynamics. The recognition of more gender 
neutral parenting, an issue which has arrived at the European level via pension 
rights and employment law, has been recognised in the Joseph Griesmar case and 
the Roca-Alvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA noted above. To take the latter case, 
the discrimination argument revolved around the fact that the Spanish legislation 
provided that female employees, who have given birth to a child, had the right to 
feeding leave irrespective of the employment status of the father, whereas male 
employees were not granted the same right unless the mother was also in gainful 
employment. The question by the referring court concerned whether this 
amounted to direct discrimination on the ground of sex, as prohibited in Council 
Directive 76/207 and if so, whether a legally recognised justification for this 
discrimination could be found. As we have already noted the Court indeed held 
that the specific facts did constitute discrimination illustrating once again the 
usefulness of this tool in reconciling the changing nature of relations with the 
family of the third globalization.   
Family reunification cases have brought the question of family formation 
to the attention of the Court, highlighted above by Metock and the Chakroun case. 
In the latter case, the decisive question in this case concerned whether or to what 
extent the fact that the family relationship arose prior or subsequent to the 
sponsor’s entry to the host Member State can render one situation different from 
another. The Court, unfortunately, does not enter into this discussion. However, 
it would seem that it was influenced by Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion 
and in particular her emphasis on the fact that were different income thresholds 
to be applied based on the moment of family formation then discrimination 
could in fact be realised arguing in para 40 that “comparable situations must not be 
treated differently”. 
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In terms of name registration, the Court has chosen to base its reasoning 
on the citizenship provisions. The cases examined clearly exemplify the force of 
European Citizenship and non-discrimination when coupled together. Indeed, 
even when matters recognised as inherent competences of the Member States 
come before the CJEU, it is clear that compliance with EC law is vital, 
specifically illustrated by the case of Garcia Avello 412  in which the Court 
specifically relied on the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality.  
The welfare benefit cases provide not only the most frequent but also the 
most prominent example of how the Court attempts to reconcile its shifting 
perspective from mercantilist reasoning to more social goals. In addition, they 
provide us with much food for thought in terms of a more European approach to 
family regulation. In fact, the cases described above clearly provide concrete 
examples of the issues that third globalization families face when migrating in 
Europe. The Court’s use of both non-discrimination and citizenship in resolving 
these issues is very powerful. Indeed, we may question, and this will be dealt with 
in more detail in Chapter VI, the Court’s role in terms of adjudicating family law 
matters from a civil society perspective and the assumption of the role of social 
engineer – a role that national courts did not engage with during the second 
globalization. In connection to this, we refer to academic discussion in recent 
times concerning different categorisations of citizenship. Scholars in the field of 
EU law have already developed a discourse contemplating notions related to the 
birth of consumer citizens413 and market citizens.414 As a result of the case law 
described here, particularly that pertaining to the rights inferred from EU 
citizenship, I would pre-emptively question whether we can now talk of the 
emergence of a type of family citizen along the lines of market citizens and 
consumer citizens or whether the citizenship provisions and increasing reference 
to them are simply an additional layer added to the economic basis of the Court’s 
                                                
412 C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge   
413 See Davies, J., Entrenchment of “New Governance in Consumer Policy Formulation: A 
Platform for European Consumer Citizenship Practice?”, Journal of Consumer Policy, 32: 245-267, 
2009. 
414 See Everson, M. The Legacy of the Market Citizen, in Shaw, J. & More, G., New Legal Dynamics of 
European Union, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995). 
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reasoning. This argument will be played out in full in Chapter VI. For now, it is 
sufficient to question at this point whether the neo-formalist langue of the Court 
really intends to manage difference by recoding The Social into the 
supranational sphere or are we simply witnessing a process of social engineering 
according to an ideology of gender neutrality incorporating the family as an 
appendage to the economic citizen. 
For now, in terms of the scope of this chapter, we must decipher to what 
extent however the Court’s pronouncements are reaching the far corners of the 
Union and to what extent the sedimentary backwash is influencing the situation 
of migrating families.  
IV) The European Family: The Backwash 
We have already noted above, in Ireland, it was not until legislation on equal pay was 
introduced in 1974 and employment equality legislation followed in 1977, both as a 
result of European directives, that remuneration rates between men and women were 
formally equalized. This finally began to break down the walls of the exceptionalized 
family in terms of equal treatment of the constitutive adult members.  
More importantly, however, for our purposes the recognition of the need for 
equal treatment at the European level finally paved the way for the social revolution 
to take hold within the family in terms of its private and institutional dynamics, 
catapulting peripheral family law issues to the supranational level generating a body of 
case law the influence of which has been largely ignored. In order to fully 
understand the neo-formalistic potential of non-discrimination as a legal catalyst 
capable of infiltrating the family law sphere of Member States, we must decipher 
whether or not there is evidence, either positive or negative, at the national level 
which indicates these trends. 
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To take some specific examples, the above-mentioned Maruko415 case, held 
that a life partner of the same sex might be entitled to a survivor’s pension under 
an occupational pension scheme. In particular, the court held, in consideration 
of Council Directive 2000/78/EC, that a refusal to do so would constitute direct 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation where surviving spouses and 
surviving life partners are in a comparable situation. Since this judgment by the 
CJEU, a further, similar case has come before the Federal Labour Court in 
Germany416 in which it was held that given the comparable situation of marriage 
and life partnership, non-discrimination law applies. As a result, the same sex 
partner in this case was indeed able to claim benefits under an occupational 
pension scheme that reserved this particular right to spouses. This is a very 
important example of a positive reception of the non-discrimination catalyst in 
German law going some way to accepting change to the definition of the family. 
In fact, German legal practitioners have openly welcomed the catalytic effects of 
the pronouncements of the CJEU: 
 “In Germany we would not be where we are today without the decisions of the ECJ 
including decisions stemming from referrals from other EC States”417      
This is also true for issues concerning discrimination in pregnancy related cases 
in the UK which developed according to the non-discrimination principle 
applied in cases before the CJEU,418 exemplified clearly by the Webb v EMO Cargo 
(UK) Ltd judgment in which the House of Lords placed great weight on the 
CJEU’s ruling.419  
There are, however, instances where the courts are reluctant, for one 
reason or another, to positively receive the judgments of the CJEU. At the time 
of writing, we note the rather negative reception of the Court’s judgements in 
                                                
415 Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen. 
416 Bundesarbeitsgericht, decision of 14.01.2009, Az.: 3 AZR 20/07. 
417 Bertelsmann, K. “Who’s afraid of the European Court of Justice? A Guide to the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure for National Courts”, European Anti-Discrimination Law Review, Issue No. 2, 
Oct 2005.  
418 Case C-32/93 Webb v EMO Air Cargo. 
419 Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd (No 2) (1994). 
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London Borough of Harrow v Nimco Hassan Ibrahim, Secretary of State for the Home 
Department420 and Maria Teixeira v. London borough of Lambeth.421 We can defer from 
the response of the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government: 
“because of the very specific circumstances of the two cases, we do not expect that the judgment 
will have a significant impact on the amount of council housing provided to migrant workers” 
that the judgment of the Court may not have the practical effects it was intended 
to have. This stated, it has been noted in academic commentary that the broad 
interpretation given to Article 12 of the Regulation will lead to these joint cases 
instigating “change (in) the welfare eligibility rules in a number of Member States”422 and 
will in particular, as acknowledged by Advocate General Kokott, lead to an 
increase in social assistance claims for persons in similar positions. 
Moreover, when we note the reception of indirect discrimination we 
cannot help but notice the positive, albeit at times problematic, reaction of 
Member States. First of all, it is important to note that none of the Member 
States, apart from the UK, were familiar with this legal concept.423 In Germany, 
the concept was introduced as a direct result of the Bilka424 case and indeed in 
the UK, while already having acknowledged the existence of the concept, 
clarification was provided by this same case.425 In addition, when we look to 
Spain, we note that the concept was introduced by the Constitutional Court in 
1991, directly taken from the ECJ case law.426 
From this brief analysis of the reception in Member States then we deduce 
that in general the prohibition of discrimination at the European level, and 
                                                
420 Case C-310/08 London Borough of Harrow v Nimco Hassan Ibrahim, Secretary of State for the Home 
Department. 
421 Case C-480/08 Maria Teixeira v. London borough of Lambeth. 
422 Case C-310/08, London Borough of Harrow v Nimco Hassan Ibrahim and Secretary of State for the 
Home Department Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 23 February, 2010, nyr, Case C-
480/08 Maria Teixeira v London Borough of Lambeth and Secretary  of State for the Home Department, 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 23 February 2010, nyr, Common Market Law Review, 
48: 203-225, 2011.  
423 Prechal, S.  Equality of Treatment, Non Discrimination and Social Policy Achievements in 
Three Themes, Common Market Law Review, 41, 533-551, 2004, p. 535. 
424 Case 170/84, Bilka v Weber von Hartz. 
425 Prechal and Masselot, “Legal Impact Assessment of the Equaily Directives, A Report to the 
Commission”, (Tilburg/Leeds, 2003). 
426 Above No. 224 p. 536. 
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particularly its interpretation by the CJEU has indeed seeped into the legal 
systems of the Member States and is generally viewed in a positive manner.  
The additional paradigm we have made reference to goes, however, 
beyond the neo-formalist approach set out by Kennedy. In fact, European 
citizenship has proven to be a rather delicate issue, especially when considered in 
relation to the policies, particularly the economic concerns of national 
governments and the effects this can have on family law. The strife can be 
particularly noticed in Ireland where citizenship amendments, as a result of a 
series of national cases and the Chen case, in 2004 substantially affected migrants’ 
rights to family life. In 1998, Articles 2 and 3 were inserted into the Irish 
Constitution which respectively introduced the entitlement of anyone born on 
the ‘island of Ireland’ to Irish citizenship (jus soli) and recognised the ‘diversity of 
identities and traditions on the island of Ireland’. However, even previous to this, 
case law itself had expanded the rights of migrants and their families. In 1989, 
the Supreme Court ruled in the Fajujonu case427 that Irish citizen children had the 
right to the ‘company, care and parentage’ of their parents within the family unit 
which effectively routinely granted the right to remain to non-national parents. 
Change came in 2003 when the Supreme Court ruled in the L. and O case428 that 
the automatic right of residence granted to the parents of Irish-born children, 
regardless of the legal status of the parents, could no longer be sustained. This 
judgement was in fact intended to stem the flow of inward migration to Ireland. 
It is important to note here, that at the time of the case, more than 11,500 
applications for residence from parents with Irish citizen children were 
pending.429 The attempt, however, failed to stem the flow and consequently the 
2004 referendum took place which effectively revoked the jus soli principle. 
What is interesting is that in the Fajujonu case, the majority of the 
Supreme Court held that the ‘company, care and parentage (provided by) parents within a 
                                                
427 Fajujonu v Minister for Justice (1990) IR 151; (1990) ILRM 234. 
428 L and O v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (2003) IESC, 1. 
429 Mullally, S. “Children citizenship and constitutional change”, in Fanning, B. (ed.) Immigration 
and Social Change in Republic of Ireland, (Manchester University Press, 2007). 
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family unit’ was a right of the child derived from the constitution. Moreover, just 
one year prior to the L and O judgement, in the N.W.H.B case,430 Keane CJ held 
that the family, because it derives from the natural order was endowed with an 
authority that the Constitution itself recognised as being superior even to the 
authority of the State. As a result of the L and O cases, however, it would seem 
that only certain types of families are deserving of this constitutional protection 
afforded by the entrenched provisions on family life. The EU however added a 
further twist to the ‘citizenship, family life, fundamental rights’ debate, as noted 
the Chen case431 in effect bolstering the right to family life for migrating families by 
stating that a Union citizen child’s right of residence would be yielded ineffective 
if her parent was denied a right of residence. Placed in contrast with the Irish 
Supreme Court decision in the L and O case, the Chen case augments the child’s 
right to family life and has afforded greater protection than that of the Irish 
Constitution. However, as a result of the Chen case, the national judgments and 
the consequent referendum, Ireland has since changed its nationality laws in 
effect limiting the possibility of acquiring Irish nationality of children born to 
third country nationals.  
In terms of reception of the Metock case in the UK, we note some 
interesting points. First, the UK Border Agency has revised its guidance rules to 
comply with the judgment. In so doing, it revised Chapter 3 of the UKBA’s 
European Casework Instructions to ensure that neither the ‘lawful residence 
requirement’ nor the requirements in the Immigration Rules may be applied 
when direct family members apply for residence. What is more interesting 
though, is that the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal has been faced with a case 
in which it had to apply Metock. In the case of HB (Algeria),432 the Tribunal 
emphatically stated that  “it will be apparent from what we go on to say that the ECJ 
ruling in Metock affects a number of Tribunal and Court of Appeal decisions” signifying the 
Tribunal’s willingness to adjust its reasoning in consideration of the ruling in 
                                                
430 North Western Health Board v HW and CW (2001) 3 IR 622. 
431 Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Case C-200/02. 
432 HB (EEA right to reside - Metock) Algeria [2008] UKAIT 00069. 
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Metock. Unfortunately, the issue of family formation was not at issue in this case. 
It would be interesting to see how the tribunal might deal with this issue, 
specifically the fact that in Metock the ECJ construed the Directive as a tool for 
both family formation and family reunification.   
One of the clearest pronouncements of the Court has been that Union 
citizenship is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States. The Zambrano case discussed above certainly goes one step further in 
achieving this EU goal and in recognising a real, coherent status for citizens of 
the Union. This judgment, however, has been quite controversial. First of all, it is 
important to note that all Member States that made written submissions in the 
case and the Commission argued that the situation in the case at hand did not 
come within those envisaged by the freedoms of movement and residence 
guaranteed under EU law. In addition, the Irish government argued that to 
suggest otherwise would essentially result in opening the floodgates for similar 
types of claims. Therefore, it was not surprising when two days after the 
Zambrano judgement an Irish High Court judge openly called for a judicial 
conference to discuss the implications of the ruling while also urging the 
Government to take a formal position on the judgment as soon as possible so as 
to provide clarity in relation to a number of judicial reviews that were (and now 
still are) pending before the courts. Moreover, in the same week of the 
judgement, there were calls that the Irish government revoke the deportation 
orders of parents of 20 Irish citizen children who were forced to leave the 
country as a result of their parents’ deportation in addition to the countless 
number of parents of Irish citizen children who had left the county. The result of 
the judgement would seem to call into question the Irish government’s policy of 
deporting parents of Irish citizen children since the new rules on the acquisition 
of citizenship came into force. Most deportations are based on the reasoning that 
the family unit can still be preserved if the citizen child accompanies the parents 
back to their state of origin. This may indeed be true, the main crux of family 
preservation resting on the company and care of children by their parents 
therefore implying physical proximity. However, Zambrano and essentially the 
interpretation of EU citizenship by the Court has shed new light on these types 
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of cases affording weight to the protection of the family unit in the host EU 
Member State. 
In response to these calls, the Department of Justice released a statement 
on the Zambrano judgement.433 The main points it highlighted include stressing 
that the judgement applies only in cases where the child concerned is a citizen 
thereby reinforcing the existing citizenship rules that were introduced in 2004 
and stressing that the acquisition of citizenship remains a domestic matter. The 
Minister for Justice then went on to highlight that the government would take a 
proactive approach to the matter as opposed to waiting for the Irish Courts to 
decide pending cases in consideration of the judgement. In view of this, the 
Minister has initiated an urgent examination of all the cases that are pending 
before the courts (of which there are approximately 120) so as to decipher as 
quickly as possible if the Zambrano judgement is relevant. Furthermore, the 
Minister has said that parents of Irish citizen children who have been deported in 
the last 5 years could now apply to return to Ireland and that their situation will 
be reviewed. 
The results of this investigation will certainly provide for interesting 
reading. Suffice it to say for now that once again the primary law of the Union 
has granted stronger protection to the family and as we have seen from its 
reception in Ireland has the potential to infiltrate the domestic systems 
strengthening the rights of the family as a unit. In sum, in relation this to the 
overall impetus of this research, it could be argued that the European legal order 
is providing a level of protection for families in Europe based on a completely 
different set of rules in comparison to those used at the national level which are, 
as we have seen, generally developed along national, constitutional 
underpinnings in terms of the traditional family and which do not take into 
                                                
433Available online:   
http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/JELR/Pages/Statement%20by%20Minister%20for%20Justice,%20
Equality%20and%20Defence,%20Mr%20Alan%20Shatter,%20TD,%20on%20the%20implicat
ions%20of%20the%20recent%20ruling%20of%20the%20Court%20of%20Justice%20of%20the
%20European%20Union%20in%20the%20case%20of%20Ruiz%20Zambrano. 
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consideration the difficulties this presents when it comes to peripheral issues that 
necessarily affect the horizontal and vertical dynamics of the family. 
However, we can already note that Belgium, in the meantime, has in fact 
changed its nationality laws. Therefore, although the case has an innovative 
character, particularly when we consider its potential impact on family law, it 
may induce Member States to tighten their nationality laws so as to make this 
judgement applicable to a minimum number of cases. 
In terms of reception in Italy, we can look to a recent case concerning 
name registration for some indication on the reception of Garcia Avello  and  
Grunkin Paul. In the case of Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy,434 a married couple attempted 
to register the birth of their baby girl according to the mother’s surname. 
However, this request was rejected and Fazzo was used on the civil register. The 
couple appealed, but was told that though there was no law, the rule according 
to which births were to be registered according to the surname of the father was 
rooted in social consciousness and in Italian history. After years of appeals in 
Italy’s courts, the city of Milan ruled that Fazzo-Cusan could be used in 2012. 
This did not satisfy the couple, who took their case to Europe. The seven-judge 
court found in favour of the couple, stating that discrimination existed in how 
they were treated. It said that the Italian Supreme Court had enforced a 
‘patriarchal concept’ in stipulating that: 
The Italian Constitutional Court itself had recognised that the system in force had its 
roots in a patriarchal concept of the family which was not compatible with the 
constitutional principle of equality between men and women...It was possible that the 
rule that the father’s surname be handed down to legitimate children was necessary in 
practice, and was not necessarily incompatible with the Convention, but the fact that it 
                                                
434  ECtHR, Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, no. 77/07, Judgment of 7 January 2014. 
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was impossible to derogate from it had been excessively rigid and discriminatory towards 
women.435 
V) Concluding Remarks 
We can see then from these few select cases investigating the reception of CJEU 
judgements varies. In most cases, the principle of equality has been quite well 
received, perhaps since equality of treatment is a shared goal at both the 
domestic and EU level. The employment of fundamental rights logic, so long as 
there is a sufficient link to European law, is, albeit less so, also making advances 
at the EU level bolstered by the Union’s pledge to protect fundamental rights. 
Citizenship on the other hand, although specifically legislated for as an ancillary 
status, seems to be even more contentious. This is particularly true when one 
considers the preoccupation of Member States that the EU is intruding on wholly 
internal situations, interfering with immigration policy of the Member States and 
assuming, it could be argued, a sort of social engineering function.436 
This issue will be dealt with in Chapter VI on Citizenship. First it is 
necessary to delve into the case law of the European Court of Justice so as to 
delineate the concept of the family according to fundamental rights. 
  
                                                
435 Paragraph 67 “Par ailleurs, la Cour constitutionnelle italienne elle-même a reconnu que le système en vigueur procède 
d’une conception patriarcale de la famille et des pouvoirs du mari, qui n’est plus compatible avec le principe constitutionnel 
de l’égalité entre homme et femme…Si la règle voulant que le nom du mari soit attribué aux « enfants légitimes » peut 
s’avérer nécessaire en pratique et n’est pas forcément en contradiction avec la Convention, l’impossibilité d’y déroger lors de 
l’inscription des nouveau-nés dans les registres d’état civil est excessivement rigide et discriminatoire envers les femmes”. 
436  For a broader discussion see Wilhelmsson, T. “Varieties of welfarism in European contract 
law”, European Law Journal, (2004) 10, 6, p. 712-733; Wilhelmsson, T. & Hurri, S.J. (eds.), From dissonance 
to sense: welfare state expectations, privatisation and private law, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999). 
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Chapter V: Beyond Equality - The Influence of 
Fundamental Rights 
“nonsense upon stilts”437 
I) Introduction 
In 1791, Jeremy Bentham, in reference to the French Human Rights Declaration 
of 1789 commented that natural, imprescriptible rights were simply nonsense 
upon stilts. Today, however, as we will see, references to natural rights inherent 
to the person, from which the principles of human dignity and equality derive, 
have advanced a discourse that would seem to have arguably won out the 
nonsensical approach.438  
In the previous chapter, we noted the path by which peripheral family law 
issues arrive for adjudication at the CJEU. In so doing, we uncovered the role of 
anti-discrimination in breaking down the barrier that exceptionalized family law 
during the globalization of Classical Legal Though and The Social. However, 
what we also uncovered was an increased reference to fundamental rights and 
EU Citizenship as concepts used by the Court in the adjudication process.  
The purpose of this chapter therefore is to assess the effects of 
fundamental rights in family law cases at the supranational level. More 
specifically, we will investigate the relationship between the European Court of 
                                                
437 Bentham, Jeremy. “Anarchical Fallacies”, in Bowring, J. (ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol II 
(Edinburgh: W. Tait, 1843). 
438 It must, however, be pointed out that reference to Bentham is used here by way of provoking a 
discourse on the true nature of fundamental rights and how they are perceived. In fact, Bentham’s 
“nonsense” was hyperbolic, his actual point being more subtle in that he aimed to demonstrate that 
behind rights discourse lay policy choices. In other words, rights discourse acts as a cloak for policy 
driven decisions. He pointed to the indeterminable nature of rights, for example, how does one in any 
straightforward way reconcile freedom of expression and freedom of religion? Today, balancing and 
proportionality are advanced as a reasonable methodology.   
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Human Rights439 and its assessment of the right to family life (Article 8) and the 
European Union Court of Justice, which in recent times has increasingly made 
reference to ECtHR pronouncements. In addition, we will investigate the 
potential of the Charter of Fundamental Rights which has been modelled on the 
ECHR and which now assumes the position of primary law which must be 
respected and adhered to. The premise is that the emergence of a fundamental 
rights approach to resolving cross-border family disputes in cases concerning 
personal status and private relationships is a response to the phenomenon of 
migration and a lack of legal tools in view of the resolution of these issues at the 
national level.   
In fact, fundamental rights in family law have always played a particular 
role. As noted above in Chapter II, the constitutional protection of families that 
was espoused during the Social paved the way for a “special” protection that 
continued to inform the debate on family protection resulting in a persistent 
coupling of family law with morals and tradition effectively substantiating the 
family/market dichotomy. Nonetheless, the advancement of the interpretation of 
fundamental rights at the supranational level must be investigated since any 
discussion on family law at the European level must consider the potential of 
fundamental rights protection within the internal market.  
In addition, we must be aware that the application of fundamental rights 
across the board in terms of private law has gathered momentum in recent years, 
both at the national and supranational level.440 The aim here is to investigate this 
premise in the area of family law so as to uncover the extent to which new 
ideologies have been recognised in an attempt to inform the discussion 
concerning the reconstruction of family law at both the supra and national level 
in consideration of peripheral family law issues.  
                                                
439 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as 
amended by Protocol No. 11), Council of Europe CETS No. 5, Rome, 4 November 1950, in 
force 3 September 1953. 
440 Brüggemeier, G., et al., Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the European Union: Comparative Analyses of 
Selected Case Patterns (Cambridge University Press, 2010). Mak, C. Fundamental Rights in European Contract 
Law: A Comparison of the Impact of Fundamental Rights on Contractual Relationships in Germany, the Netherlands, 
Italy and England (Kluwer Law International, 2008).  
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To this end, this Chapter will proceed in the following way: by way of 
setting the scene, we will indicate some of the CJEU’s jurisprudence in which 
fundamental rights first played a notable role particularly with reference to the 
influence of the ECHR. This serves to introduce the relationship between the 
two Courts in a way that will inform the discussion on the potential of 
fundamental rights considerations in the peripheral family law cases coming 
before the CJEU. We will then proceed to delineate the case law of the ECtHR 
concerning the family with a view to establishing the acceptance of atypical 
family types by that Court. With the case law analysis in place, we can proceed 
to contrast the interpretation of fundamental rights by the two Courts. Finally, 
we will proceed by delineating the role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and the CJEU’s reliance on this fundamental rights document. 
II) Introducing The Interpretation Of Fundamental Rights By 
The CJEU 
It is often argued that the CJEU only pays lip service to fundamental rights 
protection in its jurisprudence owing to difficulties inherent in such an 
application in the field of private law.441 A counter argument, however, is that a 
notable change has occurred since specific reference to fundamental rights has 
increasingly become more pronounced in balancing economic rights with 
fundamental rights.442  
                                                
441 In terms of the difficulties of applying a fundamental rights based logic see Collins H., “On 
the (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law”, LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 7/2012; Smits, J.M. “Private Law and Fundamental Rights: A 
Sceptical View” in Barkhuysen, T. and Lindenbergh, S. (eds.), Constitutionalisation of Private Law 
(Brill, 2006). 
442 In this regard, see Safjan M., “The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in Private Law—On 
Actors, Vectors, and Factors of Influence”, in Purnhagen K., & Rott P. (eds), Varieties of European 
Economic Law and Regulation, Liber Amicorum for Hans Micklitz, (Springer International Publishing, 2014) 
where he examines the radiating effect of fundamental rights on private law according to various 
jurisdictions including the national and European setting.  
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 The International Handelgesellschaft443 case was the first pronouncement by 
the ECJ that specifically recognised the importance of fundamental rights in the 
internal market444:  
Although Community regulations are not German national laws, but legal rules 
pertaining to the Community, they must respect the elementary, fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the German Constitution and the essential structural principles of national 
law.  
The Court went on to state that: 
…respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law 
protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must be ensured within the 
framework of the structure and objectives of the Community. 
It is clear from the judgment then that the ECJ was already mindful of and 
attempting to assimilate the common constitutional principles of the Member 
States. This agenda was pursued in subsequent case law leading to not only a 
recognition of the importance of fundamental rights but rather to a situation 
according to which fundamental rights were actually balanced against market 
freedoms. A few important, oft-cited cases can be mentioned here by way of 
illustrating this development.  
First, we refer to the well-known Schmidberger v Austria445 judgment. In that 
case, Austria argued that the temporary closure of roads between Austria and 
Italy, effectively hampering free movement guaranteed by the EC treaty, was 
justified on the basis of freedom of expression and assembly (the road was 
blocked so as to allow an environmental demonstration). The Court therefore 
                                                
443 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 
11-70 
444 We can also make reference here to Stauder v City of Ulm. For an historical account of the 
development of human rights and their role in the EU see Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the 
European Union, (Longman, 2002) Chapter 13. 
445 Schmidberger v Austria, Case C-112/00. 
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was forced to juxtapose internal market considerations with fundamental rights. 
The Court reasoned, on the basis of “settled case-law”, that: 
…fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law the 
observance of which the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines 
supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. The ECHR has 
special significance in that respect (see, inter alia , Case C-260/89 ERT[1991] ECR 
I-2925, paragraph 41; Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001] ECR I-
1611, paragraph 37, and Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, 
paragraph 25).446 
Two points can be noted here. First, we can identify, from the language used in 
the court’s reasoning, the shift we have already made reference to – be it 
rhetorical or not - in terms of market v social reasoning. Secondly, the Court 
directly refers to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in its 
attempt to ground the application of fundamental rights by drawing inspiration 
from common constitutional provisions and international treaties. One might 
consider the real consequences of this advance i.e. the instigation of a rights-
based logic to be applied by a court that has its origins in the interpretation of 
legal issues related to the proper functioning of an internal market, which goes 
well beyond what was initially conceived in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris. 
However, we might also argue that the fundamental rights-based approach 
necessarily remains bound to the logic and language of the market oriented 
economic freedoms given the very basis of the EU legal order.   
With the wheels in motion, the Omega 447  case followed and firmly 
substantiated the direction the Court was prepared to take. The case concerned a 
German prohibition on the importation of laser guns that involved players 
targeting each other a type of “play at killing”. It was argued that the 
                                                
446 Paragraph 71. 
447 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, C-36/02. 
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encouragement of fictitious violence for entertainment purposes amounted to 
violation of human dignity, a key principle of the German Constitution. The ECJ 
in the case accepted the German government’s prohibition which furthered, at 
least in this case, a priority of fundamental rights over community law.448 The 
Court made reference to its judgment in Schmidberger confirming that the 
protection of fundamental rights justifies, in principle, a restriction upon 
fundamental freedoms. In balancing the fundamental rights approach with 
economic, internal market considerations, the Court made reference to the 
opinion of the Advocate General that “the Community legal order undeniably strives to 
ensure respect for human dignity as a general principle of law” going beyond, a merely 
market rights based approach. In other words, it would seem that what the Court 
does is not replace no rights with some rights, but rather supplements economic 
rights, with social and dignitary ones.  
From these early examples, we can already note the Court’s attempt to 
ascertain the sources of fundamental rights as reference points in deciding certain 
cases and for our purposes it allows us to introduce the impact of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and the fundamental rights delineated therein and 
interpreted by the ECtHR. The extent to which the ECHR has influenced the 
CJEU, either directly or indirectly, has led to an interesting debate on the 
European legal scene. Indeed, much attention has been given to the relationship 
between the two Courts. However, attention must be intensified now with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and with it the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, article 52(3) which stipulates that the ECHR should act as the minimum 
standard of human rights in the EU and the EU’s accession to the ECHR. 
Indeed, much of the following analysis will focus on the interaction between 
these two fundamental rights instruments and the Court. 
Bearing that in mind, we will proceed with an analysis of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR in relation to the family in order to decipher what 
                                                
448 We can make reference here also to the Schmidberger case in which the protection of the 
freedom of assembly and expression justified a derogation from free movement of goods.  
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exactly it considers the family to be. Once this is established, I will proceed to 
examine the CJEU’s references to the Convention and the case law of the 
ECtHR in order to evaluate the role of fundamental rights in private law at the 
Union level. In furtherance to this, the Charter will be examined. 
III) The European Convention On Human Rights  
Prior to delineating the case law on the ECHR, it is important to recall the 
premise of this thesis i.e. the family, in structure, nature and ideology has, and 
continues to change. We argue here that this change has been interpreted in view 
of advancing fundamental rights protection reflected in the variety of cases, 
examined below, coming before the ECtHR.  
At the national level, the principal preoccupation for a long time was in 
striking the delicate balance between private ordering within the family structure 
on the one hand and state protection, for example in cases concerning domestic 
violence, education and family welfare often justified by the special protection 
afforded to families in national constitutions.449 More recently, and here we 
recall the peripheral family law issues, family law has been further convoluted by 
two significant developments: the first being the increase of what we might term 
‘atypical family structures’ and the second, linked to the first, is the mobility of 
persons as individuals and families as units within Europe’s borders. Suffice it to 
say, at the risk of repetition, that the focus of this thesis is on the peripheral issues 
and specifically in this chapter on how fundamental rights arguments have been 
used in these areas.  
                                                
449 Here, we can make reference to the Irish Constitution (Bunreacht na hEireann) enacted in 
1937 according to which “The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and 
fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and 
imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law” (Article 41.1) “The State, 
therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and authority, as the necessary 
basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State” (Article 
41.2). Similar pronouncements can be found in the Italian Constitution in Article 31 which 
states that (1) The republic furthers family formation and the fulfilment of related tasks by 
means of economic and other provisions with special regard to large families. (2) The republic 
protects maternity, infancy, and youth; it supports and encourages institutions needed for this 
purpose.  
  
190 
To this end, and so as to simplify the ascertainment of relevant cases, a 
distinction will be made here between peripheral cases concerning the changing 
structure and composition of families on the one hand and on the other, cases 
that are in some way related to the mobility of families. Naturally, the facts of 
some cases cannot be neatly packed into one or the other box nor are their facts 
strictly limited to either core or peripheral issues. Therefore, some overlap is to 
be expected in allowing a concise overview of the intervention of fundamental 
rights in the development the family and its legal sphere. 
Generally speaking, the cases outlined give rise to an interpretation of 
Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the Convention.  
A. Article 8: Right To Respect For Private And Family Life 
Article 8 is the most obvious provision protecting the family. It is entitled 
right to respect for private and family life and states:  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for he 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
From the provision it is clear that it is characterized by negative and positive 
obligations in that not only does it protect individuals against arbitrary 
interference by public authorities but it also stipulates that states must act 
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affirmatively to respect family life450. This was made clear in the case of X & Y v 
the Netherlands451 in which the Court held that: 
[Article 8] does not merely compel the state to abstain from…interference: in addition to 
this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an 
effective respect for private and family life…These obligations may involve the adoption 
of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of 
individuals between themselves. 
B. Article 12: The Right to Marry 
Article 12 concerns the right to marry. It specifically states: 
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, 
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right. 
It is clear then from this provision that the recipients of this right are opposite 
sex couples of marriageable age according to the national laws in force. It 
excludes therefore new family formations such as same-sex couples. However, as 
we will see from the case law examination, and in accordance with Article 14 
outlined below, cases, more frequently, come before the court based on these two 
articles taken in conjunction in relation to same-sex rights to marriage and 
transsexuals’ right to marry.  
C. Article 14: Prohibition of Discrimination 
Article 14 of the ECHR concerns the prohibition of discrimination in stating: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
                                                
450 Kilkelly, Ursula. Human Rights handbook, No. 1. The right to respect for private and family 
life: A guide to the implementation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
2003. 
451 X & Y v the Netherlands, Application no. 8978/80. 
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political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status. 
Again it is clear from the wording of the Article that it guarantees equality in 
relation to the substantive rights laid out in the Convention. However, it must be 
noted here that in 2010 452 protocol 12 to the Convention came into force 
expanding the scope of equal treatment to cover rights guaranteed not just those 
rights delineated in the Convention but also those at the national level.453  
With the relevant provisions set out, an examination of the case law will 
inform us as to how the Court has applied these fundamental rights in cases 
concerning the family. 
D. Application 
It is important to note from the outset that new, atypical family forms i.e. those 
that do not subscribe to the traditional, classical family based on heterosexual 
marriage have presented difficult, some might say controversial questions for 
society and law. The ECtHR professes its preference for equal acceptance when 
it comes to deciding “family life” cases. To this end, rather than focusing on 
strict formal ties, it stipulates that the general principle to be applied is whether 
there are close personal ties between the parties. Necessarily then, in recognising 
the ever-changing nature of family life, it takes a case-by-case approach to the 
cases that come before it permitting it to interpret the Convention as a “living 
instrument”454. In the case of EM (Lebanon),455 the Court highlighted this fact-
specificity of family life and the meaning attributed to it by Article 8 of the 
Convention in stating that: 
                                                
452 It was supposed to enter into force in 2005 but there were serious delays leading to Protocol 
No. 14bis to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
453 Protocol no. 12 to the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ETS no. 177), Explanatory Report, available online at: 
 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/177.htm . 
454 Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 5856/72. 
455 EM (Lebanon) [2008] UKHL 6, [2009] 1 AC 1198. 
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Families differ widely, in their composition and in the mutual relations which exist 
between the members, and marked changes are likely to occur over time within the same 
family. Thus there is no pre-determined model of family or family life to which article 8 
must be applied. The article requires respect to be shown for the right to such family life 
as is or may be enjoyed by the particular applicant or applicants before the court, always 
bearing in mind (since any family must have at least two members, and may have many 
more) the participation of other members who share in the life of that family. In this 
context, as in most Convention contexts, the facts of the particular case are crucial.456 
Parenting 
On examination of the case law of the Court, particularly some of the early 
cases, we note that atypical family structures and the issues emanating from these 
new family types, often arrive to the Court on the basis of questions concerning 
parenting. Our starting reference point here is the issue of non-marital 
heterosexual families encompassing both couples that cohabit and those that 
perhaps were once married but separate and which have children together and 
therefore the ties, once formal but now functional, which must be maintained.  
Let us first look to the case of Marckx v Belgium. 457  This early case, 
although it did not actually feature the term de facto family did, in an attempt to 
equalise the situation of de facto families with that of marital families, recognise 
that the family protected by Article 8 was not limited to the traditional family 
based on marriage, which, in terms of our analysis of the family and progression 
from Classical Legal Thought represents a significant advancement and one 
which national courts shied away from. The Court stated that it: 
recognises that support and encouragement of the traditional family is in itself legitimate 
or even praiseworthy. However, in the achievement of this end recourse must not be had 
to measures whose object or result is, as in the present case, to prejudice the ‘illegitimate’ 
                                                
456 Ibid. Para 37 
457 Marckx v Belgium, application No. 6833/74 
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family; the members of the ‘illegitimate’ family enjoy the guarantees of Article 8 (art. 8) 
on an equal footing with the members of the traditional family  
This case concerned a Belgian law in existence at the time of the case concerning 
unmarried mothers and children born out of wedlock. The law stipulated that in 
order to establish a maternal affiliation to a child, unmarried mothers had to 
recognise the child, and then adopt him/her. It was argued that this constituted 
a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The Court, even though it obviously 
expressed a legal privileging for marital families in guaranteeing respect for 
family life, held that Article 8 and its reference to family life encompasses ties 
between an unmarried mother and her child thereby essentially recognising the 
importance of “family life” in de facto family situations.  
Even though the situation of fathers and their biological children has been 
more convoluted, the case of Berrehab v. The Netherlands458 illustrates the approach 
of the Court in analysing the facts of the specific case so as to determine the 
existence or not as the case may be, of a real and substantial bond between 
parents and their children. The applicants in this case were a father, a citizen of 
Morocco, and his daughter. The father had divorced from his Dutch wife and 
the daughter lived with her mother. However, the father was co-guardian of his 
daughter and contributed financially in view of her maintenance on a monthly 
basis. As a result of the divorce, the Government of the Netherlands refused to 
renew the father's work permit and expelled him from the country. It was argued 
that these actions, even though the father continued to maintain contact with the 
child, violated Article 8 of the Convention. The European Court of Human 
Rights agreed with the applicants and held that Article 8 had been violated in 
the case on the basis that by refusing to accommodate the father with a work 
permit renewal and his subsequent expulsion, the father was prevented from 
maintaining regular contact with his daughter. It stated:  
                                                
458 Berrehab v. The Netherlands Application No. 10730/84. 
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It follows from the concept of family life on which Article 8 is based that a child born of 
such a union is ipso jure part of that relationship; hence, from the moment of the child’s 
birth and by the very fact of it, there exists between him and his parents a bond 
amounting to “family life”, even if the parents are not living together 
The issue was further clarified in Boughanemi v France 459  according to which 
cohabitation, let alone marriage, is not essential in establishing family life for the 
purposes of Article 8. The Court was clear in pronouncing that a presumption of 
family life exists between biological parents and children regardless of marital 
status in stating that: 
The concept of family life on which Article 8 (art. 8) is based embraces, even where 
there is no cohabitation, the tie between a parent and his or her child, regardless of 
whether or not the latter is legitimate…although that tie may be broken by subsequent 
events, this can only happen in exceptional circumstances… 
It is clear from these selected examples that the Court concentrates its approach 
on the substance of family relationships as opposed to formalities permitting a 
fundamental rights based approach to de facto families with a view to establishing 
the existence of family life. What is interesting though is that the Court seems to 
place great weight on the pre-existence of a relationship, especially when it 
comes to unmarried fathers and their children. It has established that unmarried 
natural fathers must establish a sufficient degree of commitment to their children 
in order for family life to be established for the purposes of Article 8. This was 
made clear in Lebbink v Netherlands460 in which the Court stated that if Article 8 
were to apply to “a potential relationship which could develop between a child born out of 
wedlock and its natural father, relevant factors include the nature of the relationship between the 
natural parents and the demonstrable interest in and commitment by the father to the child both 
before and after its birth”. Subsequent case law clarified to some extent what the 
Court meant by ‘demonstrable interest’ and it would seem that in cases where 
the parents are cohabiting i.e. in cases where a child is born into an existing de 
                                                
459 Boughanemi v France, Application No. 22070/93. 
460 Lebbink v Netherlands, App. No. 45582/99. 
  
196 
facto family then family ties can be said to exist between the father and the child. 
Where there is no cohabitation, however, the Court will have to examine 
“contributions to the child’s care and upbringing” and “the quality and regularity of 
contact”461.  
The issue of transsexual parenting has also brought more controversial 
issues before the Court forcing the Court to once again deal with relationships 
not based on blood ties. Family ties between children and stepparents had 
already been recognised by the Court in the case of Nuutinen v Finland.462 In the 
case of X, Y and Z v The United Kingdom 463 the Court had to consider whether de 
facto family ties existed between a transsexual male and a child born to his 
partner through artificial insemination. In considering the facts, it opined that 
the relationship between a female-to-male transsexual and his child born by 
artificial insemination by donor (AID) amounted to family life. In deliberating, 
the Court attached significance, first, to the fact that their relationship was 
otherwise indistinguishable from that enjoyed by the traditional family and 
secondly, that the transsexual participated in the AID process as the child’s 
father. 
More recently, the Court has pronounced on the very interesting and 
increasingly controversial issue of the legal recognition of the rights of children 
born to surrogate mothers. In the cases of Mennesson v. France464 and Labassee v. 
France 465  the court stipulated that France has the right to ban surrogate 
parenthood but it cannot extend its stance in refusing to grant legal protection to 
parent-child relationships of children born to surrogate mothers. It ruled that the 
                                                
461 Khan v United Kingdom, Application no. 47486/06. 
462 Nuutinen v Finland, Application No. 45830/99. 
463 X, Y and Z v The United Kingdom, Application no. 21830/93. 
464 Mennesson v. France Application no. 65192/11. 
465 Labassee v. France Application no. 65941/11. 
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current practice in France constituted an infringement of the children’s right to 
respect for their private life.466 
Same-sex 
Thus far, we have described how the Court deals with atypical family forms that 
come before it when parenting is involved. What we haven’t considered is 
relationships that are formed between two people of the same sex who seek 
recognition of their family status when there are no children concerned. The 
issue of same-sex families has given rise to much controversy. 
 The case of Karner v Austria 467  exemplifies the Court’s tendency to 
privilege the traditional family. It concerned an applicant, who was deceased by 
the time of the judgment, who shared a flat with his same-sex partner. They 
shared all the utility costs of the apartment. In 1991 Mr. Karner’s partner 
discovered that he was infected with the AIDS virus and from 1993 until his 
death Mr Karner nursed him. He died in 1994 designating Mr Karner as his 
heir. In 1995 the landlord of the apartment sought to terminate the tenancy and 
brought proceedings to this effect. The action was dismissed on the basis that 
family members held a statutory right to succeed in a tenancy agreement and the 
court opined that this applied to persons in a homosexual relationship. After 
being upheld by the Regional Court, the Supreme Court eventually quashed the 
decision in 1996 reasoning that the notion of “life companion” had to be 
interpreted in accordance to its meaning at the time the legislation was enacted 
in 1974. It opined that the legislature’s intention at that time had not been to 
include persons in same-sex relationships. The applicant took the case to the 
ECtHR claiming a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of 
the Convention. Even though the applicant had died before the case was heard, 
the Court decided to proceed. It was of the opinion that the subject matter was 
of significant importance for all the state parties to the Convention. It held that 
                                                
466 Emphasis added so as to note that, in the opinion of the Court, the applicants had not claimed that 
the obstacles they faced had been insurmountable, nor had they demonstrated that they had been 
prevented from the enjoyment in France of their right to respect for their family life. 
467 Karner v Austria, Application No. 40016/98. 
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Article 14 was applicable in that differences based on sexual orientation could 
only be justified on the basis of serious reason. The fact that the Court based its 
decision on Article 14 rather than Article 8 is very telling in that its usual 
reasoning path, based on the social function rather than formal ties and 
biological links, was inapplicable to these cases. The Austrian Government 
argued that the aim of the legislation in question was the protection of the 
traditional family unit and the Court accepted that this was, in principle, a 
weighty and legitimate reason with the potential to justify a difference in 
treatment. Thankfully, however, it found that the aim pursued was rather 
abstract and in theory a broad variety of concrete measures could be used to 
achieve such an aim. In reality, it was necessary for the Government to 
demonstrate that the measure chosen to realise the aim had to be a measure 
necessary to exclude homosexual couples from the scope of the legislation in 
order to achieve that aim.  
Although the Court in the above case demonstrated a clear preference for 
maintaining the traditional family, the issues of same-sex families has again 
recently come before the Court. In considering whether same-sex couples can 
enjoy family life for the purposes of Article 8, the Court, in Schalk and Kopf v 
Austria468 made reference to changing social attitudes and legal reform that has 
taken place in contracting states to reflect these changes. It held: 
In view of this evolution the Court considers it artificial to maintain the view that, in 
contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy ‘family life’ for the 
purposes of Article 8. Consequently the relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-
sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of ‘family life’, 
just as the relationship of a different sex couple in the same situation would. 
What is especially important in this judgment, and something that will be dealt 
with in more detail below, is the Court’s reference to the Charter of 
                                                
468 Schalk and Kopf v Austria, Application no. 30141/04 
  
199 
Fundamental Rights, illustrating the cross-pollination of certain elements from 
one legal order to another.  
Regard being had to Article 9 of the Charter, therefore, the Court would no longer 
consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all circumstances be 
limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex. Consequently, it cannot be 
said that Article 12 is inapplicable to the applicants' complaint.469 
More attention will be paid to this reference below when we discuss the 
relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR. For now, suffice it to say that an 
alternative approach has been adopted by the ECtHR in guaranteeing the 
fundamental right to family life for families whose structures differ from the 
classical one based on formal ties of marriage. 
The judgments referred to thus far are important with a view to setting the 
scene in relation to the Court’s interpretation of family life. However, it is now 
important to make reference to the more peripheral-like cases that have come 
before the Court as a result of migration with a view to juxtaposing the ECtHR’s 
approach to that of the CJEU. 
Family Reunification and Residence Rights 
As we have seen from the previous chapter, the opening up of the path to the 
CJEU via anti-discrimination and a neo-formalist approach has led to real access 
in terms of the peripheral family law issues we consider here, including rights of 
residence470.  In a similar vein, the question of family unity has come before the 
ECtHR via family reunification issues and rights of residence.  
Let us begin here by making reference to the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales, and 
Balkandali v. United Kingdom471. The applicants in this case were three lawfully 
settled residents of the UK who applied to the UK Government to have their 
                                                
469 Paragraph 61 of Schalk and Kopf v Austria, Application no. 30141/04. 
470 See Chatper IV. 
471  Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, Application nos. 9214/80; 9473/81; 
9474/81. 
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husbands join them on the basis of the immigration rules that were in force at 
that time. This application was refused and therefore the case arose from their 
challenge to the refusal. They argued that the rules in question applied stricter 
conditions for the granting of permission for husbands to join their wives than 
vice versa. The Government claimed the stricter measures complained of were in 
force in order to protect the domestic labour market and maintain “public 
tranquillity”. On the basis of this, the applicants claimed discrimination on the 
grounds of race and sex, and in the case of the third Applicant, Ms. Balkandali, 
on the grounds of birth. They specifically alleged a violation of Article 14 
(prohibition of discrimination), Article 3 (prohibition of torture), Article 8 
(respect for family life) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
The arguments based on Article 8 of the Convention are of particular 
interest to us. It was submitted that Article 8 in protecting the right to family life 
inferred the right to establish one’s home in the State of lawful residence. Based 
on this, they argued that if this right was not upheld, then they would be forced 
either to move abroad to set up the family home or to be separated from their 
spouses. More specifically, they claimed that in conjunction with Article 14 of the 
Convention dealing with discrimination, that the immigration rules not only 
violated their right to family life but that they were discriminatory on the basis of 
sex, race and, in the case of Mrs. Balkandali, birth. The applicants claimed there 
was no objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment and 
that the Government’s position disrespected the role of women in modern 
society. In response to the claims, the UK Government argued that Article 8 was 
inapplicable to the case at hand and rather argued that it was an immigration 
case governed by Protocol 4. It argued that even if the Court were to find Article 
8 applicable then the differences made on the basis of race, sex and birth were 
objective and reasonable and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued i.e. the 
need to protect the domestic labour marked at a time of high domestic 
unemployment, and to advance public tranquillity through effective immigration 
control.  
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In deciding the case, the ECtHR resolved that the facts fell within the 
ambit of Article 8 when examined in conjunction with Article 14. It is important 
to note however that it was of the opinion that Article 8 when taken alone had 
not been violated. It observed that case in question concerned immigrants who 
married after arrival to the UK in differentiating between immigrants who had 
come to the UK leaving a family behind in their country of origin. On the basis 
of this the Court held that the duty on states imposed by Article 8 does not imply 
a general obligation on the part of contracting States to respect the choice of 
matrimonial residence. It substantiated in arguing that the applicants to the case 
had not sufficiently demonstrated obstacles to establishing family life in their own 
or their husbands’ home countries. For that reason, taken on its own there was 
no violation of respect for family life. It did, however, unanimously find a 
violation of Article 14 together with Article 8 on the basis that there had been 
discrimination on the grounds of sex reasoning that the difference in treatment 
was not justified. It is interesting to note that the Court made specific reference 
to efforts at that time to achieve gender equality, a recognition that can be 
paralleled to efforts at the EU level that were discussed above.  
Family Name 
Family name is another issue that has been considered by the Court (one which 
can be contrasted to the CJEU’s approach to the issue472). It is an issue that 
indeed comes under the scope of protection of Article 8 but it is suggested that 
the Court does not attach great importance to the issue since it has never found a 
violation. In the case of Sterjna v Finland473, the applicant was refused permission 
to change his Swedish surname based on the fact that it caused problems and was 
likely to be mispronounced by Finnish speakers. He claimed that the relevant 
Finnish law violated Article 8. The Court however was not convinced and held 
that there was no violation as the applicant had not established any particular 
inconvenience or singularity in his name.  
                                                
472 See Chapter IV. 
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The case of Guillot v France474 concerned the registration of a forename. 
The applicants wished to name their daughter ‘Fleur de Marie’ after the heroine 
in Mystères de Paris. The European Court of Human Rights noted that Article 8 
does not contain any explicit provision on forenames. However, since they 
constitute a means of identifying persons within their families and community, 
forenames, like surnames do concern private and family life. Furthermore, the 
choice of a child’s name by its parents is a personal, emotional matter and 
therefore comes within their private sphere. The subject-matter of the complaint 
thus fell within the ambit of Article 8. The Court noted the upset caused by the 
refusal to register the forename they had chosen. It stated that that forename 
consequently could not appear on official documents and deeds. In addition, the 
Court found it probable that the difference between the child’s forename in law 
and the forename she actually used entailed certain complications for the 
applicants when acting as her statutory representatives. However, the Court 
noted that it was not disputed that the child regularly used the forename in issue 
without hindrance and that the French courts which had considered the child’s 
interest had allowed the application made in the alternative by the applicants for 
registration of the forename 'Fleur-Marie'. In consequence, the Court did not 
find that the inconvenience complained of was sufficient to raise an issue of 
failure to respect private and family life. There had been no violation of Article 8 
ECHR.  
More recently, however, we note the case of Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy475 
already mentioned above. To recall briefly, the case concerned a married couple 
attempted to register the birth of their infant girl according to the mother’s 
surname. However, this request was rejected and Fazzo was used on the civil 
register. The couple appealed, but was told that though there was no law, the 
rule according to which births were to be registered according to the surname of 
                                                
474 Guillot v France, Application No. 22500/93. 
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the father was rooted in social consciousness and in Italian history. After years of 
appeals in Italy’s courts, the city of Milan ruled that Fazzo-Cusan could be used 
in 2012. This did not satisfy the couple, who took their case to European Court 
of Human Rights. The seven-judge court found in the couple’s favour, saying 
that discrimination existed in the treatment of the couple. It said that the Italian 
Supreme Court had enforced a ‘patriarchal concept’ in stipulating that: 
The Italian Constitutional Court itself had recognised that the system in force had its 
roots in a patriarchal concept of the family which was not compatible with the 
constitutional principle of equality between men and women...It was possible that the 
rule that the father’s surname be handed down to legitimate children was necessary in 
practice, and was not necessarily incompatible with the Convention, but the fact that it 
was impossible to derogate from it had been excessively rigid and discriminatory towards 
women.476 
Cross-Pollination of Religion and Culture 
Another interesting issue that has come before the Court is that concerning 
religion and the family. This is particularly interesting considering the wider 
scope of this hypothesis of this thesis i.e. migration within the EU and the 
peripheral family law issues that ensue. Two very pertinent judgments can be 
referred to here. 
The first case to consider is that of Muñoz Díaz v. Spain477. The applicant in 
this case was a Spanish national of Roma descent who married, in accordance 
with Roma customs and traditions, Mr Muñoz Díaz. The marriage was therefore 
recognised by the Roma community who afforded all the normal social effects of 
marriage to the couple. On Mr. Diaz’s death, the applicant applied for a 
survivor’s pension based on the social security contributions that her husband 
had made during the 19 years prior to his death. The Instituto Nacional de la 
Seguridad Social (the National Institute of Social Security INSS) however refused 
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the application stating that the applicant “[had] never been the wife of the deceased prior 
to the date of death” in that the marriage did not constitute a valid civil marriage in 
accordance with the Civil Code. Mrs. Diaz subsequently filed a claim with the 
Labour Court which on the contrary recognised the civil effects of the marriage 
and based on this granted the entitlement to Mrs. Diaz. This decision however 
was appealed by the INSS to the Madrid Higher Court of Justice resulting in the 
quashing, on the basis of Article 49 of the Civil Code, of the Labour Court 
judgment. It viewed the union as a more uxorio cohabitation arrangement that fell 
outside the scope of the General Social Security Act. The appeal continued with 
the applicant referring the question to the Constitutional Court. Mrs. Diaz at this 
point based her claim on the principle of non-discrimination in respect of race 
and social condition contained in Article 14 of the Spanish Constitution. The 
Constitutional Court however dismissed the appeal in holding that the legal 
possibility of marrying in a civil form was “neutral from a racial or ethnic point 
of view” and therefore no discrimination had taken place. The case eventually 
came before the ECtHR. It held that here had indeed been a violation of Article 
14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol 1. In 
particular, the Court made reference to the State’s willingness to treat Mr. and 
Mrs. Diaz as spouses in that the civil registration authorities had granted the 
family status as a ‘large family’ for other purposes and that therefore it would be 
disproportionate for the State to refuse to recognise the civil effects of the 
marriage in assessing entitlement to a survivor’s pension.  
The second case we can make reference to here is Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey478. 
The case was brought under Article 8 of the Convention and again concerned 
social security benefits. The applicant in this case married her husband, again in 
a religious ceremony in 1976 and they had six children. The husband died in 
2002 and one year later the applicant brought a claim in her name and in the 
name of their youngest daughter. She sought to have their marriage registered 
and to have the name of her daughter entered in the civil register as a child of 
the marriage. In furtherance to this, the applicant applied to the retirement 
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pension fund for a transfer of the said benefits to her and her daughter’s name. 
Her claim was successful in relation to the transfer to the daughter’s name but, 
on the basis that their marriage had never been legally recognised, the claim in 
her name failed. Therefore, the Court was asked to consider whether there was 
discrimination on the basis of the nature of the marriage. In this case, however, 
the Court held that there had been no discrimination and distinguished it from 
Muñoz Díaz v. Spain considering the element of good faith that was present in that 
case. More precisely, the Court pointed to the fact that the Spanish authorities in 
the Diaz case had already recognised Mrs. Díaz as her partner’s spouse as she 
had been granted ‘large family’ status and had also been issued with a family 
record book. The Court also placed weight on the fact Mrs. Díaz at the moment 
of her marriage had no other option available as the only form of marriage at 
that time was in accordance with the rites of the Catholic Church. In the case at 
hand however, the Court claimed that Mrs. Yiğit was aware of the fact that in 
order to obtain the pension in question she would have to regularise her 
relationship in accordance with the civil code and moreover she had twenty-six 
years to do so. Article 8 was also considered by the Court; however, it was 
decided that it could not be interpreted as imposing an obligation on contracting 
States to recognise religious marriages. 
Family Allowances 
This is another indicative judgment of the ECtHR in relation to family structure 
and composition. Joined cases, Fawsie v Greece479 and Saidoun v Greece480, concerned 
Syrian and Lebanese nationals legally resident in Greece as political 
refugees.  Both families claimed an allowance that in Greece is paid to mothers 
of large families. Their claims were rejected however on the basis that they did 
not have the status of "mother of a large family" within the meaning of the 
legislation since the legislation stipulated that either the parents or the children 
should have Greek nationality or the nationality of one of the member States of 
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the European Union. The Supreme Administrative Court, in consideration of 
Article 8 of the Convention, found that the legislation did not lead to a 
disruption of family ties, nor did it impede the construction of family life. In 
addition, the Supreme Administrative Court considered the case on the basis of 
Article 14 of the Convention but did not deem the refusal of the allowance 
wrongful on the basis of discrimination since the distinction between foreigners 
and nationals was based on the reasonable and objective criterion of nationality. 
The ECtHR however was of a different opinion. It recalled that a difference in 
treatment based solely on nationality could only be justified by very strong 
considerations. It held unanimously that there had been a violation of Articles 8 
and 14 of the Convention taken together. 
Gender Roles in Family Life 
Another interesting body of case law can be discerned in relation to the 
prohibition on discrimination, particularly when considered in conjunction with 
Article 8. Most recently, we can make reference to the case of Andrle v the Czech 
Republic481. The applicant was a divorced man who complained that there was no 
lowering of the pensionable age for men who had raised children equivalent to 
that available for women in the same position. More specifically, the applicant 
applied for a retirement pension at the age of fifty-seven based on the fact that he 
had cared for two children. The claim was rejected however with the Czech 
Social Security Administration arguing that he had not reached the pensionable 
age, in his case sixty-one years and ten months, required by section 32 of the 
Pension Insurance Act. Mr. Andrle appealed this decision which eventually 
reached the Czech Constitutional Court that decided that his claim was 
manifestly ill-founded basing its decision on the discretion afforded to the 
legislature to implement preferential treatment, the objective and reasonable aim 
pursued by this preferential treatment of women and the relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued. In relation to 
the aim of the preferential treatment of women pursued by the Czech 
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government, it was argued that under the old communist system women with 
children were required to work full-time while simultaneously caring for children 
and the household. Therefore, it was argued that the differential treatment was a 
measure intended to compensate for the burdensome existence that women were 
forced to adhere to during this time. The ECtHR noted the government’s recent 
efforts to equalise the retirement age of men and women however held that 
progressive modification of the pension system could not be criticised especially 
taking into consideration the gradual nature of demographic shifts and changes 
in perceptions of the role of the sexes. Therefore the ECtHR granted a wide 
margin of appreciation in consideration of discrimination in this case.  
With the ECtHR cases delineated, let us now turn to the case law of the 
CJEU in relation to the Charter of Fundamental Rights before turning to an 
analysis of the relationship between the two Courts and the instruments on which 
they rely. 
IV) The Charter Of Fundamental Rights Of The European 
Union 
When the EU was created, the original treaties did not contain any reference to 
the protection of human rights as it was thought that the creation of an internal 
market would not require recourse to a body of human rights provisions. 
However, on recognition that encouraging the free movement of persons, goods 
and services essentially lead to more than an efficient functioning of the market, 
the European Court of Justice increasingly decided cases with human and 
fundamental rights aspects. In an effort to render effective a more rights-based 
approach and in order to substantiate EU citizenship the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was proclaimed in 2000, the content of which reflects 
greatly the European Convention on Human Rights and more generally 
protection afforded to nationals of Member States by the various Constitutions of 
the Member States. The Charter, originally a declaration of compliance with 
human rights became a legally binding document in 2009 when the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force.  
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A. Early Reference to the Charter 
In the years before the Charter became legally binding, there was some 
confusion as to the purpose, scope and effect of the instrument. For some time, 
the Court and Advocates General made specific reference to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the general principles of EU law as sources of 
fundamental rights protection in the EU.  The Charter, however, even though it 
remained non-binding at this point, provided the CJEU with an additional 
instrument, a toolbox of rights that could be considered and utilised by the Court 
as readymade general principles. In effect, as we will see from the pre-Lisbon 
case law examples, the Charter was used an instrument for identifying 
fundamental rights as general principles of Community law. As set out in 
Parliament v. Council: 
the principal aim of the Charter, as is apparent from its preamble, is to reaffirm ‘rights 
as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international 
obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the 
Community Treaties, the [ECHR], the Social Charters adopted by the Community and 
by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court … and of the European Court 
of Human Rights.482 
This is particularly notable in reference to cases concerning anti-discrimination. 
As we have already pointed out in the previous chapter, the EU institutions have 
increasingly broadened the scope of equality of treatment. With specific 
reference to the Charter, although the Mangold483 did not explicitly mention it, it 
did provide an inkling of the direction into which the Court planned on going. In 
fact, this direction was again bolstered in the subsequent Kücükdeveci484 case in 
which it was made clear by the Court that:  
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Article 6(1) TEU provides that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union is to have the same legal value as the Treaties. Under Article 21(1) of the 
charter, ‘[a]ny discrimination based on … age … shall be prohibited’.485 
The two cases, although not very forceful in their use of the Charter (in fact 
Mangold made no reference to it at all) did however bring to light the 
inspirational character that the Court granted to the Charter coupled with the 
general principles by anticipating direct horizontal effect to the general 
principles 486 . This step anticipated the post-Lisbon characteristic that the 
Charter487 was to assume i.e. that of having the same legal value of the treaties.  
B. The Family and the Charter 
The Charter, as mentioned, is modelled on the ECHR. However, there are some 
relevant differences, some of which have already been alluded to, which should 
be highlighted before the case law analysis. The relevant provisions for the 
purposes of family law include. 
Article 7: Respect for private and family life 
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications. 
As we can see then, Article 7 of the Charter directly corresponds to Article 8 of 
the ECHR aside from the change in wording from correspondence to 
communications taking into account advances in modern technology.  
                                                
485 Ibid. at paragraph 22 
486 The Court did so based on the Defrenne doctrine.  
487 For a discussion on the role fundamental rights play in relation to questions concerning European 
identity see Safjan M., “Between Mangold and Omega: Fundamental Rights versus Constitutional 
Identity”, (2012) 3 Il diritto dell'Unione europea 442-449. 
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Article 9: Right to marry and right to found a family 
The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance 
with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights. 
Article 9 of the Charter protects the right to marry and found a family in 
accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights. In 
comparison to the ECHR, and its Article 12, we note that the wording of Article 
9 has been left open so as to provide protection for marriages and the foundation 
of families other than heterosexual. 
Article 21: Non-discrimination 
1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or 
social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other 
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or 
sexual orientation shall be prohibited 
2. Within the scope of application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any of 
their specific provisions, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited. 
Although these provisions are indeed important in laying the foundations for a 
meaningful protection of families and their fundamental rights at the European 
level, what is also important, particularly for our purposes, is Article 24 of the 
Charter which provides that: 
Article 24: The rights of the child 
2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private 
institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consideration. 
3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal 
relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary 
to his or her interests. 
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With the relevant provisions laid out, we can now turn to some of the case law 
examples so as to decipher whether or not the Charter adds in any significant 
way to the protection of migrating families in Europe. 
C. Interpreting The Charter 
One of the first cases concerning family law issues that the Court directly applied 
the Charter is the McB488 case. In this case, the CJEU was asked, by the Supreme 
Court of Ireland, whether Article 7 of the Charter which protects the right to 
family life influenced in any way the interpretation of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation 489 . The question was focused on the actions of a mother who 
removed her children from the country in which the father of the children was 
living without his consent. To give some more particulars of the case: the parents 
were not married, and under Irish law the father did not have the right to 
custody of the children seeing as he had just filed for paternity at the time when 
the mother took their child from Ireland to England. Based on Irish custody law 
therefore, formally, the mother had the right to choose the place of residence of 
the children and, when she removed them, the father could not obtain a court 
judgment declaring the wrongfulness of her conduct.  
The father argued that the peculiarity of Irish law disproportionately 
affected his parental rights and that the Regulation should have been interpreted 
in light of the Charter (and of Art. 8 ECHR), so as to afford the natural father 
with custody rights de jure. This would have allowed him to seek a court 
declaration of the wrongfulness of the removal of his children by the mother.  
The CJEU confirmed that the Regulation must be construed to allow a 
parent with custody to invoke the wrongfulness of removal without his consent. 
However, custody rights are conferred exclusively according to domestic law; a 
subject matter that, under Art. 51(2) of the Charter, is outside the competence of 
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the EU i.e. outside the reach of the Charter. The case-law of the ECtHR was of 
little help to the father’s cause: a similar case was resolved by the Strasbourg 
court in recognising that national legislation conferring custody rights on only 
one of the natural parents was legitimate, provided that the other had the right 
to seek a court order reversing this initial allocation (this being the minimum 
standard of protection that the Convention ensures). In its ultimate analysis, the 
CJEU rejected the extensive interpretation of the Regulation advocated by the 
father in the main proceedings, and arguably made clear that, for the time being, 
it would not abuse any incorporation doctrine in order to expand the 
competence of the EU. Thus, the McB case and the Charter invoked in support 
of the father’s rights did little by the way of protecting the father’s rights in this 
case.  
However, if we look to another category of case law, that which also 
invokes the EU citizenship provisions (which will be dealt with more thoroughly 
in the following chapter) we note that family rights, and in particular family 
unity, have been protected and the Charter has been more frequently relied 
upon in these instances. We point briefly to the Dereci case490, a case that forms 
part of a series of cases that will be dealt with in more detail in the following 
chapter. For now, we will examine whether the reasoning is perhaps more 
reflective of the Court’s reasoning in cases concerning fundamental rights when 
coupled with EU citizenship. 
V) Cross-Referencing Of The Courts 
In examining the relationship between the two Courts 491  and the legal 
instruments at their disposal, we make reference to the above-mentioned McB492 
case and the Court’s reference to the comparable Guichard v. France493 case heard 
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492 J. McB. v L. E., Case C-400/10. 
493 Guichard v. France, Application No. 56838/00. 
  
213 
before the ECtHR. The CJEU specifically pointed to this case highlighting the 
similarities in their fact patterns: 
 The European Court of Human Rights has already considered a case in which the facts 
were comparable to those of the case in the main proceedings, where the child of an 
unmarried couple was taken to another State by its mother, who was the only person 
with parental responsibility for that child. In that regard, that court ruled, in essence, 
that national legislation granting, by operation of law, parental responsibility for such a 
child solely to the child’s mother is not contrary to Article 8 of the ECHR, interpreted in 
the light of the 1980 Hague Convention, provided that it permits the child’s father, not 
vested with parental responsibility, to ask the national court with jurisdiction to vary the 
award of that responsibility (Guichard v.France ECHR 2003-X 714; see also, to that 
effect, Balbontin v.United Kingdom, no.39067/97, 14 September 1999).494 
The facts of the Guichard v. France case are as follows. The applicant in the case 
was the father of a child born out of wedlock. Both the mother and the father, 
however, had officially acknowledged parental responsibility of the child. After 
some time, the mother decided to move to Canada with the child and there she 
applied for custody and it was granted to her. The father applied to the French 
courts to have the child placed under joint parental authority but this was 
refused. Simultaneously, in reliance on the Hague Convention on the civil 
aspects of international child abduction, he sought the assistance of the Ministry 
of Justice for the safe return of his daughter to France. The Ministry refused to 
assist on the basis that the mother, at the time of moving to Canada, legally had 
custody of the child and therefore the removal of the child without the father’s 
consent was not wrongful for the purposes of the Convention. The administrative 
courts agreed with this position and so the applicant was forced to refer to the 
ECtHR. As outlined, the ECtHR ruled that the national legislation did not 
infringe upon the right to family life. 
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The CJEU made reference to another case in its reasoning, that of Zaunegger 
v. Germany495 In so doing, it stated that:  
The European Court of Human Rights has also ruled that national legislation which 
does not allow the natural father any possibility of obtaining rights of custody in respect 
of his child in the absence of the mother’s agreement constitutes unjustified discrimination 
against the father and is therefore a breach of Article 14 of the ECHR, taken together 
with Article 8 of the ECHR (Zauneggerv.Germany, no. 22028/04, § 63 and 64, 3 
December 2009).496 
That stated, the Court went on to rule, after a consideration of Article 24 of the 
Charter and considerations of the best interests of the child, that Regulation 
No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from 
providing, by its law, that the acquisition of rights of custody by a child’s father, 
where he is not married to the child’s mother, is dependent on the father’s 
obtaining a judgment from a national court with jurisdiction awarding such 
rights to him, on the basis of which the removal of the child by its mother or the 
retention of that child may be considered wrongful, within the meaning of Article 
2(11) of that regulation. 
The reasoning of the Court is interesting in that we can note its willingness 
to engage with the ECtHR. What is more compelling however is the feeling we 
get from the case in relation to the aspirational value of the Charter. The Court, 
in para. 53, states that: 
 Moreover, it follows from Article 52(3) of the Charter that, in so far as the Charter 
contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, their meaning and 
scope are to be the same as those laid down by the ECHR. However, that provision does 
not preclude the grant of wider protection by European Union law. Under Article 7 of 
the Charter, ‘[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, 
home and communications’. The wording of Article 8(1) of the ECHR is identical to 
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that of the said Article 7, except that it uses the expression ‘correspondence’ instead of 
‘communications’. That being so, it is clear that the said Article 7 contains rights 
corresponding to those guaranteed by Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Article 7 of the Charter 
must therefore be given the same meaning and the same scope as Article 8(1) of the 
ECHR, as interpreted by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights497  
In short, this case demonstrates the Court’s willingness to go beyond the ECHR. 
We can make reference to past cases such as Carpenter498, Akrich499, Metock500 and 
MRAX501 all of which made reference to Article 8 of the ECHR in emphasizing 
that the separation of family members must be sufficiently justified. Now, 
however, it would seem that the Charter represents a new path for fundamental 
rights protection, a toolbox exclusive to the Court. As indicated above, however, 
the influence of EU Citizenship is also key here, particularly in consideration of 
the interplay between these two notions and how this interplay influences family 
law cases at the European level. 
VI) Concluding Remarks 
In consideration of the foregoing, coupled with our understanding of the neo-
formalist langue, we can clearly note a transformative dimension when it comes 
to the interpretation of family law issues, both before the CJEU and, as 
highlighted above, before the European Court of Human Rights. The influence 
of a supranational body of case law dealing with emerging family issues on the 
CJEU, particularly considering the cross-referencing before the two courts, has 
caused the court to shift gears, abandoning its strict economic rights position and 
incorporating, by a variety of means, dignitary and social rights into its family 
law jurisprudence. This has led to a balancing of rights at the European level 
influenced by pronouncements of the ECtHR. What were formerly policy 
                                                
497 J. McB. v L. E., Case C-400/10. Para. 54. para. 53 
498 Carpenterv Secretary of State for the Home Department Case C-60/00. 
499 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akrich, Case C-109/01. 
500 Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Case C-127/08. 
501 Mouvement contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v Belgian State, Case C-
459/99. 
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arguments then are being recast as rights – the recodification of the social parole 
in the neo-formalist langue. 
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Chapter VI: Reconstructing the Family 
“Union Citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, 
enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective 
of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for.”502 
I)  Introduction 
Thus far, we have outlined in Part I how the family became exceptionalized and 
how the Social failed to break down the dichotomy between the family and the 
market which essentially left the family to regulation in terms of its horizontal 
dynamic based on local law, custom and a classical approach to the traditional 
family based on marriage. The results of this led to inequality not only within 
family structures but also in terms of its vertical dynamic with the state and the 
family’s role in society. Chapters IV and V of part II have delineated the role of 
anti-discrimination and to a certain extent the role of fundamental rights in 
balancing difference as part of the CJEU’s assumed neo-formalist langue as 
manifested in relation to peripheral family law issues. This approach, and indeed 
secondary law implemented in the Member States, coupled with a dissatisfaction 
of the stagnant nature of family law at the national level has led to a 
deconstruction of the classical/traditional notion of the family both in terms of 
its horizontal and vertical dynamics that persisted for so long. Simultaneously, 
the march of equality and fundamental rights interpretation, in breaking down 
the wall that isolated the family, has begun to reconstruct the family in line with 
the neo-formalist langue.  
This thesis, however, takes a further step based on the analysis of the case 
law of the CJEU as we have already pre-empted. The pronouncement of the 
ECJ, that “Union Citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the 
                                                
502 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Nueve [2001] ECR I-
6193, para. 31. 
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Member States” is very telling in terms of an advancement of a new, transnational, 
or better, what we have already referred to as post-neo-formalist approach, that 
is materializing at the supranational level. It expresses clearly the goal that the 
introduction of European citizenship into the primary law of the Union intends 
to meet. We question here to what extent citizen rights go beyond the formal 
rights the court has developed on the basis of its progression from a market based 
approach to anti-discrimination to its interpretation of fundamental rights in 
providing for a new societal ideal. What we will see emanating is that the rights 
rhetoric we have already made reference to in terms of the shifting goals of the 
EU assume an additional dimension not only when we consider individuals as the 
recipients of citizenship rights but also in consideration of the family as a unit.  
This analysis will be conducted through a delineation of the developments 
since the introduction of the concept of EU Citizenship exploring the concept of 
citizenship itself in an attempt to decipher the expectations it conjured on its 
initial inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty to what it means for EU citizens today. 
In so doing, we will investigate the notions of market citizens and consumer 
citizens in an attempt to decipher whether we can now talk of, as a result of the 
Court’s interpretation of the citizenship provisions, in conjunction with anti-
discrimination and fundamental rights, the emergence of a new dimension of 
protection for what may be termed ‘family citizens’. We investigate the 
foundational role that EU Citizenship503 has played in moulding a private law 
capable of dealing with cross-border situations in general and more specifically to 
our scope in developing a foundation for the protection of families in Europe 
considering the new social goals of the EU.  
                                                
503 The work of G. Comandé in this regard has been significantly influential. He argues that the private 
law of the Member States is being used as a tool to aggregate what she terms “shadow citizenship” in 
the everyday lives of EU citizens. See Comandé, G. “The Fifth European Union Freedom: Aggregating 
Citizenship…around Private Law’, in Micklitz, The Constitutionalization of European Private Law (2014) 
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II) EU Citizenship 
The integration process has come a long way since the establishment of the 
European Community. Goals have changed based on the recognition that a truly 
integrated market depends on the interdependence of all involved actors in turn 
leading to a change in ideology, from market-based to socially informed 
reasoning. In short, it became clear that the neo-functionalist504 thinking had 
reached a deadlock and a new approach was required. That new approach was 
influenced by the recognition that the EC needed to engage not only with 
Member States but also with the demos so as to construct a common identity 
horizontally amongst the people within Europe’s borders and in turn, in a 
vertical fashion, strengthening the relationship between the people and Europe 
and its institutions505. As convoluted as it may appear, citizenship, in conjuring 
both political and social rights, was meant to allow the growth of the Union 
beyond the market while simultaneously strengthening the market itself through 
protection of its actors. 
We may say then that the market building process evolved into an identity 
building process506, bolstered by the following few, rather vague and seemingly 
perfunctory, lines introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992:  
1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the 
Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship. 
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall 
be subject to the duties imposed thereby. 
 
                                                
504 Laffan, B. “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe”, 34 J. Common Market 
Studies 81, 83 (1996) making reference to the Monnet method. 
505 Weiler, J. “To be a European Citizen – Eros and Civilisation” 41-42 Madision Working 
Paper Series in European Studies 1998 
506  For a critique see G. Comandé, “The Fifth European Union Freedom: Aggregating 
Citizenship…around Private Law’, in Micklitz, The Constitutionalization of European Private Law (2014) 
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Initially, these provisions were heavily criticised, branded as derived 507 , 
redundant508 and a mere symbolic move by the Union in that the new provisions 
did not extend any new rights to the people of Europe but rather simply 
congregated existing entitlements under the umbrella of the new concept. It was 
met with a certain degree of scepticism on the basis that its main value lay in its 
rhetoric509 and it would not essentially confer many substantive rights on its 
intended addressees510. In addition, it was argued that the Treaty itself made 
citizenship of the Union depend on nationality of a Member State stating that 
“Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship”. Therefore, 
the benefits of Union citizenship from the outset were always to be enjoyed as 
dependent on individual legal systems and nationality of Member States. This 
sceptical view was also supported by the fact that the free movement and 
residence rights had already been extended beyond economic connotations by 
secondary law as noted above 511 . Initially, the added value of the 
constitutionalisation of the concept of European Union Citizenship was 
questioned.  
Additionally, we may also argue that it was not possible to transpose a 
concept of citizenship to a transnational, non-nation state polity such as the EU. 
In fact, we can assume that the EU Citizenship provisions never intended to 
implant a notion synonymous to national citizenship since the transplantation of 
legal notions from one environment to another is always met with a certain 
amount of resistance, as reception is dependent on the economic, legal, political 
                                                
507 Shaw, Jo. “European Citizenship: The IGC and Beyond European Integration”. Online 
paper Vol 1 1997 No 3. Available at: 
 http://ssrn.com/abstract=302662 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.302662 
508 Bulvinante, I. “Union Citizenship and its Role in the Free Movement of Persons Regimes”, 5 
Web JCLI at 3 2003.  
509  See Lyons, C. “Citizenship in the Constitution of the European Union: Rhetoric or 
Reality?”, in Bellamy, R. (ed)., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European 
Perspectives (Avebury, 1996), 96; D’Oliveria, H. “European Citizenship: Its meaning , Its 
Potential”, in Dehousse, R. (ed.), Europe after Maastricht (Munich, 1994).  
510 With this said, the Treaty did specifically confer some substantive rights on those eligible for 
Union citizenship, such as the right to vote in Parliament elections, the right to petition and the 
right to a reply in the language of a request. 
511 Council Directive 93/96/EEC of the Council of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence 
for students and Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for 
employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity.   
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and social milieu at the receiving end of the transplant512. Therefore, it would 
seem that EU Citizenship was pronounced in the Maastricht Treaty along with 
an awareness that the concept would need to be out-worked in order to delineate 
what exactly this novel concept added to the European toolkit in terms of its 
relationship with Member States.   
It is clear then that clarification regarding this novel concept was required 
and that clarification has come in the form of judgments of the CJEU. The 
ambiguous nature of European Citizenship has been and continues to be 
explored by the Court, strengthening, as we shall see, the rights of EU citizens 
qua citizens rather than based on economic participation (albeit at times 
arguably masked by economic reasoning). The Court’s interpretation of the free 
movement provisions and the prohibition on discrimination based on nationality 
has in itself been interpreted as the creation, on the basis of citizenship in its 
embryonic form in the original EEC Treaty of 1957513, as creating ‘an incipient 
form of European citizenship514’ subsequently developed and strengthened by the 
Court.   
It is this development from citizenship in its embryonic form to its 
constitutionalization in the primary law of the EU that we are concerned with. It 
is imperative here that we investigate the case law, particularly in relation to 
family law, and the role it has played in advancing a more substantive notion of 
                                                
512 For a discussion on the notion of citizenship see C. Scott, “‘Transnational Law' as Proto‐Concept: 
Three Conceptions”, German Law Journal, 2009, Vol. 10, No. 7, at 877, 2009; D. Kochenov, 
“Citizenship without Respect: The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal”, (Jean Monnet Working Papers 8 
(2010); D. Kochenov, “Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship 
between Status and Rights”, Columbia Journal of European Law (2009) 2. 
513 Jacobs, F.G. “Citizenship of the European Union-A Legal Analysis”, European Law Journal, 
Vol. 13, No. 5, September 2007 pp. 591-610. 
514 Plender, R.O. “An Incipient Form of European Citizenship”, in Jacobs, F.G. (ed.) European 
Law and the Individual (North-Holland, 1976). 
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European Citizenship advancing the rights of European families by casting the 
widest possible social safety net around EU citizens515. 
III) European Citizenship As A Developing Concept 
As has been noted and clearly pronounced by the judgments of the CJEU, more 
forcefully in recent times, the landscape of the Union has changed dramatically 
since the birth of the European Economic Community. We have witnessed a 
significant change in the way actors within Europe’s boundaries are perceived 
and characterized which can be linked back to Kennedy and the shift from 
Classical Legal Though to the Social to the Neo-formalist langue. This will be 
explored in more detail below but not before outlining the important shift that 
has occurred in relation to actors and how the citizenship provisions have acted 
as a catalyst in bringing about new categories of citizens. 
A. From Market Citizenship to Consumer Citizens… 
At the outset, the underlying premise of establishing a common, internal market 
was that market actors were required to ensure the functioning and growth of 
such an economic forum. These actors, described as homo economicus 516  were 
characterized as holders of economic rights effectuated via economic activity 
enjoying the rights of free movement, the right to seek employment517 and to 
provide and receive services518 in other Member States. According to Everson 
                                                
515  O’Neill, P. & Sandler, S.R. “The EU Citizenship Acquis and the Court of Justice: 
Citizenship Vigilante or Merely Vigilant Treaty Guardian?”, 7 Rich J. Global L. & Bus, 205, 
2008. 
516 Everson, Michelle. “The Legacy of the Market Citizen”, in Shaw, J. & More, G. (eds.), New 
Legal Dynamics of European Union, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) 71. 
517 Case 344/87 Bettray v Staatssecretaris van Justice, 1989; Case C-292/89, R v Immigarions Appeal 
Tribunal ex parte Antonissen 1991. 
518 Case 286/82 and 26/83, Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro 1984; Case 33/74 Johannes van 
Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, 1974. 
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(making reference to Ipsen519) “whilst market citizens or Marktbürger were drawn from 
amongst the ranks of the nationals of the EC member states, such nationals were only to be 
regarded as fully fledged market citizens when ‘acting as participants in or as beneficiaries of 
the common market”520.  
The market citizen521 is an important player in the European field and is a 
concept upon which an economic based approach to equal treatment was 
developed. The underlying hypothesis in relation to market citizens is that their 
citizenship rights kick in when they act “as participants in or as beneficiaries of the 
common market”522. They are expected to play a specific role towards the “legal and 
practical realisation of the internal market”523. The notion was bolstered by the view of 
market players as consumers who were, by virtue of the open market, granted 
access to a wide range of products and services bolstering individual choice. This 
was also reflected in secondary legislation, for example Directive 93/13524 on 
unfair terms in consumer contract. In fact, as Everson points out, the language of 
freedom and choice dominated the legislation and the scope of the legislation 
that was enacted so as to confer this market citizenship on market players525. The 
main point here is that by virtue of being a market player in the open market, 
rights and duties were conferred on the consumer constructing a dependency 
relationship between the Union as the addressor and the nationals of the 
Member States as the addressees.   
The development of Europe’s goals, however, brought with it a change in 
perspective in terms of market citizens as economic players.526 A new semantic 
                                                
519 Ipsen, H.P. Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1972) p. 187 cited in 
Everson, M. “The Legacy of the Market Citizen”, in Shaw J. and More G., New Legal Dynamics of 
European Union, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995). 
520 Ibid. 
521 Everson, M. The Legacy of the Market Citizen, in Shaw,  J. & More, G., New Legal Dynamics of 
European Union, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995). 
522 Ibid. citing Ipsen (1972) p. 102. 
523 Above No. 238. 
524 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.  
525 Everson, M. “The Legacy of the Market Citizen”, in Shaw, J. & More, G., New Legal Dynamics 
of European Union, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995). 
526 Davies, Jim. The European Consumer Citizen in Law and Policy, (Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), p. 
22. 
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was adopted, one that can be related back once again to Kennedy’s second 
globalization, The Social and its transition into the Neo-formalist period, that 
increased attention on the rights and responsibilities of market players, and on 
the political landscape of the EU. This was largely in response to the recognition 
of a certain disconnect with the ‘European polity’. What we already see 
emerging, in fact, is the shift from economic, market citizens to consumer citizens 
advocating that  
The consumer is no longer seen merely as a purchaser and user of goods and services for 
personal, family or group purposes but also as a person concerned with the various facets 
of society which might affect him directly or indirectly as a consumer527 
Previously, consumers in the EU were simply characterised by their 
consumption. In other words, the perception was that if you consumed, you were 
a consumer acting within the framework of the market reliant on the law of 
contract. Individual interests and ensuring equality were typically safeguarded by 
the contractual notions of ‘good faith’, ‘undue influence’ and 
‘misrepresentation528. This individualist approach altered with the recognition 
that consumption was also concerned with society at large and the different 
aspects of society that could touch, either directly or indirectly, consumers. In 
other words, the individual ethos that had characterised consumer law, and 
consumer redress for a long time was gradually replaced in view of the 
recognition of collective consumers possessing collective interests529. We can 
recall here the shift from Classical Legal Thought to The Social based on the 
acknowledgement of interdependence between, not only the market and society 
that supports it via consumption but also between different groups or actors 
participating in this exchange. This shift not only increases complexity but also 
allure in terms of the protection afforded by the EU institutions. In the words of 
Everson and Joerges, in relation to consumer protection in the EU: 
                                                
527 EEC Council Resolution on a “Preliminary Programme for a Consumer Protection and 
Information Policy” (OJ 1975 C92/1): 
528 Everson, M. “The Legacy of the Market Citizen”, in Shaw, J. & More, G., New Legal Dynamics 
of European Union, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995). 
529 Ibid. 
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Ubiquitous though this simple consumer protection formulation may be, however, it 
barely begins to describe the true complexity that characterises the interrelationships that 
are established between the act of consumption and the whole of any one legal order, be 
that order national, supranational or transnational in nature530 
In effect, when considering the EU, consumption was reshaped by 
intervention from the EU institutions. The consumer was reconstructed via 
rights, for example the right to protection of health and safety, of economic 
interests, to redress, to information, education and representation and 
responsibilities for instance, to inform oneself, environmental concerns etc. The 
market citizen developed from a passive actor in the internal market, ‘a mere cog in 
the economic machinery of the internal market’ with limited rights, to becoming a 
‘cognisant’ actor, ‘an influential market actor, cognisant of a role that demands a broader 
contribution to European society that the mere final purchase of a good or service’531. The 
move represented an evolution to encompass “rights granted to individuals as 
participants and beneficiaries of economic integration”532.  
It can be argued that this consumer citizen533 we speak of was an inevitable 
progression from the market citizen in that the two are inextricably linked. The 
market citizen was instrumentalised with a view to fulfilling the objectives of the 
internal market. It was inevitable that that same market citizen would eventually 
become instrumentalist in its demands for a legally protected forum, essentially 
paving the way to consumer citizens. In other words, the passage from passive 
consumers to consumers who were empowered and protected by a rights 
enforcement framework was one that effectively led to the development of this 
category of citizen. As pointed out by Davies534, the evolution we are concerned 
with here takes stock of the emergence of average consumers, vulnerable 
                                                
530  Everson, Michelle & Joerges, Christian. “Consumer Citizenship in Postnational 
Constellations?” EUI Working Papers, LAW No. 2006/47 
531 Maduro, M., “Europe’s Social Self: ‘The Sickness unto Death’”, in Shaw, J., (ed.), Social Law 
and Policy in an Evolving European Union, (Oxford, Hart, 2000). 
532 Ibid. 
533 Davies, J., “Entrenchment of New Governance in Consumer Policy Formulation: A Platform 
for European Consumer Citizenship Practice?”, Journal of Consumer Policy, 32: 245-267, 2009. 
534 Ibid. 
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consumers and finally consumer citizens, that concept being nicely summed up 
by Gabriel and Lang: 
the marketplace becomes surrogate for political discourse...the citizen is being redefined as 
a purchaser whose ‘ballots...help create and maintain the trading areas’...buying becomes 
tantamount to voting, market surveys the nearest we have to a collective will535. 
Therefore, by being a player in the market and exercising rights and assuming 
responsibilities one becomes a consumer citizen. Bearing this discussion on the 
different classifications of citizen in mind, we will now proceed to investigate the 
shift to Union citizens all the while bearing in mind the particular situation of the 
family and how jurisprudential developments could potentially create a space for 
the emergence of a notion of family citizens. In doing so, we will go right to the 
heart of what is termed here the post-neo-formalist period in assessing the extent 
to which the citizenship provisions have gone beyond the recodification of 
economic based rights to self-standing rights as the additional dimension. 
B. …to Union Citizens: “Putting Flesh on the Bones”536 
When the European Economic Community was construed, there was a clear 
distinction between the competences of the parties to the agreement in that the 
EEC was charged with establishing the common market with social matters being 
left to the Member States537.  Over time, it was recognized that the proper 
functioning of the market was reliant on interdependence and that proper Union 
citizenship, one that takes account of the trans-national character of the EU, 
must be based on social citizenship538. We have witnessed a progressive increased 
consideration of the link between the people of Europe, considered as more than 
mere factors of production, and the Union itself. This is reflected in the 
                                                
535 Gabriel and Lang 1995 pp. 175-176 quoted in Davies, “Entrenchment of a New Governance 
in Consumer Policy Formulation: A Platform for European Consumer Citizenship Practice?” 
Journal of  Consumer Policy, 2009 32: 245-267. 
536 O’ Leary, S. “Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union Citizenship”, 1999 24 ELRev 
68. 
537 Consumer law is an exception…see HM, Social Justice.  
538 Douglas-Scott. 
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pronouncements of the Court, in particular, at least initially, by the Advocates 
General in their Opinions. We can make reference here to the proclamation of 
Advocate General Jacobs in the case of Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig539 as an 
indication of the impact of the rights that pertain to citizenship of the Union in 
their claim to ‘civis europeus sum’ in opposing any violation of fundamental rights.  
This is far removed from the initial reaction to what might be called the 
skeleton citizenship provisions that make no reference to rights or duties to be 
assumed by addressors or addressees leaving the concept wide-open to criticism 
based on its empty and symbolic nature540. Much criticism was based on the fact 
that EU Citizenship did not confer additional rights to the people of the Union 
in the sense that it simply extended the right of mobility to non-economically 
active nationals of Member States, a right that had already be granted to specific 
groups, for example, students and pensioners. In addition, at the broader, more 
theoretical level, the notion concerning the commonly understood institution of 
citizenship i.e. national citizenship traditionally rooted in cultural identity and 
civic and political participation, was not, as we have already pointed above, 
directly transplantable based on the transnational character of the Union. 
Therefore, it was difficult to decipher what exactly the new concept entailed. 
This, coupled with the fact that EU citizenship was dependant on national 
citizenship, led to the belief that it was a concept that did little to further or add 
to the rights and duties expected from its inclusion in the Treaty.    
That stated, the scepticism with which EU citizenship was met was soon 
knocked on its head by the pronouncements of the then Court of Justice. As we 
will see from the early case law, the Court took a broad approach to the notion 
                                                
539 Case C-168/91, Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig 1993. 
540 On the symbolic nature of the change in wording brought about by the Maastricht Treaty in 
general i.e. from the European Economic Community to the European Union, see C. Closa, 
“The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union”, 1992, 29 CMLRev. 1137; S. O’ 
Leary, “Nationality Law and Community Citizenship: A tale of Two Uneasy Bedfellows” 1992 
12 YBEL 353.  
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and used it instrumentally, to borrow the classification of AG Jacobs541, in three 
veins: 
1.  to broaden the scope of the non-discrimination principle; 
2.  to broaden the scope of the non-discrimination principle in the context of 
market freedoms; 
3.  as an independent source of rights.  
It serves here to provide some examples, that will primarily focus on the first two 
veins of extension, with the final one i.e. citizenship being used as an 
independent source of rights, being discussed more specifically in relation to core 
hypothesis of this thesis, the reconstruction of family law. Where relevant, 
however, reference will be made to the influence certain of these cases have had 
in relation to the peripheral cases.    
Broadening the scope of the anti-discrimination principle 
The case of Martinez Sala542 was heralded as the first significant pronouncement 
concerning EU citizenship in furthering anti-discrimination extracting it from its 
previously economic underpinnings. The Court in this case broadened the scope 
of application of the non-discrimination principle with regards to financial 
benefits in holding that in cases where the EU national is lawfully resident in a 
Member State other than that of origin, then that EU citizen is entitled to equal 
treatment in relation to financial benefits that come within the scope of the 
Treaty. It concerned a Spanish woman who had been residing in Germany for 
twenty-five years. She was receiving social assistance for her own unemployment 
at the time. She then applied for a child-raising allowance but was refused this on 
the basis that she was not a German national and did not possess a residence 
entitlement or a residence permit for Germany. The issue came before the ECJ 
which considered the residence requirement for receipt of a benefit to be a 
                                                
541 Jacobs, F.G. “Citizenship of the European Union-A Legal Analysis”, European Law Journal, 
Vol. 13, No. 5, September 2007, pp. 591–610. 
542 Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern Case C-85/96. 
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limiting condition and moreover, discriminatory where a Member State’s own 
nationals were not subject to the same condition. In reliance on Article 17 and 
18 of the EC Treaty and on the principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality contained in Article 12 of the same, the Court held that nationals of a 
Member State could rely on their European citizenship for protection against 
discrimination on grounds of nationality by another Member State. Put simply, 
the ECJ applied the general principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality to the applicant on the basis of her EU citizenship in stating that  
Article 8(2)…attaches to the status of citizen of the Union the rights and duties laid 
down by the Treaty, including the right, laid down in Article 6…not to suffer 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality within the scope ratione materiae of the 
Treaty543. 
This case is significant for our purposes since, by including the situation of Mrs. 
Martinez Sala within the scope of application of the EC Treaty, the ECJ 
enlarged that scope in two respects. First, the simple fact that Mrs. Sala was a 
Union citizen lawfully residing in another Member State was enough for her to 
fall under the scope of application of the EC Treaty. Secondly, the ECJ ruled 
that a benefit previously granted only to workers should also be granted to non-
economically active persons in the EU.544 It is opportune to make reference here 
to the concluding remarks of Advocate General La Pergola. He quite simply 
concluded his opinion by stating that: 
justification for equality of treatment lies rather, as I have explained, in the legal status 
of a citizen of the Union, in the guarantee afforded by the status of the individual, as it 
is now governed by Article 8 of the Treaty, which is enjoyed by a national of any 
Member State and in any Member State. In other words, the Union, as conceived in the 
                                                
543 Paragraph 62. 
544 In fact it has been commented that the Court in this case seemed to be prepared to “explode 
the linkages’ previously required for the application of the principle of non-discrimination which 
had been built in previous case law. See O’Leary, S. “Putting Flesh on the Bones of European 
Union Citizenship?” (1999) 24 ELRev. 68, 77-78 cited in Craig and De Burca, EU Law, Text, 
cases and materials, 4th Ed, Oxford.   
  
230 
Maastricht Treaty, requires that the principle of prohibiting discrimination should 
embrace the domain of the new legal status of common citizenship545. 
In following the opinion, it is clear that the Court agreed with the view that 
equal treatment should be broadened to augment the rights of EU citizens based 
solely on their status as EU citizens.  
Not long after this groundbreaking decision, the Court ruled in the 
Grzelczyk546 case. Its ruling in this subsequent case signified a significant stepping 
stone in the evolution of EU citizenship and it is from this case that the 
intentions of the Court emerge very clearly based on the oft-cited clarification 
that 
Union Citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same 
treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are 
expressly provided for.547 
We note from this case the development of a general principle in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, i.e. that discrimination on ground of nationality will not be 
permitted against EU citizens who have exercised their free movement rights. 
The applicant in the case was a French national who had studied in Belgium for 
three years and who had also worked there so as to sustain himself financially. In 
his final year, Mr. Grzelczyk ceased to work so as to concentrate on his studies 
and therefore applied for a non-contributory minimum subsistence allowance. 
The allowance was initially granted but subsequently withdrawn based on the 
fact that the applicant did not fulfill the conditions set out in Belgian law, i.e. in 
order to claim the allowance one must either be of Belgian nationality or a 
worker. The question referred to the Court centered around whether or not the 
refusal was contrary to the EC Treaty provisions on citizenship in combination 
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with the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality. Previous to this 
case, the situation was that assistance for students fell outside the scope of the 
Treaty. However, this case expanded the scope of the non-discrimination 
provisions to students based on the new EC Treaty title on education and the 
citizenship provisions. The Court essentially held that Articles 12 and 18 EC 
precluded preconditions such as those in the case at hand i.e. conditions relevant 
to sufficient resources and sickness insurance.  
The fact that a Union citizen pursues university studies in a Member State other that the 
State of which he is a national cannot of itself, deprive him of the possibility of relying on 
the prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article 6 of 
the Treaty548 
The importance of the decision for our purposes lies in the fact that the court, 
even though it had previously ruled that assistance for students fell outside the 
scope of the EC Treaty, recognized expressly that EU citizenship permits 
nationals of other Member States lawfully residing in the host Member State to 
access social benefits.  
The third and final example here concerns the well-known case of Garcia 
Avello549 and provides us with yet another example of an active Court taking the 
opportunity to put flesh on the citizenship bones. As previously outlined, the case 
revolved around the surname borne by children born in Belgium to a married 
couple resident there. The father of the children, Mr. Garcia Avello, was a 
Spanish national, the mother Belgian. The two children were in possession of 
dual nationality. On registration of their births in Belgium, the children were 
given the double surname borne by their father composed in accordance with 
Spanish law and custom according to which children took the first element of 
their father's surname and the first element of his mother's surname. Wishing to 
adopt the Spanish way, the parents subsequently applied to the Belgian 
authorities to have the children’s surname changed to Garcia Weber i.e. so that 
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it was comprised of the first element of their father’s surname, followed by their 
mother’s (maiden) surname. That application was refused as contrary to Belgian 
practice and the question of whether such a refusal might be precluded by 
principles of Community law such as those relating to citizenship of the 
European Union and freedom of movement for citizens was referred to the ECJ 
by the Conseil d'État. This case deserves particular attention, as it is not only one 
of the early cases that added flesh to the citizenship bones but it also represents 
an example of how citizenship is used as a tool by the Court in decided 
peripheral family law cases. The opinion of Advocate General Jacobs is 
particularly telling and reflective of the actuality of European families. The 
Advocate General reasoned that  
In the present case, the Commission submits that the introduction of citizenship of the 
Union, with its attendant enjoyment of all the rights conferred by the Treaty — 
including, thus, the right to be free from any discrimination on grounds of nationality — 
is a new factor enabling the Court to reach a decision in this case on a rather broader 
basis than it did in Konstantinidis. I agree that Article 17 makes clearer the 
applicability of the principle of non-dis- crimination to all situations falling within the 
sphere of Community law, without there being any need to establish a specific 
interference with a specific economic freedom.550 
It is clear from this then that the citizenship provisions are an important factor in 
broadening the scope of non-discrimination to situations other than those 
characterized by economic activities. In doing so, based on the rights conferred 
by EU citizenship, anti-discrimination moves away from its economic 
underpinnings. In terms of our scope here, in consideration of the potential 
influence of the new post-national setting the family finds itself in, the Advocate 
General in recognizing the ‘Europeanization’ of families as a result of free 
movement coupled with the changes in family structure, stated that:  
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As regards social order in the broader sense, it does not seem to me that there is any 
overriding public interest in ensuring that one particular pattern of surname transmission 
should always prevail for the citizens of a Member State within its territory. This is a 
field in which both legal rules and social practice have been changing in recent years, and 
continue to change, throughout the European Union. Increases in numbers of divorces 
and remarriages, together with a significant decrease in the social stigma of illegitimacy, 
have considerably reduced the rigidity of expectations as to identity of surname between 
father and child. Increased mobility for citizens of the Union has led to increased 
familiarity with other naming systems. Thus, whilst conformity with the norm in the 
home Member State remains one factor to be taken into consideration when deciding 
whether it is in the interest of a child — or of society — for his or her surname to be 
changed, it is neither the only nor the preponderant factor in that regard.551 
I would moreover take issue with the argument that the principle of non-discrimination 
seeks essentially to ensure the integration of migrant citizens into their host Member 
State. The concept of 'moving and residing freely in the territory of the Member States' is 
not based on the hypothesis of a single move from one Member State to another, to be 
followed by integration into the latter. The intention is rather to allow free, and possibly 
repeated or even continuous, movement within a single 'area of freedom, security and 
justice', in which both cultural diversity and freedom from discrimination are ensured.552  
This recognition comes at an important juncture in the development of family 
law and the Advocate General’s support of the diversification of family types on 
the one hand and the novel peripheral issues that free movement has instigated 
on the other is welcomed. The Court, in a less detailed reasoning reached the 
same conclusion as the Advocate General holding that since the children, as EU 
citizens, were residing in another Member State exercising their free movement, 
this provided them with a sufficient link to Community law enabling them to be 
afforded protection under Article 12 EC Treaty illustrating the capacity of EU 
citizenship provisions to set aside national rules when necessary so as to facilitate 
the free movement of families. In addition to this, we decipher from the 
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judgment that because the Court gave full effect to European law in this situation 
we can begin to contemplate the possibility that many other issues can be 
considered in the same way, opening a Pandora’s box553. 
Broadening the scope of the non-discrimination principle in the context of market freedoms 
In accordance with Advocate General Jacob’s classification, we will now turn to 
the Court’s use of the citizenship provisions in broadening the scope of the non-
discrimination principle in the context of market freedoms.  
The Collins 554  case concerned an applicant who had dual Irish and 
American nationality who moved to the UK with a view to seeking employment 
there. After one month he applied for jobseeker’s allowance which was refused 
based on the fact that he was not an habitual resident in the UK. Essentially, the 
referred question was whether, as a citizen of the Union, even though the 
applicant is not considered to be a ‘worker’ within the meaning of Regulation No 
1612/68 and does not have a right, pursuant to Directive No 68/360/EEC, to 
reside in the Member State in which he is seeking work, he may rely on any 
other provision of Community law in order to obtain the income-based 
jobseeker’s allowance, the granting of which is normally subject to a condition of 
habitual residence in the State. The Court recalled its earlier case law 
highlighting that even though job-seekers are covered by Article 39 in terms of 
access to employment, their social and tax advantages were not covered by the 
same555. However, the Court subsequently reasoned, based on the introduction 
of the citizenship provisions using them in essence to depart from its earlier case 
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law in considering, that the rights of job-seekers according to Article 39 should 
be interpreted in conjunction with the general right to equal treatment of EU 
citizens: 
In view of the establishment of citizenship of the Union and the interpretation in the 
case-law of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by citizens of the Union, it is no longer 
possible to exclude from the scope of Article 48(2) of the Treaty — which expresses the 
fundamental principle of equal treatment, guaranteed by Article 6 of the Treaty — a 
benefit of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour 
market of a Member State.556 
The Court was of the opinion that the residence requirement in place which 
conditioned the entitlement to job-seeker’s allowance, was justifiable only on 
objective considerations, independent of the nationality of the claimant and any 
refusal must proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions. In 
this vein, the ECJ therefore, considering that the applicant in fact fell within the 
scope of application of Article 39 EC Treaty as a national of a Member State and 
therefore was entitled to equal treatment in seeking employment, effectively 
broadening the scope of non-discrimination based on nationality.  
A similar conclusion was reached in relation to tide-over allowances for 
students in in 2005 when the Ioannidis557 case was referred to the Court. After 
completing his secondary education in Greece, Mr. Ioannidis moved to Belgium 
in 1994 where he undertook studies and obtained a diploma in physiotherapy. 
After completing a vestibular course in France in 2001 he returned to Belgium 
and applied for the tide-over allowance which was refused. The question referred 
to the Court was whether it is contrary to Community law to refuse the tide-over 
allowance to a national of another Member State on the ground that he 
completed his secondary education in another Member State. In response to this 
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question, the ECJ, relying on Collins558, stated that nationals in another Member 
State seeking employment indeed fall within the scope of Article 39 EC Treaty 
and therefore can rely on the prohibition on discrimination. 
From this select examination of the early case law, we note the emergence 
of a Grundfreiheit ohne Markt559, a de-economisation of the scope of the Union 
rights. Suffice it to say that the initial skepticism in relation to the novelty of EU 
citizenship no longer stands when we look to the actual role the Court is 
assuming in the allocation of social advantages, which prior to the introduction 
of EU citizenship were confined to the competence of Member States. In 
essence, the citizenship provisions permitted the development of an approach to 
equal treatment that is far removed from the initial market perspective goal. 
This becomes even more apparent when it comes to Advocate General 
Jacob’s third vein of expansion, citizenship as an independent source of rights. 
Moreover, it is here we begin to note the effects of this post-neo-formalism on the 
family in reference to the resolution of peripheral family law issues. 
EU Citizenship as an independent source of rights in view of ‘Family Citizens’ 
Recent, quite controversial jurisprudence from the Court can be interpreted in 
an encouraging light and with caution. The aim here it to delineate this recent 
case law that relates to the potential of the citizenship provisions in assuming the 
stance of an independent fountain of rights which could potentially create a legal 
space in terms of reconstructing the family even further beyond the advances 
made by the neo-formalist langue.  
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(a) Towards a Citizen Rights-based Family Law 
At the risk of repetition, some of the cases previously mentioned should be 
recalled here in introducing European Citizenship as an independent source of 
rights. Baumbast560, for example, and more specifically the Opinion of Advocate 
General Geelhoed recognised, for the purposes of interpreting Regulation 
1612/68 561, the changing nature of the family and in particular the social 
acceptance that had occurred in terms of extra-marital cohabitation and also, at 
least to some extent the recognition of homosexual partnerships. As previously 
outlined, the central question in the proceedings did not concern the 
private/core dynamics of the family but rather focused on rights to education 
(note the peripheral nature of the reference) in the host Member State for the 
children and rights of residence for the children’s carer. From the family law 
perspective though, the case brought an interesting question in relation to family 
relationships before the Court with the Advocate General noting that Regulation 
1612/68 emanates from a time when “family relationships were relatively stable” 
and any provisions contained therein concerned the protection of the traditional 
family. However, in recognising that “considerable social developments have occurred 
which are likely to have considerable influence on the view to be formed as to the nature and 
scope of the provisions of the Regulation” and that the Court must consider these 
developments, the AG argued that “relevant rules of law risk losing their effectiveness”. 
Therefore, with a view to giving content and substance to rights conferred by 
virtue of being an EU citizen, the Court reasoned that to deprive the parents of 
rights of residence would effectively deprive children of their Community right. 
In another vein, let us recall the well renowned Chen562 case concerning 
Catherine Zhu acquired Irish citizenship by virtue of the constitutional changes 
introduced in 1998, namely the introduction of jus soli after her mother travelled 
to Northern Ireland to give birth there. The family subsequently moved to Wales 
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and applied for a residence permit which was refused. The application was 
appealed and referred to the ECJ. The Advocate General concluded that a 
young child as a national of a Member State has a right to reside in another 
Member State insofar as he or she has sickness insurance and sufficient resources 
not to become an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the host Member State. 
Furthermore, he said that a child’s right of residence would be yielded ineffective 
if the parent was denied right of residence. The reasoning of the Court is of 
particular concern here as the substance of the citizenship rights played a 
significant role in the reasoning of the Court as it took a significant step in 
establishing EU Citizenship as an independent source of rights. 
The Court reasoned that on the basis of Article 18 of the EC Treaty, 
Catherine Zhu as an EU Citizen had an inalienable right to reside in a place of her 
choice in the EU and that to deny residency rights to the parents of a minor child 
would effectively render this right ineffective. By recognising the child’s 
independent rights in this case but also that these rights would be rendered 
ineffective without the support of parents, the Court effectively granted the right 
of the family to remain together based on the citizen status of the child. 
Contrasted with the Carpenter case a clear shift is appreciable.  
Ruiz Zambrano563 is one of the more telling pronouncements of the Court 
in recent times. It exposes how primary law, citizenship provisions and the 
prohibition on discrimination, can grant more comprehensive protection to 
‘international’ families in Europe as opposed to national legislation. The legal 
question revolved around whether Mr. Zambrano, as a parent of an EU citizen 
child, derived a right of residence by virtue of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. If this question were to be answered in the affirmative, 
then the further question would be whether he could be exempt from having to 
obtain a work permit. The case was quite contentious with all the Member States 
that made written submissions together with the Commission arguing that the 
question referred represented a wholly internal situation and therefore did not 
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come within the scope of application of EU law since the citizen children in this 
case had never exercised their free movement rights564. The Court however, held 
that the Citizens Directive was not applicable in this case and instead turned to 
the citizenship provisions for guidance. It recognised that EU citizenship is 
“intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States” citing Article 
20(1) of the TFEU. In effect the Court, in relying on previous case law, held that 
Article 20 of the TFEU precludes measures that have the effect of depriving 
citizens of the enjoyment of their substantive rights under EU law. In applying 
this to the facts of the case at hand, were Mr. Zambrano to be deported then this 
would effectively mean that the citizenship rights of the minor children would 
become ineffective. The Court stated that: 
Article 20 TFEU is to be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a Member State from 
refusing a third country national upon whom his minor children, who are European 
Union citizens, are dependent, a right of residence in the Member State of residence and 
nationality of those children, and from refusing to grant a work permit to that third 
country national, in so far as such decisions deprive those children of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights attaching to the status of European Union 
citizen. 
Not only did the Citizenship provision factor heavily in the decision making 
process of the Court but the rights to family life were well established by the 
Advocate General Sharpston in making reference to Articles 7 and 24 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights565 and relevant international provisions including 
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights566; Article 
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9.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child567; Article 8 and Article 3 of 
Protocol 4 to the European Convention of Human Rights568. Therefore what we 
witness is an expression of protection in terms of both the horizontal and vertical 
dynamics of the family via an attribution of substance to the citizenship 
provisions. 
Although both these cases have been criticised for stretching the 
boundaries of the scope of EU law one must consider what is essentially involved 
here. The economic goals of the EU essentially require the free movement of 
goods, services and people. When people migrate they take with them their 
mutable and immutable characteristics, be that civil status, religion, culture etc. 
Moreover, for the purposes of this analysis they take with them their families and 
these families deserve legal protection and a legal basis upon which they can rely 
so they can exercise their right to family life. It is within this realm that the shifts 
from market to social reasoning, clearly demonstrated by Zambrano, take a 
significant step essentially recognising that movement is not a necessary 
prerequisite to trigger the scope of EU citizenship rules therefore expanding its 
scope to wholly internal situations.  
The effects of this interpretation of primary law on family law therefore 
have the potential to be significant. Not only this, but the interpretation of the 
citizenship provisions in conjunction with anti-discrimination seem to indicate 
that there is something more to EU citizenship – a whirlpool effect as we will see 
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in the concluding chapter. The decision itself was indeed motivated by the family 
law principle of unity of the family. However, this principle was essentially 
upheld and derivative rights granted on the basis of the citizenship provisions. 
Therefore, Zambrano goes further than previous case law like Chen case in which 
the same conclusion was reached however a condition that the family were not to 
become an unreasonable burden on the host Member State was imposed and in 
Carpenter when the principle of unity was actually upheld on the much criticised 
link between the care function of Mr. Carpenter’s wife in respect to his children 
and his economic activity in Europe. 
Therefore, it would seem that citizenship, in going beyond – or perhaps 
better integrating the rights parole into the neo-formalist langue - is allowing the 
Court to encroach in areas that were previously reserved to Member States. It is 
via encroachment in these areas that the Court is faced with increased instances 
of peripheral family law issues, very often using tools emanating from the 
primary law of the Union and further developed and interpreted by the Court so 
as to grant greater protection to migrating (and now as a result of Zambrano, not 
even migrating) families in Europe as opposed to the limited protection offered 
by domestic legal systems.  
(b) The Dark Side of Citizenship 
Even good law can have negative effects and throughout this research, we have 
made continuous reference to the at times unclear and precarious path the 
jurisprudence has taken. In terms of anti-discrimination for example, confusion 
still arises as to the practical effect of the use of the anti-discrimination principle. 
The recent Test-Achats569 case has once again demonstrated that the equality 
rhetoric echoing across Europe and more particularly its use at the European 
level can in fact lead to negative real effects on the ground, what can be termed 
here as levelling down. This is in complete contrast to the one of the original 
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aspirations of equal treatment – integration of women in the workplace via equal 
treatment in order to fulfil economic goals.  
In terms of the rights rhetoric that accompanies the substantiating of 
European Citizenship and the construction of a European society or better the 
furthering of a European identity, it would seem, at least to some extent, that the 
Court takes one step forward and two steps back resulting in difficulties in 
establishing what exactly is happening under the calm surface of the ‘citizenship 
whirlpool’.  
We have above noted the potential of Zambrano. Bearing this potential in 
mind however, we turn our attention to the more recent McCarty570 case. Shirley 
McCarthy was born and had always lived in Northern Ireland. She had never 
worked, and received state benefits.  In 2002 she married a Jamaican citizen who 
had no valid leave to remain in the UK.  Following her marriage, she acquired 
an Irish passport and sought to assert her rights of free movement within the EU 
and those of her husband as her spouse.  The Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom referred the following questions to the CJEU: 
‘1.      Is a person of dual Irish and United Kingdom nationality who has resided 
in the United Kingdom for her entire life a “beneficiary” within the meaning of 
Article 3 of Directive 2004/38? 
2.      Has such a person “resided legally” within the host Member State for the 
purpose of Article 16 of [that] directive in circumstances where she was unable to 
satisfy the requirements of Article 7 of [that directive]?’ 
The CJEU found that Mrs McCarthy could not be considered a “beneficiary” 
under Article 3 of the Directive because she had never moved to another 
Member State. On this basis, it also purported that her husband could not 
therefore derive similar rights. In its reasoning, the Court considered Article 21 
of the Rome Treaty which enshrines the fundamental right of freedom of 
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movement of EU citizens across Member States. Moreover, it referred to the 
decision of the Grand Chamber in Zambrano. However, it distinguished the 
Zambrano case finding that no element of Mrs McCarthy's situation, as described 
by the national court, indicated that the national measure taken against her had 
the effect of depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of her EU 
rights. The ECJ argued that by contrast to Zambrano, the national measure at 
issue in the proceedings did not have the effect of obliging Mrs. McCarthy to 
leave the territory of the EU in that even if her husband were to be expelled, she 
could choose to remain in the UK. Thus, the ECJ ruled that the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of her rights attached to EU citizenship had not been 
undermined. It would seem that the existence of children in the Zambrano family 
was a decisive factor in distinguishing Mrs. McCarthy’s case in that in upholding 
the national decision did not “oblige her to leave the territory of the EU” as 
would have occurred if the negative decision had of been upheld in the Zambrano 
case.   
Thus, whereas Zambrano gave effect to EU rights based on Citizenship of 
the Union even though no movement had taken place, the same citizenship logic 
was not engaged to enforce the rights of Mrs McCarthy. The denial of access in 
terms of Mrs McCarthy’s EU rights did not have the same effect as a similar 
measure did on the Zambrano children. Accordingly, the court found that 
McCarthy’s case fell outside EU law and was a matter of purely internal law 
within the UK. 
That being said, although it has been argued that the Court took a step 
back in deciding as it did in McCarthy, it is imperative to note that it still took 
the all important step in Zambrano.  
It was hoped that the Dereci571 case would provide some clarification to the 
confusion that ensued these two seemingly conflicting cases.  It concerned five 
joint applicants, each of whom was a third country national wishing to reside in 
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Austria with his/her Austrian family member. None of the applicants’ family 
members had exercised their right to free movement within the Union. The 
specifics of each familial relationship differ. Mr Dereci, is a Turkish national who 
entered Austria illegally and married an Austrian citizen. He and his wife had 
three children, all of whom were Austrian citizens and minors.  Mr Dereci, at the 
time of the case, was resident with his family in Austria. Mr Maduike, a Nigerian 
national, entered Austria illegally and married an Austrian national.  He and his 
wife were residing in Austria at the time of the case. Mrs Heiml, a Sri Lankan 
national, married an Austrian national. She subsequently entered Austria as a 
regular migrant, and was still residing there with her husband at the time of the 
case despite the expiration of her residence. Mr Kokollari entered Austria legally 
at age of 2 with his parents, who were then Yugoslav nationals.  At the time of 
the case, he was 29 years old and residing in Austria. He claimed to have been 
maintained by his mother who has assumed Austrian nationality. Mrs Stevic, a 
Serbian national, residing Serbia with her husband and three adult children.  
She sought family reunification with her father, a naturalised Austrian citizen 
resident in Austria, from whom she was receiving monthly financial support. All 
applications for resident permits were rejected by the Austrian Bundesministerium 
für Inneres. It refused to apply the provisions pursuant to Directive 2004/38/EC 
for family members of EU citizens on the grounds that the Union citizens 
concerned had not exercised their rights of free movement. It also placed weight 
of the fact that Mr Dereci, Mr Maduike, Mrs Heiml and Mr Kokollari had been 
subject to expulsion orders and individual removal orders. The Court stated572 
that Union citizens, who have never exercised free movement rights, cannot for 
that reason alone be assimilated to a purely internal situation since citizenship of 
the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of Member 
States. In essence, the Court was of the opinion that as long as an EU citizen can 
move from their Member State of origin to another Member State and exercise 
free movement and residence rights, then they can enjoy family reunion. 
Otherwise the only way an EU citizen can enjoy family reunion with a third 
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country national is if they simply cannot move, the only discernable example of 
this so far emanating from Zambrano.  
In effect then, Dereci limits the Zambrano logic exceptionalising it and the 
rights it confers to particular family compositions and structures. 
IV) Concluding Remarks 
To begin with Carpenter, we can safely say that the Court based its reasoning on 
internal market logic in that not only did base the claim concerning the wife’s 
right to remain on Mr. Carpernter and his economic activity with the 
Community but it also extended what can actually be considered as economic 
activity. In so doing, it incorporated and recognised the importance of the care-
giving function and the fundamental right to family life but essentially, in stating 
that the economic activity could not be carried out without it, based its reasoning 
not in the unity of the family as such but rather its internal market reasoning. In 
other words, the fundamental right to family life was extended via Mr. 
Carpenter’s economic freedoms: 
The Court points out that the Community legislature has recognised the importance of 
ensuring the protection of the family life of nationals of the Member States in order to 
eliminate obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EC 
Treaty573.  
It is clear that the separation of Mr and Mrs Carpenter by her deportation would be 
detrimental to their family life and, therefore, to the conditions under which Mr 
Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom. That freedom could not be fully effective if 
Mr Carpenter were to be deterred from exercising it by obstacles raised in his country of 
origin to the entry and residence of his spouse574. 
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We can see from this reasoning that the main concern of the Court here (at least 
that which was exposed by the judgment) was the fundamental freedom of Mr. 
Carpenter, not Mrs. Carpenters right, as primary caregiver, to remain in the UK 
with a view to protecting the unity of the family. However, this rights based 
approach to economic law ensured that the integrity of the family was upheld in 
the case. 
The Chen case that followed, as we have seen above, concerned a different 
set of facts and the question rather concerned corollary rights of parents of EU 
citizen children. The parental right of residence in this case was seen to be 
necessary so that the child could benefit from her EU citizenship. In this case, we 
already see a change in reasoning in that by virtue of Catherine’s EU citizenship, 
residence rights were granted to both Catherine and her mother upholding the 
unity of the family. The Court reasoned that Catherine is covered by adequate 
sickness insurance and, through the members of her family, has at her disposal 
sufficient resources to ensure that, during her stay, she does not become a burden 
on the public finances of the host Member State.  Consequently, she can claim a 
right of residence either by virtue of the directive concerning rights of movement 
and residence for persons who are not economically active or by virtue of the 
provision of the Treaty which provides for freedom of movement and of 
residence as a fundamental right of citizens of the Union. It went on to state that 
if Mrs. Chen were to exercise a right of establishment in the United Kingdom in 
the name and on behalf of her daughter, but were then herself denied the right to 
reside in that State, that outcome would be manifestly contrary to the interests of 
her daughter and would contravene the principle of respect for family unity: in 
such a case, the young child would automatically be abandoned.  Therefore, her 
mother must be able to invoke a right of residence deriving from that of her 
young child, because otherwise the latter’s right would be entirely deprived of 
any effectiveness. 
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Then we come to the Zambrano case575 from which we can note a further 
shift in that the Court is now fully engaged with using the citizenship provisions 
as a means to uphold the unity of family ties. The reasoning of AG Sharpston is 
particularly telling of the direction into which citizenship reasoning is headed: 
First, from the moment that the Member States decided to add, to existing concepts of 
nationality, a new and complementary status of ‘citizen of the Union’, it became 
impossible to regard such individuals as mere economic factors of production. Citizens 
are not ‘resources’ employed to produce goods and services, but individuals bound to a 
political community and protected by fundamental rights 
Second, when citizens move, they do so as human beings, not as robots. They fall in 
love, marry and have families. The family unit, depending on circumstances, may be 
composed solely of EU citizens, or of EU citizens and third country nationals, closely 
linked to one another. If family members are not treated in the same way as the EU 
citizen exercising rights of free movement, the concept of freedom of movement becomes 
devoid of any real meaning.  
Third, by granting fundamental rights under EU law to its citizens, and stating that 
such rights are the very foundation of the Union (Article 6(1) TEU), the European 
Union committed itself to the principle that citizens exercising rights to freedom of 
movement will do so under the protection of those fundamental rights576. 
‘Over succeeding years, the EU has reinforced its policy on fundamental rights through 
(for example) setting up a Fundamental Rights Agency, creating an independent portfolio 
within the Commission responsible for fundamental rights, supporting humanitarian 
projects throughout the world and transforming the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU, first proclaimed in 2000, from a non-binding text (‘soft law’) into primary law. 
Fundamental rights have thus become a core element in the development of the Union as 
                                                
575 Confirmed by Dereci. 
576 Paragraphs 127-129. 
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a process of economic, legal and social integration aimed at providing peace and 
prosperity to all its citizens577. 
What we can see from the reasoning in Zambrano is that although the Court 
considers fundamental rights arguments, it has merged them with rights ensuing 
from EU Citizenship. It seems to go beyond the economic logic to which it was 
once bound and is instead creating a citizenship space within which rights, based 
on the fundamental right to family life, can be expanded upon. In sum, the 
Court’s aspirations in relation to EU Citizenship coupled with fundamental 
rights protection have provided conceptual support in family law cases that 
would otherwise be left outside the scope of the legal toolbox of the Court, 
developing, some might say, a sphere within which the notion of family citizens, 
just like consumer citizens and market citizens, can begin to emerge. However, 
the subsequent case law seems to narrow the enjoyment of citizenship rights to 
those families with children based on their need for company, care and 
parentage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
577 Paragraph 154. 
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Conclusions 
I) Recalling The Hypothesis 
In concluding this research, let us call to mind the principal hypothesis i.e. that 
the interpretation of European Union law, both primary and secondary, is having a 
deconstructive effect on national family law and is reconstructing it via the European Union 
legal order. This can be broken down into two elements. Has a deconstruction of 
traditional family law taken place? Has the family been subject to a 
reconstruction at the EU level? We will deal with both these questions here with 
a view to concluding this research. 
A. The Deconstruction Process 
The genealogical approach to this thesis assisted us to uncover distinct historical 
ideas and theoretical underpinnings that have influenced the development of 
modern family law. Chapter I illustrates the wall that required deconstruction in 
clearly setting out that as a result of the globalization of Classical Legal Thought, 
contract law was venerated “as the legal space in which to maximise space for 
the will of the parties” and family law was venerated “as its opposite, the space 
for the untrammelled will of the state imposing ascriptive statuses saturated with 
duty”578. Contact law therefore was universal according to the highly influential 
thoughts of Savigny while family law gave voice to the spirit of the people leading 
to a localisation of the foundations of family law. Contract law was characterised 
by a profound preference for individualism and supported a laissez faire ideology. 
In terms of equality, the equal autonomy of contract law did not extend to the 
family, in which patriarchal property-based subordination remained untouched. 
The construction of the family and the regulation of familial ties that was to ride 
the wave of the second globalization – The Social - was one characterised by the 
                                                
578 Halley, “What Is Family Law?,” May 8, 2013. 
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institution of marriage, the local nature of norms, customs and traditions that 
governed the family, and profound inequalities between the parties to the private 
marital bubble which Classical Legal Thought failed to penetrate as it marched 
towards accommodating capitalism and the rise in global trade, the fulfilment of 
will and the creation of an individualist, liberal approach that disregarded the 
family in all but its function as a cog, an aid mechanism for the proper 
functioning and support of industrialization. 
The Social has potential to de-exceptionalise the family from this isolated 
position it has been pushed towards. This potential was based on the shift from 
economic development as the overall goal to the idea of interdependence; from 
the individualism that characterized Classical Legal Thought to an increased 
demand for group rights and collective concerns; and the move from formal 
equality to social justice. We noted the shift from contract as the web and woof of 
life in terms of regulation to more social aspirations that emanated from the 
construction of societal spaces and the interaction between the state, the 
economy and the private sphere considering the new approach to collective 
concerns, values, interests and purposes579. In fact, the socialization of law during 
this second globalization had unprecedented effects on the structure and 
contours of private law particularly, as we illustrated in Chapter II, in 
consideration of the development of the master/servant relationship into one of 
employment law.   
Was the same potential realized in terms of the family? To a certain 
extent, the answer to this question would be yes in view of the fact that during 
The Social, or rather towards the end of this globalization, ‘family law’ finally 
came to be recognized as a distinct legal field. That being said, the net it cast was 
limited in scope to say the least. It was recognized as a field of law that dealt with 
formal issues concerning marriage, and, where provided for, separation and 
divorce, in addition to the rights and duties between parents and legitimate 
children. It remained rooted in the patriarchal system that was firmly entrenched 
                                                
579 Ibid pg 3. 
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during the globalization of Classical Legal Thought. Based on this, the 
constitutional process at national levels, as illustrated by the Constitutions of 
Ireland and Italy, placed the marital family on a pedestal disregarding other 
family types. Interpretation by national courts therefore was limited to local 
definitions of the family, essentially rooted in the formation of formal marital 
bonds. This, as we highlighted, left little scope for courts to socially engineer the 
legal position of emerging family structures, compositions and ideologies.     
As argued throughout this thesis, the deconstruction process only really 
began with the shift in the legal langue with the onset of the third globalization of 
legal thought – neo-formalism. We highlighted a change in the legal grammar 
employed in an attempt to integrate ‘politics through law’ via rights discourse, the 
emergence of identity rights and the use of law to meet a variety of ends 
including distributive and social functions. This, in terms of the deconstruction of 
the family market dichotomy was largely rooted in the notion of equality that 
stemmed from economic integration which cut across the tensions that persisted 
after the globalization of Classical Legal Thought and The Social. In more concrete 
terms, the development of the a body of anti-discrimination law according to the 
European legal order pulled the family out of the patriarchal structure to which it had 
been subjected (the deconstruction) and nudged it, via peripheral family law issues, 
towards rights-based adjudication (the reconstruction). Essentially this gave rise to 
solutions considered more satisfactory as opposed to the purely private or the purely 
social solutions that were adopted during the earlier globalizations. 
B. The Reconstruction Process 
Equal treatment, like many novel fields of EU law, has developed at warp-speed. 
In its early days, the goal of the equal pay provisions contained in the primary law was 
to reintroduce women into the market place prompted by the preoccupations of the 
French that their already established equal pay laws would place them at a 
competitive disadvantage. Additionally, non-discrimination based on nationality 
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was enshrined already in Article 69 of the ECSC Treaty.580 Today, however, we 
note the extensive character of anti-discrimination law at the European level and its 
expansive reach in many directions. Through this, and the gradual adoption of 
secondary legislation, the then ECJ was provided with space and much leeway in 
terms of developing what was already considered a worthy field of law 581 
broadening the access path582 in terms of issues that could be referred via the 
preliminary reference procedure583 – the swash. Through this process the Court 
was given the leeway to define its mandate, establish a “new legal order” and 
develop a constitutional doctrine584 - a clear shift from the economic based equal 
pay and non-discrimination based on nationality provisions. 
This new legal order developed alongside a shift in aspirations – from 
economic to socially orientated - rendered sharp by the Treaty on the European 
Union. We note: 
Ø the classical conception of the EEC in establishing an internal market 
thereby focused on engaging workers to facilitate the market; 
                                                
580 Providing for the free movement of all workers in the coal and steel industries including a 
provision on the prohibition of discrimination. This prohibition however only applied to 
workers who were in possession of a recognised qualification in coalmining or steelmaking. 
581 This points to issues of legitimacy of which we cannot deal with here. Suffice to say that via equality 
aspirations, based on the economic constitution, the court was in some way legitimized in its march 
towards, what would eventually become a general principle of equality. On legitimacy, see Bartl M., 
Legitimacy and European private law, PhD Thesis, defended at the European University Institute, Florence, 
2012; Scharpf, Fritz W., Legitimate Diversity: The New Challenge of European Integration, in Börzel, 
Tanja, A./Cichowski, Rachel A. (eds.): The State of the European Union, Vol. 6, Oxford, 2003, 79-
104; Scharpf, Fritz W., Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity, in: European Political Science 
Review 1/2, 2009,173-204; Scharpf, Fritz W., The Asymmetry of European Integration, or why the 
EU cannot be a social market economy, in Socio-Economic Review (2010) 8/2, 211-250. 
582 G Tridimas & T Tridimas, “National Courts and the European Court of Justice: A Public Choice 
analysis of the Preliminary reference Procedure, International Review of Law and Economics, 24, (2004) 125-
145; Bobek M., “Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants: The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice through 
the Eyes of National Courts” in Maurice Adams, Johan Meeusen, Gert Straetmans and Henri de 
Waele (eds), Judging Europe’s Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice 
Examined (Oxford, Hart, 2013). 
583 In fact, according to the Court itself “….is essential for the preservation of the Community character of 
the law established by the Treaty and has the object of ensuring that in all circumstances this law is the same in 
all States of the Community” (Case C-166/73 Rheinmuhlen). 
584 Tridimas, “Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary 
reference Procedure, Common Market Law Review, 40: 9.50, 2003; G Tridimas & T Tridimas, “National 
Courts and the European Court of Justice: A Public Choice analysis of the Preliminary reference 
Procedure, International Review of Law and Economics, 24, (2004) 125-145. 
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Ø to a more socially based EU - albeit still economically motivated in 
striving to achieve the “most efficient market economy” – engaging 
different actors in exchange for protection, for instance, consumer 
participation in the market in exchange for consumer protection 
Ø  and finally a recodification of this European social in the direction of 
individual rights with a stronger focus on fundamental rights and 
interdependency. 
It is precisely here where we can pinpoint not only the reconstruction of family but 
also how the European legal order goes beyond the neo-formalist langue in terms of 
European identity building. Before concluding with the issues that this necessarily 
conjures, let us look to the specifics of how this reconstruction affects the family.  
The Specifics 
Traditionally, evidenced by family law textbooks, family law dealt with the private 
dynamics of the relationships established on the formation of marital ties. It dealt with 
the unique and autonomous domain that it occupies in society based on the intimate, 
private and emotional relationships it governs; its quest to preserve traditional, 
national and customary ways of life against the upheavals of postmodernity and 
globalization and its derivation from values other than market rationality. By 
broadening the access path however, the European legal order has allowed for the 
consideration of peripheral family law issues, essentially de-exceptionalizing the family 
from the market. As we noted in Chapter IV, via an examination of the selected 
peripheral paths, family law concerns much more than that which traditionally was 
confined to the private bubble. Employment law regimes585, welfare benefits586, name 
                                                
585 C-363/12, Z. v A Government Department and The Board of management of a community school and C-167/12, 
C.D. v S.T. 
586 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Case C/413/99; London Borough of 
Harrow v Nimco Hassan Ibrahim, Secretary of State for the Home Department Case C-310/08; Maria 
Teixeira v. London borough of Lambeth Case C-480/08; Commission v Anton Pieter Roodhuijzen Case T-
58/08; Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Buhen C-267/06; K.B. v National Health Service 
Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health Case C-117/01; Joseph Griesmar v French Republic Case 
C-366/99 and Case C-104/09 Roca-Alvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA. 
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registration587 in particular consideration of migration, and residence and family 
reunification588 all necessarily shift interpretations of the family, its structure, its 
ideology and its governance. The inclusion of these peripheral issues in 
reconceptualizing the family broadens the field in terms of breaking down the 
family/market dichotomy.  
Second, by catapulting the family into the European legal order, anti-
discrimination has served to deconstruct the patriarchal structure that persisted within 
family structures for so long. It has been reconstructed in accordance with the 
principle of equality leading to the replacement of patriarchy with a more gender-
neutral approach to regulating the family. We can make reference here to Case C-
104/09 Roca-Alvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA589 and the equality approach that 
was taken in consideration of breast feeding leave.  
Third, in advancing the neo-formalist langue, not only through anti-
discrimination but also via the developed general principle of equality and reference 
to fundamental rights, the court has shifted the dynamics of family law adjudication, 
not only in terms of the private dynamic within the family but also in terms of 
balancing the fundamental right to family life against policy considerations.590 As we 
noted in Chapter II, the globalization of The Social coincided with the 
constitutionalization of the family at the national level. The effects of this however 
were limited in scope in that the classical, therefore limited to formal bonds created on 
marriage and the local nature of family regulation, definition of the family was placed 
on a constitutional pedestal leaving little room for courts to manoeuvre, essentially 
                                                
587 C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge ; C-353/06 Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul v 
Leonhard Matthias Grunkin-Paul and Standesamt Stadt Niebüll. 
588 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department Case C-60/00; Chen and Zhu v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, Case C-200/02; Case C-127/08, Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform; Case C-578/08 Rhimou Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandese Zaken; Gerardo 
Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEM) Case C-34/09.  
589 Case C-104/09 Roca-Alvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA. 
590 It must be noted however that this discourse if perhaps more advanced in terms of the Opinions of 
the Advocates General with the Court, understandably so, particularly in consideration of, for instance, 
the CD and Z references, not always assuming the same logic. This debate goes deep into the difficulties 
faced in terms of implementing fundamental rights, particularly in horizontally inclined cases and is 
one which, in this author’s opinion will gain significant momentum with increased reference to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Unions accession to the European Convention of Human 
Rights. 
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blocking any expansion of the family conception. The rights based interpretation, 
served by cross-reference between the CJEU and the ECtHR serves to widen the 
scope of interpretation to include non-traditional, non-classical family types.  
On this very note of adjudication, it is imperative to point out how the 
progression from Classical Legal Thought to The Social to Neo-formalism affects the 
family591. The hero figures of the first globalization, after Savigny of course, were the 
judiciary in that they deductively interpreted the already formal character of the Will 
Theory that underpinned this legal consciousness. In fact, this was one of the principal 
attacks from ‘the socializers’. The social, rather, was concerned with social 
engineering via legislators who drafted the multiplicity of special laws that constituted 
the new order, along with the administrator who produced and enforced the detailed 
regulations that put legislative regimes into effect. The third globalization has turned 
the adjudication of family law issues on its head. We noted in the Introduction to this 
thesis that just over one hundred years ago, not even colonial courts were prepared to 
interfere with local family law. Today, we are witnessing increased adjudication of 
family law issues at the supranational level. This very fact is incredible on its own, let 
alone that this shift in adjudication has lead to the use of a complete alternative 
toolbox in terms of adjudication. 
These advancements paint an attractive picture of the reconstruction of family 
law and indeed, if we look to increasingly inclusive pronouncements of both national 
and supranational courts, can certainly be noted as a welcomed momentum in terms 
of modernising family law. One might be tempted, particularly in relation to family 
law and its underdog position, to herald any advances as a step in the right direction. 
However, if the foundations are weak then the building will crumble and rather than 
construct a weak European space for family law it is preferable to build concrete 
foundations upon which migrating families can be supported.  
                                                
591 Although not dealt with here, we should recall that the EU’s calls for a broader access to justice have 
paved the way for the extra-judicial resolution of private law disputes. In terms of family, particularly in 
relation to Brussels II bis and the rise of cross-border mediation, we can perhaps note a re-privatization 
of the resolution of family law dispute. Additionally, and in conjunction with the point made in footnote 
598 below, we may wonder to what extent adjudication of family law issues at the supranational level 
has already gone beyond the peripheral issues approximating them to the core. 
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II) Beyond Neo-Formalism 
EU Citizenship, in going beyond neo-formalism in providing a space where 
rights can be claimed and developed in a self-standing nature, that is, as we 
noted in relation to the Zambrano case and the shift from the economic 
interpretation employed previously592 towards the creation of a European society 
and identity building project. This can be connected back to the broad impetus 
of this research based on the fact that the nation state is undergoing a 
transformation.593 Even though the concepts and methodological lenses differ, we 
note the trend recognizing the evolving nature of the European transnational legal 
order in providing a forum within which both citizens and private actors can avail of 
increased opportunities to participate in the changing economic and political 
environment. This is where the EU, and more especially the CJEU, comes into 
difficulty. The uncertainty concerning the scope of EU Citizenship has been 
developed in this thesis with reference to the one step forward approach taken by 
the Court in Zambrano594 contrasted with the two steps back approach taken in 
McCarthy595 and Dereci596. This inconsistent approach muddies the waters and 
renders it difficult to ascertain the future of jurisprudential pronouncements of 
the Court. In connecting this back to Savigny, and his strife for a systematization 
of law during the first globalization, we can perhaps question the rhetoric of EU 
Citizenship and call for clarification in terms of the rights (and duties) it 
establishes. To exemplify: is EU Citizenship confined to an elite few in Europe 
                                                
592 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Case C-60/00; Chen and Zhu v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Case C-200/02. 
593 We can think here about the effects of globalization on the nation state, the effects of international 
agreements and the establishment of international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, 
but more specifically for our purposes we focus attention on the influence of the European legal order 
on the individual nation states as constitutive members. See Slaughter, A.M., “Global Government 
Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy”, Harvard Law School, Public 
Law Working Paper No. 18.;  Slaughter, A.M., A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2009); 
Fischer-Lescano A., & Teubner G., “Regime-Collision: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law”, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 999 (2004); Sassen S., Territory, Authority, Rights: From 
Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton University Press, 2006). 
594 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEM). 
595 McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Case C-434/09. 
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who take advantage of their free movement rights i.e. EU Citizenship based on 
the economic foundations of the Union597, or, in another direction, is the goal to 
develop a citizenship that aims to connect the European polity i.e. every Member 
State national by virtue of being born within Europe’s border thereby granting 
them – and their dependant and ascendants – a legal sphere within which their 
rights can be exercised and fulfilled?  
In another vein, pre-empting increased reference to fundamental rights, 
particularly as a result of the Charter and the EU’s accession to the ECHR, we 
must consider questions pertaining to institutional choice, again depending on 
the path, be it restrictive or liberal, that the Court decides to follow. Moreover, 
connected to this, we may question whether EU citizenship in conjunction with 
the neo-formalist langue is actually moving towards the core?598 
It is impossible to adequately deal with these various issues here – each 
perhaps deserving a thesis of its own. Suffice it to note, in posing conclusions for 
further research, that the ‘empty’ nature that characterized the citizenship 
provisions on their introductions can be refuted. Rather, I would argue that 
although the provisions themselves on first glance seem quite somber and 
unlikely to cause much stir599, it is now clear that behind these provisions is 
something more, a potential to subtly (and perhaps not even) further the scope of 
the EU and the rights of those persons within its borders. Like a whirlpool the 
provisions represented by the deceiving, still surface of the water are simply there 
for all to be seen. More difficult however is to gauge what is actually going on 
below the surface of the water in the vortex of the whirlpool.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
596 Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, Case C-256/11. 
597 C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge. 
598 Here we can think about the road not taken by the Court in reasoning the CD and Z cases.  
599 We may question whether the citizenship rules so abstract that their indeterminacy allows 
them to be invoked quite instrumentally? 
  
258 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
259 
Bibliography 
 
Books and Book Chapters 
Amram D. & D’angelo A. (eds), La famiglia e il diritto fra diversità nazionali ed iniziative 
dell’Unione Europea, I quaderni della rivista di diritto civile, (Padova, 2011). 
Antokolskaia M., “Family Law and National Culture. Arguing against The Cultural 
Constraints Arguments”, in Boele Woelki K., Debates in Family Law around the Globe at 
the Dawn of the 21st Century (Intersentia, 2009): 37-51. 
Antokolskaia A., “Comparative Family Law. Moving With The Times?”, in Örücü E. 
and  Nelken D. (eds.) Comparative Legal Studies: A Handbook (Hart 2007): 241-263. 
Antokolskaia M., Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe – A Historical Perspective, 
European Family Law Series No. 13 (Intersentia, 2006). 
Antokolskaia M., Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe – A Historical Perspective, 
European Family Law Series No. 13 (Intersentia, 2006). 
Azoulai L., “The Case of Fundamental Rights: A State of Ambivalence”, in Micklitz 
H.W. and De Witte B. (eds.) The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of Member 
States (Intersentia, 2012).  
Bartl M., Legitimacy and European private law, PhD Thesis, defended at the European 
University Institute, Florence, 2012. 
Becker G., A Treatise on the Family (Harvard University Press, 1991) 
Bell M., “Constitutionalization and EU Employment Law” in Micklitz H.W., The 
Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 
Bengoetxea J., The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European 
Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press, 1993) 
Bernini S., “The Foundation of Civilised Society: Family and Social Policy in Britain 
and Italy between 1946 and 1960” in Nautz J., Ginsborg P. and Nijhis T., The Golden 
Chain, Family, Civil Society and the State (Berghahn Books, 2013). 
Bessone M., Alpa G., D’Angelo A., Ferrando G., Spallarossa M.R., La famiglia nel 
nuovo diritto (2002). 
  
260 
Bishop, J.P., Commentaries of the Law of Marriage and Divorce, and Evidence in Matrimonial 
Suits, 1st Ed, (Lettle, Brown, 1852). 
Blackstone W., Commentaries on the Laws of England, (1765). 
Bobek M., “Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants: The Legitimacy of the Court of 
Justice through the Eyes of National Courts” in Maurice Adams, Johan Meeusen, 
Gert Straetmans and Henri de Waele (eds), Judging Europe’s Judges: The Legitimacy of the 
Case Law of the European Court of Justice Examined (Oxford, Hart, 2013) 
Boele-Woelki K. (ed.), Debates in Family Law around the Globe at the Dawn of the 21st Century 
(Intersentia 2009). 
Boele-Woelki K. and Svedrup T. (eds.), European Challenges in Contemporary Family Law, 
European Family Law Series No. 19 (Intersentia 2008). 
Boele-Woelki K., Ferrand F., Gonzàlez Beilfuss C., Jantera-Jareborg M., Lowe N., 
Martiny D., Pintens W., Principles of European Family Law Regarding Parental 
Responsibilities, European Family Law Series No. 16 (Intersentia, 2007). 
Boele-Woelki K., Ferrand F., Gonzàlez Beilfuss C., Jantera-Jareborg M., Lowe N., 
Martiny D., Pintens W., Principles of European Family Law Regarding Divorce and 
Maintenance Between Former Spouses, European Family Law Series No. 7 (Intersentia, 
2004). 
Brownsword R., “Freedom of Contract, Human Rights and Human Dignity”, in 
Friedmann D. and Barak-Erez D. (eds.) Human Rights In Private Law (Intersentia, 2001). 
Brüggemeier G., Colombi Ciacchi A., and Comandé G., (eds.) Fundamental Rights and 
Private Law in Europe Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
Brüggemeier G, Colombi Ciacchi A., & Comandé G., (eds.) Fundamental Rights and 
Private Law in Europe Vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
Busnelli F.D., Famiglia e arcipelagofamiliare, in Riv. Dir. civ., 2002, 509 e ss. 
Busnelli F.D. and Santilli M., “La famiglia di fatto”, in Oppo G., Cian G. and 
Trabucchi A. (eds.), Commentario al dirittoitalianodellafamiglia, VI, 1, (1993). 
Cardia Vonèche L. and Bastard B., “Can Co-Parenting be Enforced? Family Law 
Reform and Family Life in France”, in Maclean M. (ed.), Family Law and Family Values 
(Hart Publishing, 2005). 
Choudhry S. and Herring J., European Human Rights and Family Law (Hart Publishing, 
2010). 
Collins H., Standard Contract Terms in Europe: A Basis for and a Challenge to European Contract 
Law (Kluwer Law International, 2008). 
  
261 
Collins H., The European Civil Code: The Way Forward, (Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
Collins H.,  Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press, 2003).  
Collins H., ‘Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment 
Relation’, in H Collins H., Davies P. and Rideout R. (eds.), Legal Regulation of the 
Employment Relation (2000). 
Collins H., On the (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law, 
LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 7/2012. 
Comande G., “The Fifth European Union Freedom: Aggregating 
Citizenship…around Private Law” in Micklitz H.W., The Constitutionalization of 
European Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
Cottier M., “Registered Partnerships for Same-Sex Couples in Switzerland: 
Constructing a New Model of Family Relationships”, in Maclean M. (ed.), Family Law 
and Family Values (Hart Publishing, 2005). 
D’Angelo A., Il Bambino nella Famigliari Composta. Percorsi di Riscoperta della Solidarietà 
Familiare, Ph.D. Thesis (2013), on file with the author.  
Davies J., The European Consumer Citizen in Law and Policy, (Palgrave MacMillan, 2011) 
De Vosg B.J., “The Netherlands Report” in Brüggemeier G., Colombi Ciacchi A., 
and Comandé G. (eds.) Fundamental Rights and Private Law in Europe Vol. I (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
Everson M., “The Legacy of the Market Citizen”, in Shaw  J. and More G., New Legal 
Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon Press, 1995). 
D’Oliveria H., “European Citizenship: its Meaning, its Potential”, in Dehousse R. 
(ed.), Europe after Maastricht (Law Books in Europe, 1994). 
Everson M,. “The Legacy of the Market Citizen”, in Shaw J. and More G., New Legal 
Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995). 
Fortino M., Diritto di famiglia. I valori, I principi, le regole, (2004). 
Foucault M., “Security, Territory, Population”, Lectures at the College de France, 
1977-1978, (2004): 203-05. 
Foucault M., “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, in Rabinow P. (ed.) The Foucault Reader 
83 (1984). 
Fraser, Husband and Wife (2nded 1878) Vol. 2. 
  
262 
Ginsborg P., “Unchartered Territories, Individuals, Families, Civil Society and the 
Democratic State” in Nautz J., Ginsborg P., and Nijhuis T., The Golden Chain: Family, 
Civil Society and the State (Berghahn Books, 2013). 
Glendon M.A., The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law, and Family in the United States 
and Western Europe (University of Chicago Press, 1996)  
Grassetti C., “I principi costituzionali relativi al diritto familiare”, in Calamandrei P. 
and Levi A., (eds.), Commentario Sistematico alla Costituzione Italiana (1950) 
Habermas J., The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Polity, 2012)  
Hartog H., Man and Wife in America: A History (Harvard University Press, 2009) 
Houghton W., The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870, (Yale University Press, 1957). 
Kahn-Freund O., “Common and Civil Law – Imaginary and Real Obstacles to 
Assimilation” in Cappelletti M. (ed.), New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe, 
(Springer, 1978) 
Kasirer N., “The Dance Is One” in Sylvio Normand (ed.), Mélanges offerts au professeur 
François Frenette: Étudesportantsur le droit patrimonial (Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006) 
Kelly F., A Guide to Early Irish Law (Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1988)  
Kennedy D., “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000”, in 
Trubek D. and Santos A., (eds.), The New Law and Economic Development. A Critical 
Appraisal (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
Komesar N., Law’s Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
Laycock D., Picarello Jr A.R. and Fretwell Wilson R., Same-Sex Marriage and Religious 
Liberty: Emerging Conflicts (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 
Leong Wai Kum, Family Law in Singapore: Cases and Commentary on the Women's Charter and 
Family Law (Malayan Law Journal, February 1990) 
Lewis, J. “The Changing Context for the Obligation to Care and Earn” in Maclean 
M. (ed.), Family Law and Family Values (Hart Publishing, 2005) 
Lyons C., “Citizenship in the Constitution of the European Union: Rhetoric or 
Reality?”, in R. Bellamy (ed.), Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and 
European Perspectives (Avebury, 1996) 
Maclean M., Family Law and Family Values (Hart Publishing, 2005)  
Maduro, M.P., “Europe’s Social Self: “The Sickness unto Death”” in Shaw J., (ed.), 
Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union (Hart Publishing, 2000) 
  
263 
Maduro M.P., We, The Court: The European Court Of Justice & The European Economic 
Constitution, (Hart Publishing, 1998) 
Mak C., “The Lion, the Fox and the Workplace: Fundamental Rights and the Politics 
of Long-Term Contractual Relationships” in Grundmann S., Cafaggi F. and Vettori 
G. (eds.), The organizational contract. From exchange to long-term network cooperation in European 
contract law (Markets and the law) (Farnham: Ashgate 2013). 
Mak C., Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law. A comparison of the impact of 
fundamental rights on contractual relationships in Germany, Italy the Netherlands and England 
(Kluwer Law International, 2008). 
Martiny D., “Is Unification of Family Law Feasible or Even Desirable”, in 
Haartkamp A. et al. (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code (Kluwer Law International, 
2004) 
McGlynn C., Families and the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).  
Micklitz H.W., The Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford University Press, 
2014). 
Micklitz H.W., The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2011). 
Micklitz, H.W., “Judicial Activism of the European Court of Justice and the 
Development of the European Social Model in Anti-Discrimination and Consumer 
Law” in Neergaard U., Nielsen R., and Roseberry L.M. (eds.) The Role of Courts in 
Developing a European Social Model (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) 
Micklitz H.W., The Politics of Judicial Co-operation in the EU – Sunday Trading, Equal 
Treatment and Good Faith (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
Mill J.S., The Subjection of Women (1869)  
Montesquieu C., The Spirit of the Laws 264-77 (Cohler A.M. et al. trans. eds.) 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) (1748) 
Mullally S., “Children Citizenship and Constitutional Change”, in Fanning B., (eds.) 
Immigration and Social Change in Republic of Ireland (Manchester University Press, 2007) 
Nietzsche F., The Genealogy of Morals (Horace B. Samuel trans., Boni & Liverwright 
1913) (1887) 
Nozick R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974) 
Pérez A. T., Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theory of Supranational Adjudication, 
(Oxford University Press, 2009) 
  
264 
Plender R.O., “An Incipient Form of European Citizenship”, in. Jacobs F.G., (ed.), 
European Law and the Individual (North-Holland, 1976) 
Safjan M., “The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in Private Law—On 
Actors, Vectors, and Factors of Influence”, in Purnhagen K., & Rott P. (eds), Varieties 
of European Economic Law and Regulation, Liber Amicorum for Hans Micklitz, (Springer 
International Publishing, 2014). 
Sandulli A.M., “Rapporti etico-sociali, art. 29”, in Cian G., Oppo G., Trabucchi A. 
(eds.), Commentario al diritto italiano della famiglia, (1992) 
Scharpf, Fritz W., Legitimate Diversity: The New Challenge of European Integration, 
in Börzel, Tanja, A./Cichowski, Rachel A. (eds.), The State of the European Union, 
Vol. 6, Oxford, 2003, 79-104. 
Schiek D.,  Waddington L., and Bell M., (eds.) with the collaboration of Choudhury 
T., De Schutter O., Gerards J., McColgan A., and Moon G., Cases, Materials and Text 
on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law (Hart Publishing, 2007) 
Douglas-Scott A., Constitutional Law of the European Union, (Longman, 2002) 
Sassen S., Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton 
University Press, 2006) 
Scherpe J.M. (ed.), Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in Comparative Perspective (Hart 
Publishing, 2012) 
Scherpe J.M., “From ‘Odious Crime’ to Family Life – Same-Sex Couples and the 
ECHR” in Verbeke A.L. et al. (eds.) Confronting the Frontiers of Family and Succession Law. 
Liber Amicorum Walter Pintens, (Intersentia 2012): 1225-1240 
Schmidt V. A., Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Polities (Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 
Shapiro J., “Changing Ways, New Technologies and the Devaluation of the Genetic 
Connection to Children” in Maclean M. (ed.), Family Law and Family Values, (Hart 
Publishing, 2005) 
Shatter A., Shatter's Family Law, 4th ed., (Butterworths, 1997) 
Slaughter A.M., A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2009) 
Smits J.M., “European Private Law: A Plea for a Spontaneous Legal Order” in Curtin 
D.M., Smits J.M., Klip A. and McCahery J.A., European Integration and Law; Four 
Contributions on the Interplay between European Integration and European and National Law to 
Celebrate the 25th Anniversary of Maastricht University’s Faculty of Law (2006): 55-107 
Smits J.M., “Private Law and Fundamental Rights: A Sceptical View” in Barkhuysen 
T. and Lindenbergh S. (eds.), Constitutionalisation of Private Law (Brill, 2006) 
  
265 
Stalford H., Children and the European Union. Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Hart 
Publishing, 2012) 
Stein T., “The Notion of the Term Family on European Level with a Focus on the 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Justice”, in Verbeke A.L. et al. (eds.), Confronting the Frontiers of Family and Succession Law. 
Liber Amicorum Walter Pintens (Intersentia 2012). 
Von Savigny F.K., and Holloway W., System of the Modern Roman Law (Madras: J. 
Higginbotham, 1867) 
Watson A., Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (University of Georgia 
Press, 1974)  
Journal Articles 
Abrams K., and Brooks P., “Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the 
Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation”, Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, Vol. 21, No. 
1, (2009) 
Amram D., “Homosexuality and Child Custody through the Lenses of Law: Between 
Tradition and Fundamental Rights”, Electronic Journal Of Comparative Law, Vol. 15, 
(December 2011): 1   
Azoulai L., “The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy: The Emergence of 
an Ideal and the Conditions for its Realization”, Common Market Law Review Vol. 45, 
No. 5, (October, 2008) 
Azoulai L., “Comment on the Ruiz Zambrano judgment: a genuine European 
integration”, (March, 2011), available at, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/ 
Baraldi, M.B., “Different Families, Same Rights? Freedom and Justice in the EU: 
Implications of the Hague Programme for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
Families and their Children”, ILGA Europe (2007) 
Barnett R.E., “A Consent Theory of Contract”, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1986) 
Becker G. and Lewis H., “On the Interaction between Quantity and Quality of 
Children”, Journal of Political Economy 81 (1973) 279-288 
Bertelsmann K., “Who’s Afraid of the European Court of Justice? A Guide to the 
Preliminary Reference Procedure for National Courts”, European Anti-Discrimination 
Law Review, Issue No. 2, (October 2005) 
Bradley D., “Convergence in Family Law: Mirrors, Transplants and Political 
Economy”, Oxford University Comparative Law Forum 2 (2001) 
  
266 
Bulvinante I., “Union Citizenship and its Role in the Free Movement of Persons 
Regimes”, 5 Web JCLI (2003) 
Busnelli F.D., “La famiglia e l’arcipelagofamiliare”, Rivista di dirittocivile (2002)  
Cambien N., “Case C-127/08, Blaise, Baheten, Metock and Others v Minister for 
Justice”, Equality and Law Reform, Colum. J. Eur. L. 15 (2009): 321   
Caruso D., “Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization”, 38 N.Y.U. J. 
Int’l L.& Pol. (2007) 
Closa C., “The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union”, CMLRev. 
29 (1992): 1137 
Cohen M., “The Basis of Contract”, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 575 (1933) 
Comandé G., “Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation: ‘Insights’ for a (Non) 
Zero Sum Game”, Opinio Juris In Comparatione, 2 (2010):1-39 
Conneely S., “Researching the Irish Family Mediation Service: Women in 
Mediation”, 5(2) IJFL 10, (2002) 
Costello C., “Metock: Free movement and “Normal Family Life” in the Union”, 
Common Market Law Review 46 (2009): 587-662 
Davies J., “Entrenchment of New Governance in Consumer Policy Formulation: A 
Platform for European Consumer Citizenship Practice?”  Journal of Consumer Policy 32 
(2009): 245-267 
Deakin S., “The Changing Concept of ‘Employer’ in Labour Law”, 30 Indust.L.J. 72 
(2001) 
Douglas-Scott A., “A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing 
European Human Rights Acquis” 42, Common Market Law Review, Issue 3 (2006): 629-
665 
Eriksson A., “European Court of Justice: Broadening the Scope of European Non 
Discrimination Law”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 7 (2009) 
Erickson A. L., “Coverture and Capitalism”, History Workshop Journal 59 (2005): 9 
Everson M. and Joerges C., “Consumer Citizenship in Postnational Constellations?” EUI 
Working Papers, LAW No. 47 (2006) 
Fahey E., “Going Back to Basics: Re-Embracing the Fundamentals of the Free 
Movement of Persons in Metock”, (2009) available online at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371516 
  
267 
Farrar J. and Atiyah P. S., “The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract,” British Journal 
of Law and Society 8, No. 2 (1981): 277  
Finch N., “Family Policy in the UK, Welfare Policy and Employment In The Context 
Of Family Change”, Social Policy Research Unit, University of York. 
Fischer-Lescano A., & Teubner G., “Regime-Collision: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law”, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 999 (2004)  
Gerencser A.E., “Family Mediation: Screening for Domestic Abuse”, 23 Fla St U L 
Rev 43 (1995) 
Giorgi F. and Triart N., “National Judges, Community Judges: Invitation to Journey 
through the Looking Glass–On the Need for Jurisdictions to Rethink the Inter-
Systemic Relations Beyond the Hierarchical Principle”, European Law Journal, Vol. 14, 
No. 6 (2008) 
Halley J., “What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I,” Yale Journal of Law & the 
Humanities 23, No. 1 (May 8, 2013) 
Halley J., “What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II,” Yale Journal of Law & the 
Humanities 23, No. 2 (May 8, 2013). 
Halley J. and Rittich K., “Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: 
Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism. Introduction 
to the Special Issue on Comparative Family Law”, The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 58, No. 4 (October 1, 2010): 753–75 
Harding A., “Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South East Asia” The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 51, No. 1 (January, 2002): 35- 53  
Hayek,“Competition as a Discovery Procedure” The Quarterly Journal of Austrian 
Economics Vol. 5, No. 3 (Fall 2002): 9-23 
Hesselink M.W., “A Toolbox for European Judges”, European Law Journal 17(4) (2011): 
441-469  
Hesselink M.W., “European Contract Law: A Matter of Consumer Protection, 
Citizenship, or Justice?” European Review of Private Law, 15(3) (2007): 323-348 
Héritier F., “Quel Sens Donner aux Notions de Couple et de Mariage? A la Lumiere 
de L'antropologie”, Information Sociales No. 122 (2005): 6-15 
Herzog R., and Gerken L., “Stop the European Court of Justice”, available at 
http://euobserver.com/9/26714/?rk=1  
Hurwitz B., “Learning from Primary Care Malpractice: Past, Present and Future”, 
QualSaf Health Care 13 (2004) 90-91 
  
268 
Jacobs F.G., “Citizenship of the European Union-A Legal Analysis”, European Law 
Journal, Vol. 13, No. 5 (September, 2007): 591–610 
Jemolo C.A., “La Famiglia e Ildiritto”, in Ann. Sen. Giur. Università di Catania, III 
(1948)  
Kahn-Freund O., “On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law”, Modern Law Review 
Vol. 37, No. 1 (1974) 
Kennedy D., “Savigny’s Family/Patrimony Distinction and its Place in the Global 
Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought”, 58 American Journal of Comparative Law 811 
(2011) 
Kennedy D., “From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon 
Fuller’s Consideration and Form”, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 94 (2000) 
Kiernan K., “The Diversity Initiative–Welcoming the Diversity of Family Life in 
Ireland’, Submission to Department of Social & Family Affairs on the Proposed 
‘Strategy for Strengthening Families” (2004) 
Kilkelly U., “The right to respect for private and family life: A guide to the 
implementation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Human 
Rights Handbook, No. 1” (2003) 
Kochenov D., “Citizenship without Respect: The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal”, 
Jean Monnet Working Papers 8 (2010), available at, 
<http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/10/100801.html> 
Kochenov D., ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult 
Relationship between Status and Rights”, Columbia Journal of European Law (2009). 
Laffan B., “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe”, 34 J. Common 
Market Studies 81, 83 (1996) 
Lando O., “Can Europe Build Unity of Civil Law Whilst Respecting Diversity?” 
Europa e Diritto Privato (2006) 
Legrand P., “Against a European Civil Code”, 60, Modern Law Review (1997): 44 
Legrand P., “The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants””, 4 Maastricht Journal of 
European & Comparative Law 111 (1997) 
Legrand P., “European Legal Systems are not Converging”, 45 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (1996): 52 
Lo Scalzo A, Donatini A, Orzella L, Cicchetti A, Profili S, Maresso A. Italy: Health 
system review. Health Systems in Transition (2009): 13  
MacCormick N., “Beyond the Sovereign State”, Modern Law Review 56 (1993): 1-18  
  
269 
Mack K., “Alternative Dispute Resolution and Access to Justice for Women”, 17 Adel 
LR 123 (1995) 
Mak C., “The on and the many: Translating insights from constitutional pluralism to 
European contract law theory”, European Review of Private Law 21(5/6) (2013): 1189-
1210  
Mak C., “Europe-Building through private law. Lessons from Constitutional 
Theory” in S. Grundmann (ed.), Seminar 'Private law and nationalism' organised by the CESL 
on 3 February 2012 in Amsterdam Vol. 8/3. European Review of Contract Law (De Gruyter, 
2012): 326-341 
Mak C., “Hedgehogs in Luxembourg? A Dworkinian Reading of the CJEU’s Case 
Law on Principles of Private and Some Doubts of the Fox” European Review of Private 
Law 20(2) (2012): 323-345 
Maduro M.P., “Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of 
Constitutional Pluralism”, European Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2007) 
Mattei U., “Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law” 42 am j 
comp l 195 (1994) 
Micklitz H.W. and European University Institute, "A Self-Sufficient European Private Law: 
A Viable Concept?" EUI Working Papers, 2012/31 (European University Institute, 
2012)  
Micklitz H.W. and European University Institute, "The Visible Hand of European 
Regulatory Private Law: Thetransformation of European Private Law from Autonomy to 
Functionalism in Competition and Regulation", EUI Working Papers 2008/14 (European 
University Institute, 2008)  
Muldrew C., ‘“A Mutual Assent of her Mind”? Women, Debt, Litigation and 
Contract in Early Modern England”, History Workshop Journal 55 (2003): 49 
Mueller-Freienfels W., “The Emergence of Droit de Famille and Familienrecht in 
Continental Europe and the Introduction of Family Law in England”, Journal of Family 
History, Vol. 28, No. 1, (2003): 31-32  
Mueller-Freienfels W., “The Unification of Family Law”, American Journal of 
Comparative Law 16 (1968)  
Nicola F.G., “Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law” 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 
777 (2010): 787 
O’Leary S., “Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union Citizenship” 24 ELRev 
68 (1999) 
O’Leary S., “Nationality Law and Community Citizenship: A tale of Two Uneasy 
Bedfellows” YBEL12 (1992): 353 
  
270 
O'Connell, H., “‘A Raking Pot of Tea’: Consumption And Excess In Early 
Nineteenth-Century Ireland,” Literature and History 21(2) (2012): 32-47 
Olsen F.E., “The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,” 
Harvard Law Review 96, no. 7 (May 1, 1983): 1497–1578 
O’Neill P. and Sandler S.R., “The EU Citizenship Acquis and the Court of Justice: 
Citizenship Vigilante or Merely Vigilant Treaty Guardian?”, 7 Rich J. Global L. & Bus 
(2008): 205 
Pollicino O., “Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of the Principle 
of Equality between Judicial Activism and Self-Restraint”, German Law Journal Vol. 5, 
No. 3, (2004) 
Prechal S., “Equality of Treatment, Non Discrimination and Social Policy 
Achievements in Three Themes”, Common Market Law Review 41 (2004): 533-551 
Prechal S. and Masselot, “Legal Impact Assessment of the Equality Directives, A 
Report to the Commission”, Tilburg/Leeds (2003) 
Ronfani P., Il Diritto e le Nuove Famiglie: Una Lettura Sociologica di un Rapporto Complesso, 
Min. e giust., Rome, 2, (2008): 13-26 
Ryan F.W., “Marriage at the Boundaries of Gender: The Transsexual Dilemma 
Resolved?” Irish Journal of Family Law, 1(2004) 
Ryan F. W., “Sexuality, Ideology and the Legal Construction of Family: Fitzpatrick v 
Sterling Housing Association”, 3 Irish Journal of Family Law (2000) 
Sacco R., “Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law” 37 Am J 
Comp L 1, 240 (1991) 
Safjan M., “Between Mangold and Omega: Fundamental Rights versus 
Constitutional Identity”, (2012) 3 Il diritto dell'Unione europea 442-449. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity, European Political 
Science Review 1/2, 2009,173-204 
Scharpf, Fritz W., The Asymmetry of European Integration, or why the EU cannot 
be a social market economy, in Socio-Economic Review (2010) 8/2, 211-250. 
Scott C., “’Transnational Law’ as Proto‐Concept: Three Conceptions”, German Law 
Journal Vol. 10, No. 7 (2009): 877 
Shaw J., “European Citizenship: The IGC and Beyond European Integration” online 
paper Vol. 1  No. 3 (1997) 
Skevik, A. “Children of the Welfare State: Individuals with Entitlements, or Hidden in 
the Family?” Jnl Soc. Pol. 32.3 (2003): 423–440 
  
271 
Slaughter A.M., “Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and 
Disaggregated Democracy” Harvard Law School Public Law Working Paper No. 18. 
Smits J.M., “Law Making in the European Union: On Globalization and Contract 
Law in Divergent Legal Cultures”, Louisiana Law Review 67.4 (2007): 1181-1203 
Teubner G., “Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends 
Up in New Divergences” 61 Modern Law Review 12 (1998) 
Teubner G., “Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law”, 17 Law and Society 
Review (1983): 239-285 
Timothy G.W. and Jochen S., “Incentives that Saved Lives: Government Regulation 
of Accident Insurance Associations in Germany, 1884-1914” Yale University Economic 
Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 1013; Yale Economics Department Working Paper 
No. 104. (August 9, 2012) 
Toggenburg G. N., “LGBT go Luxembourg: on the stance of Lesbian Gay Bisexual 
and Transgender Rights before the European Court of Justice” (Judgment in the Case 
C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, CJEU April 
1, 2008) European Law Reporter 5 (2008) 
Tridimas T., “Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance 
in the Preliminary reference Procedure”, Common Market Law Review, 40: 9.50, (2003) 
Tridimas G. and Tridimas T., “National Courts and the European Court of Justice: A 
Public Choice Analysis of the Preliminary Reference Procedure”, International Review of 
Law and Economics, 24, (2004): 125-145 
Van Elsuwege P. and Kochenov D., “On the Limits of Judicial Intervention: EU 
Citizenship and Family Reunification Rights”, European Journal of Migration and Law 4 
(2011): 443 
Waldman E.A., “What Do We Tell the Children?”, Capital University Law Review, Vol. 
35, No. 2. (2006) 
Weiler J., “To be a European Citizen–Eros and Civilisation” Madision Working 
Paper Series in European Studies 41-42 (1998) 
White G.E., “From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social 
Change in Early Twentieth-Century America”, 58 Va. L. Rev. 999 (1972) 
Wilhelmsson T., “Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract Law”, European Law 
Journal 10(6) (2004): 712 
Wollenschlager, F., “A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: 
Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European 
Integration”, European Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1, (January, 2011): 1-34 
  
272 
Case Law 
Court of Justice of the European Union 
Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Case C/413/99 
Bettray v Staatssecretaris van Justice, 1989, Case C-344/87 
Bidar v London Borough of Ealing, Case C-209/03 
Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Case C-127/08 
Boukhalfa v BRD, Case C-214/85 
Carlos Garcia Avello v Étatbelge, Case C-148/02 
Carpenterv Secretary of State for the Home Department, Case C-60/00 
Centrum voorgelijkheid van kansen en voorracismbestrijding v Firma Feryn NV, Case C-54/07 
Chen and Zhu v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Case C-200/02 
Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom, Application No. 28957/95 
Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Case C-138/02 
Deutsche Telekom, Case C-50/96 
D’Hoop v Office Nationale de l’Emploi, Case C-224/98 
Erich Stauder v City of Ulm, Case C-29/69 
Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich, Case C-
112/00 
Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEM), Case C-34/09 
Grunkin-Paul v StandesamtNiebull, Case C-353/06 
Grzelczyk v Centre public d-aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-a-Neuve, Case C-184/99 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 
Case C-11/70 
James Wood v Fonds de garantie des victimes des actes de terrorisme et d’autres infractions, Case C-
164/07 
  
273 
J. McB. v L. E., Case C-400/10 
Johannes van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijsverenigingvoor de Metaalnijverheid, 1974, Case 
33/74 
Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig und Landratsamt Calw Ordnungsamt, Case C-168/91 
Laval, Case C-3341/05 
London Borough of Harrow v Nimco Hassan Ibrahim and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Case C-310/08 
Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro 1984, Case 286/82 and 26/83 
Maria Teixeira v London Borough of Lambeth and Secretary  of State for the Home Department, 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Case C-480/08 
Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, Case C-85/96 
Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Case C-127/08 
Netherlands v Reed, Case C-59/85 
Office national de l’emploi v Ioannis Ioannidis, Case C-258/04 
Omega Spielhallen – und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürger-Meisterin der Bundesstadt 
Bonn, Case C-36/02 
Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I-05769, par. 38, Case C-540/03   
R v Immigarions Appeal Tribunal ex parte Antonissen1991, Case C-292/89 
Rhimou Chakroun v Minister van BuitenlandeseZaken, Case C-578/08 
Roca Alvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA, Case C-104/09 
Seda Kucukdeveci v Swedex, Case C-555/07 
Shingara v Radiom, Case -65 and 111/95 
Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul v Leonhard Matthias Grunkin-Paul and Standesamt Stadt 
Niebüll, Case C-353/06 
Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, Case C-267/06 
Viking, Case C-438/05 
Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, Case C-144/04 
  
274 
European Court of Human Rights 
Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v United Kingdom, Application Nos. 9214/80; 9473/81; 
9474/81 
Andrle v the Czech Republic, Application No. 6268/08 
Berrehab v The Netherlands Application No. 10730/84 
Boughanemi v France, Application No. 22070/93 
Cusan and Fazzo v Italy, Application No. 77/07 
Fawsie v Greece, Application No. 40080/07 
Guichard v France, Application No. 56838/00 
Guillot v France, Application No. 22500/93 
Khan v United Kingdom, Application No. 47486/06 
Labassee v France Application No. 65941/11 
Lebbink v Netherlands, App. No. 45582/99 
Marckx v Belgium, application No. 6833/74 
Mennesson v France Application No. 65192/11 
Muñoz Díaz v Spain, Application No. 49151/07 
Nuutinen v Finland, Application No. 45830/99 
Saidoun v Greece, Application No. 40083/07 
Schalk and Kopf v Austria, Application No. 30141/04 
Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey, Application No. 3976/05 
Sterjna v Finland, Application No. 18131/91 
Tyrer v The United Kingdom, Application No. 5856/72 
X and Y v the Netherlands, Application No. 8978/80 
X, Y and Z v The United Kingdom, Application No. 21830/93 
  
275 
National 
Chappell v. Trent, 19 S.E. 314, 338 (1893) 
Corte Costituzionale, ord. 15 April 2010, n. 138 
Dalrymple v. Dalrymple(1811) 2M Hag. Con.54, (1814) 2 Hag. Con. 137n. 
Duncan v Cumming 1714 5 Broun’s Supplement 104 
EM (Lebanon) [2008] UKHL 6, [2009] 1 AC 1198 
G v An Bord Uchtala (1980) IR 32 
Fajujonu v Minister for Justice (1990) IR 151; (1990) ILRM 234 
Farquar v Murray, 3F, 859-64 
Forster v. Forster (1864) 33 L.J.C.P. 150 
Hogg v. Gow May 27, 1812, F.C 
H.P. Bulmer Ltd v J. Bollinger SA [1974] 
Hyde v. Hyde (1866) L.R. 1 P & D 130 
In the Matter of Choo Eng Choon, Deceased (1908) 12 SSLR 120 
L. and O. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (2003) IESC 1 
Mc D. v L. &Anor(2009) IESC 81 
Mc D. v L. &Anor (2008) IEHC 96 
McGee v. The Attorney General (1974) IR 28 
McGeever v McFarlane (1951) 67 Sh Ct Rep 48 
McGuire v McGuire ,157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953) 
Murphy v. Attorney General [1982] IR 241 
North Western Health Board v HW and CW (2001) 3 IR 622 
R (on the application of E) (Respondent) v Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions Appeal Panel 
of JFS and others (United Synagogue) (Appellants), [2009] UKSC 15 
R v Willans (1856) 3 Ky 16 
  
276 
Ryan v The Attorney General (1965) IR, 294, 350 
The State (Nicolaou) v AnBordUchtala (1966) IR 567 
WO’R & EH v An Bord Uchtala (1996) 2 IR 248, 286 
 
 
